






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Vol. I
No. 1

Philosophical Monographs

January, 1908
Whole No. 36

THE
Psychological Review

EDITED BY

J. MARK BALDWIN
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

HOWARD C. WARREN
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

AND

CHARLES H. JUDD
YALE UNIVERSITY
(*Editor of the Psychological Monographs*)

THE JOHNS HOPKINS STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND
PSYCHOLOGY. No. 1

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE:
ITS NATURE AND FUNCTION IN EPISTEMOLOGY

BY

WILLIAM DAVIS FURRY, Ph.D.

Henry E. Johnston, Jr., Scholar in the Johns Hopkins University

THE REVIEW PUBLISHING CO.
BALTIMORE, MD.

AGENTS: G. E. STECHERT & CO., LONDON (2 Star Yard, Carey St., W. C.);
LEIPZIG (Hospital St., 10); PARIS (76 rue de Rennes);
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INTRODUCTION¹

That the epistemological problem is the most urgent in current philosophical discussion is to be inferred from the introduction into the more complete works of Logic and Metaphysics of topics that directly pertain to neither. The preliminary discussions found in such works as Bradley's, Bosanquet's, and Sigwart's Logic are not however psychological precisely, neither are they to be regarded as an indication that Psychology is becoming sufficiently ample in its programme to include what previously was regarded as subject-matter of more or less independent philosophical disciplines. The introductory chapters in the works thus named are rather epistemological than psychological. Paulsen is historically justified in holding that Epistemology arises always as a critical reflection on Metaphysics with which it is, at the first, identified. From Kant and Locke until now the conviction has been growing that *knowing* precedes *being*, so that the priority which Metaphysics so long held should be given to Epistemology. The limitations as well as the possibilities of human knowledge are to be sought within the knowing process rather than in some already determined objective existence.

Since the time of Locke and Kant, epistemological inquiry has been increasingly to the fore. There was 'constant whetting of the knife' until the time of Lotze, who felt that the whetting process should end and an actual theory of the object of knowledge established. But despite the constant whetting of the knife the conviction will not down that the whetting has not yet been sufficiently done.

Both Kant and Locke were embarrassed by metaphysical presuppositions in assuming an existence falling beyond the

¹ This Introduction, while intended to define the epistemological problem, serves also in a measure as a summary of the writer's position. The detailed references to the authorities mentioned will be found in the later more extended passages of the essay.

limits of thought. The objective, as determined apart from the knowing process, held the determining rôle in thought, and continued so to do until the idealistic reaction of the Post-Kantians. The attempt was then made to establish the object of knowledge wholly in terms of the subject. Self-consciousness was held to be the sole condition of knowledge. Experience was regarded as the realization of a single, spiritual principle, while the successive modes in the development of knowledge were regarded as the specific ways in which this one principle embodies itself. The unity of experience, which had hitherto been sought beyond experience, was disclosed in the evolution of the self. The object of knowledge becomes thus intimately related to the subject that has it as object.

With Hegel the self came to be identified with reflective thought. Reality came also to be identified with thought, since being which should fall beyond the process of thought would be the same as the non-existent. The distinction of subject and object as the necessary condition of knowledge at any stage of the development of thought, is a distinction of mind from itself and finds its completion when mind becomes conscious that the distinction is of its own making. Nevertheless, the object of knowledge to be vital and fruitful, must be more than is already given in thought. The self is not furthered by merely revolving its own perfections. If the object is not more than the subject, thought as judgment, becomes both meaningless and useless. This position is also expressed in the view of Lotze that 'reality is richer than thought', and in the statement of Bradley that 'knowledge is unequal to reality.' All these expressions are based upon the conviction that thought must somehow refer to a real beyond itself. Thought, therefore, remains dualistic despite the attempted identification of its two aspects in terms of rational thought.

Kant also found that thought as such is dualistic and so concluded that "beyond the bounds of knowledge there is a sphere of faith." But what thought could not do, Kant thought the moral consciousness able to accomplish. The Voluntarists, including the Pragmatists of the present time, seek in turn to

make the will the explaining principle of the mind and the sole organ of reality. But Kant found that the moralistic position is also dualistic since the will cannot reduce the subject-matter of thought. Every genuine act of will involves a struggle upon the part of the subject toward its object, which is not, as yet, an actual possession. The object of the will, as also the object of thought, must represent an 'other' as a larger and more complete experience, in which the dualistic character of will is to be transcended by being absorbed in a more complete experience.

The dualisms of both the theoretical and the practical, bequeathed to modern philosophy by Kant, constitute under one form of statement or another, the epistemological problem of current discussion. Defined as the dualism of mind and body, it is sufficient to indicate that it cannot be solved by reducing either term of the dualism to the other. This means necessarily the loss of the meaning attaching to the one, without a corresponding increase of meaning attaching to the other. Both terms of the dualism have come to represent definite types of meaning and any attempt at a solution of the problem thus set by ignoring either type of meaning is already doomed. The inability of any one of the more modern attempts to solve the epistemological problem is to be found in the fact that these several attempts have either minimized or wholly ignored one or the other of these types of meaning. That mind cannot be reduced to body is evidenced by the fact that Materialism represents a passing philosophy. The rapid spread of idealistic philosophy in our day shows also how easily the metaphysical doctrine of the unreality of things visible and tangible can be popularized. Paulsen is abundantly justified in his characterization of modern philosophy as tending toward idealism. The inability, however, of either of these two general types of philosophy to satisfy the mind indicates that the solution of the epistemological problem has not only not been adequately achieved, but that such solution can be attained only by reaching a farther meaning in which both types of meaning are merged in a single unitary mode of experience.

The dualistic character of the epistemological consciousness is generally recognized in current discussion. The dual-

ism is, however, no longer regarded as a datum of immediate experience, but rather an experience into which consciousness develops. The epistemological consciousness must therefore be treated genetically and while affirming the position of St. George Mivart that "Epistemology is a product of mental maturity both racial and individual," likewise the position of Ormond that "the distinction of subject and object is fundamental to Epistemology" and still further the position of Professor Baldwin that, "it is only when the mode of reflection has been reached, in which the subject takes the objective point of view, that the knower becomes an Epistemologist," we shall maintain in the present discussion that the epistemological consciousness of reflection, with its characteristic problem of unification and completion, has been reached only when consciousness has passed through a series of earlier dualistic experiences, in each of which the epistemological problem presented itself. No one mode of the development of thought is to be taken exclusively as containing the explanation of the whole, but all forms of knowledge are to be considered. Taking this point of view, it at once occurs to us that it is necessary to widen the generally accepted notion of the nature of the epistemological consciousness and the problem which it presents.

Upon analysis, thought is found to involve always the presence and operation of two moments, which in reflective thought are recognized as 'content' and 'control.' The programme of a Genetic Epistemology would be the tracing of the development of thought both in the individual and in the race with respect to the increasing determinateness of these two aspects. Hegel's *Phänomologie des Geistes*, represents an attempt in this direction but lacks the psychological point of view requisite to the genetic method. Baldwin's *Thought and Things* is the most complete and satisfactory attempt yet made to treat knowledge genetically.

In the light of such a method of treatment of the development of thought it is seen that thought has reached the dualism of reflective experience only by passing through a series of earlier dualistic experiences, at each of which a higher mode of conscious determination was made possible by the establish-

ing of a more comprehensive and complete experience. Each successive mode of mental determination is made possible and necessary by the presence in consciousness of partial and fragmentary meanings. Thought, as Bradley discerns, is always incomplete and must, for the sake of its own completion, be absorbed in a fuller experience. The Voluntarists also find the ideas, as internal meaning, finite and fragmentary, and this necessitates an external meaning as an 'other' and more complete and all-inclusive experience. Both the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists agree that thought and will seek an object in which both alike are to be completed. But such completion is necessarily a further experience. To attempt to solve the epistemological problem presented at any stage of its genetic development by a return to genetically earlier experience means a mutilation of the system of meanings already acquired, while the resulting constructions become more or less empty postulates.

Despite the increased discussion of the epistemological problem in modern philosophical inquiry, one seeks in vain for a definite statement of the problem itself. According to Bradley it is the problem of "forming the general idea of an absolute experience in which all phenomenal distinctions are merged—a unity which transcends and yet contains every manifold appearance in an immediate, self-dependent and all-inclusive individual." For Bosanquet, it is the "work of intellectually constituting a totality which we call the real world." With Royce, who proceeds from the more active aspect of consciousness, and makes will rather than thought the explaining principle of the mind and the organ of reality, the epistemological problem presented by the subject-object dualism of reflective experience is the "transcending of the subjective by the process of completely embodying, in individual form and in final fulfilment, the internal meaning of finite ideas." The Pragmatists finally, by subordinating the theoretical to the practical, thus identifying the true and the good, attempt to solve the problem by reinstating a form of experience in which stimulus and response, as the two aspects of the life of action, regain their old-time immediacy. Group-

ing the Pragmatists with the Voluntarists, it is to be said that they, together with the Intellectualists, represent the two current types of epistemological theory, while both alike reach the conclusion that the epistemological problem is the setting up of a larger and more complete experience in which the limitations alike of thought and will are overcome.

Defining the progress of cognition again as an increasing determinateness of the two aspects, content and control, the limitation of each of the two preceding types of epistemological theory becomes evident. Each proceeds by attempting to make the one or the other of the two aspects of thought an *imperium in imperio*, and both reach the common conclusion that either of these two aspects cannot interpret the whole of experience. Assuming that reflective thought involves the subject-object dualism, the Intellectualists attempt to reconcile the dualism thus presented by an exclusive emphasis upon the side of the object as a related content. The control aspect, according to Bradley is "something necessary, but still *per accidens*. And as thought can not make phenomena, it contents itself without them and is therefore symbolic and not existential." Whatever form and structure the content, of knowledge may come to show are dependent upon the laws of thought. The control aspect, however, retains its primitive value and validity, while the presented contents, as the result of a process of increasing contextuation, become but sublimated symbols of the reality which they once constituted. The dualism of the intellectualists represents the presence and conflict of two sorts of experience, one immediate, characterized by lack of reference beyond mere psychic existence, and the other mediate, characterized by the relational and discursive character of thought. The epistemological problem is occasioned by the conflict of these two types of experience, a conflict arising only when reflection is reached, and finds its solution, for the time being, by a process of making thought merely psychic, thus identifying the mediate with the primitive immediacy. Bradley is at pains to indicate, however, that the conflict between these two types of experience is due to the presence of reflective thought, rather than the reverse, as the Voluntarists and Pragmatists are today insisting.

The latter, as representing a second type of epistemological theory, seek to overcome the dualistic character of reflective experience by placing almost exclusive emphasis upon the control aspect of thought, inwardly or subjectively interpreted. The object of thought, they hold, must represent the expression and embodiment of the subject as the inner organizing, determining principle of knowledge. The object of knowledge is what it is only because the subject means it as its own object. Ideas as content of thought are acts of will as well as acts of cognition, and the object of thought is but the embodiment and fulfilment of an exclusive act of will or purpose. The subject of knowledge can acknowledge no object other than those of its own determination. What therefore the content of thought is, as well as the relational character which characterizes it, is determined solely in terms of the *will* as the controlling and organizing moment of experience.

But it is found that both types of epistemological theory are inadequate, in that each finds meanings which it is not able to reduce in terms of its explaining principle. The Intellectualists find with Bradley that thought can never harmonize its own content, meaning that thought as such can never transcend the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what' as the two aspects of thought. The more complete thought becomes as a relational system the deeper and broader becomes the dualism. To attain reality as the object of thought, meaning an experience in which these two aspects of thought are reconciled, means necessarily breaking with thought, so that the conclusion is reached in the present discussion that reality, as a unified experience, becomes for the Intellectualists an a-logical and mystical postulate.

The Voluntarists likewise find that will, as the controlling and organizing aspect of thought, is also dualistic, since it is unable to reduce the subject-matter of reflective thought. To reduce the true to the good, as for instance Professor James does in his recent lectures on *Pragmatism*, only shifts the emphasis of the dualism. The dualism remains as one of end or good and fact, together with the epistemological problem of its reconciliation. Will can not harmonize its content with the

data of thought, and the attempt to solve the epistemological problem thus presented by making the will all-sufficient by reaching a 'volitional immediacy' in which *the will wills only its own will*, is to set up an a-volitional postulate which is also mystical.

The final outcome of these two types of epistemological theory is closely identical, in that both alike reach an absolute experience which, as the completion alike of the finite and fragmentary character of thought and will, 'is not anything but sentient experience.' Such is the necessary outcome of any epistemological theory which proceeds by ignoring either of the two aspects of thought. The strength of each type of theory however represents the weakness of the other. The farther the Voluntarist pushes his programme, the more he reveals the need of thought as lending value and meaning to the life of will. Whatever meaning is found attaching to the practical life is borrowed from reflective and rational experience. The fact is that, if the will were able to will itself, to operate as it were in a void, occasion for an act of will would never arise. Professor Royce is quite right in holding that the active life is motived by the finite and fragmentary character of finite ideas. But a farther experience, in which present experience as limited and incomplete is made more complete, can not be reached by reverting to an earlier more immediate mode; the absolute experience must represent fulfilment, not destruction. And likewise, the farther the Intellectualist extends his programme, the more is felt the need of bringing thought into more fruitful relations with the more active and selective aspects of experience. Thought as such is pale and as it were removed from the concrete character of life as actually lived. It only "formulates and duplicates, divides and recombines that fullness of reality which is had directly and at first hand in sense experience." Bradley recognizes the static character of reflective thought, but is unable to avoid this outcome. The Voluntarists, with Professor Royce, also appreciate that the dualistic character of reflective experience can be transcended only in a fuller and richer embodiment of whatever meanings consciousness already has. Neither type of theory can limit

itself to its own programme because each proceeds by abstracting one of the two essential aspects of knowledge.

These criticisms suggest that, if knowledge is to escape from the *cul-de-sac* in which reflective experience involves it, it can do so only in some mode of experience in which the two aspects of thought, content and control, with whatever meanings attach to them, are brought together in some larger whole. The determination of such a mode of experience represents the epistemological problem *par excellence*. Such experience will be in type neither purely rational and static nor wholly volitional and dynamic; it must be a mode in which, as Professor Baldwin says, "experience can find its dynamics intelligible and can act upon its static meanings as immediate and dynamic satisfactions."

The burden of the present discussion is that the aesthetic experience represents a mode of conscious determination in which the two aspects of thought are recognized and reconciled by the rise of a new mode of immediate experience.

The essential character of this type of experience is the 'semblant' treatment of meanings already present for the sake of further meaning as fulfilling personal purposes. By this method of treating meanings already present as having a further meaning, using present meanings as schemata for more complete meanings, consciousness completes the otherwise incomplete and fragmentary character of its present store. The epistemological problem of the Intellectualists is precisely the problem of setting up of an 'other' as a richer experience in which thought as incomplete might complete itself. On the other hand the epistemological problem of the Voluntarists is that of discounting a future experience which, as external meaning, completely embodies the otherwise finite and fragmentary character of finite ideas. Both alike hold that the experience in which thought and will are completed is a state of immediacy in which both theoretical and practical interests are wholly satisfied. But each type of theory, failing to recognize the mediatory rôle of the semblant treatment of an already guaranteed content, has to fall back on a mode of reality beyond its own monistic postulate, thus hugging to itself a mass of ill-gotten gain.

In the present discussion it is shown that the æsthetic arises with the epistemological alike in the race and in the individual; that the æsthetic experience has passed through a series of stages of development at each of which it reflects the epistemological problem then present and crying for solution. Upon analysis, the æsthetic experience at each of these several stages is found to possess precisely those characteristics which enable it to reduce the several meanings which neither thought nor will can of itself reduce. As Kant long ago perceived, neither the theoretical nor the practical reason can heal the wound that reflection makes. The need is for a type of interest *sui generis*; and this is what we find the æsthetic interest to be. It represents a treatment of meanings already acquired for the sake of the further meaning that inspires them, the process of reaching a complete experience—an ideal whole—through the schematic treatment of earlier partial experiences of thought and will. The object thus constructed is held up and treated as being what it is not and as being everything save precisely what in its concrete isolation it is. It sets up the 'other' of thought as a further meaning which while not realized, can nevertheless be treated 'as if it were.' The object of thought thus constructed does not break with experience, since it represents a more complete experience. There is a focusing of the two aspects of thought by a process of detachment from the original spheres in which they hold as mediate experiences, by the setting up of a larger whole of experience in which both aspects become moments in what is immediate.

The æsthetic experience thus represents the expression of an interest which is neither theoretical nor practical. Because of this, it is fitted to reconcile and unify these two types of interest. It is true, as Professor Tufts contends, that the æsthetic did not arise to satisfy an already existing sense of the beautiful; but to identify it with either of the two recognized types of interest means to reduce the æsthetic to the limitations from which it seeks to disengage them. The point to be insisted upon in the present discussion is the fact that the æsthetic can not be reduced to any form of mediate experience, without at once bringing about its own destruction; this qualifies it as a mode of experi-

ence in which these several mediate types are reconciled and the entire psychic function furthered.

Defining genetic epistemology as the tracing out of the development of thought with reference to the increasing determinateness of its two aspects of content and control, and defining the epistemological problem as that of the furthering of these two aspects without the sacrifice of either, by the establishing of a more complete experience in a new and higher immediacy which in turn becomes the platform for still higher reaches of thought; and further defining the æsthetic experience as a mode of conscious determination in which the guaranteed meanings of consciousness are mediated with reference to a further and ideal experience—an experience whose value lies, as Professor Baldwin says “in discounting in advance any new demands for mediation which new dualism may make,” the epistemological function of the æsthetic at once becomes evident. The ‘absolute’ experience is thus reached. It is not a formal and static experience, such as the Intellectualists reach, nor is it a blind and meaningless dynamic as the Voluntarists teach; but it is rather an experience which is richer and completer than either thought or will or both together, since it represents an experience in which the ‘genetic dynamogenies as well as the static dualisms are mediated.’¹

¹ Baldwin, *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. IV, No. 4, April, 1907; see also *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, Appendix, II. My indebtedness to Professor Baldwin, both with respect to general ideas and to details, will be evident to the reader. I wish especially to acknowledge the use of material from his unpublished lectures on the nature and rôle of the æsthetic.

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE: ITS NATURE AND FUNCTION IN EPISTEMOLOGY.

PART I. EXPOSITORY.

CHAPTER I.

The First Immediacy as Illustrating an A-dualistic Consciousness and as being Pre-epistemological and Pre-aesthetic.

Mr. A. E. Taylor has pointed out that the character of experience for the metaphysician is its immediacy, meaning that character of experience in which existence and content considered as the two aspects of reflective thought are not separated in consciousness. Such immediacy, he proceeds to say, may be due to the absence of reflective analysis of the given content into its constituent aspects, or it may be due to fusion, at a higher level, into a single directly apprehended whole, of the results won by the processes of abstraction and analysis. There is, he concludes, an immediacy which is below reflective thought, as well as an immediacy which is above it. It is with what Mr. Taylor calls the immediacy below reflection that we have to do in the present chapter.¹

That consciousness, alike in the individual and the race, is, in its first appearance, immediate in the sense of being a-dualistic, is a conclusion by no means peculiar to Mr. Taylor. Psychologists and anthropologists alike hold, that consciousness, in its first appearance, is undifferentiated and protoplasmic, the 'big, booming confusion' of James, the 'undifferentiated continuum' of Ward, and the 'relatively pure objectivity' of Baldwin. These several writers agree in holding that primitive consciousness is a-dualistic in the sense, that there is present in consciousness no distinction between given data and the resulting constructed meanings. "The child" as James says, "does not see light, but is light." To open the eyes is precisely seeing. There is no reference of presentations to the external

¹ A. E. Taylor, *Metaphysics*, p. 32.

world since at this stage of conscious development there is no distinction made between content and other things. "There was a time" says Bradley, "when the separation of the outer world as a thing apart from our feelings had not even begun."¹ And again he says, "in the beginning there is nothing beyond what is presented; what is, is felt, or is rather felt simply. There is no memory or imagination or fear or thought or will and no perception of likeness or difference. There are in short no relations and no feelings but only feeling. In all one blue with differences which work and are felt, but are not discriminated."² A more recent description of this first immediacy is given by Professor James under the caption 'Pure Experience.' "Pure experience" he says, "is the name which I give to the original flux of life before reflection has categorized it. Only newborn babes and persons in semicoma from sleep, drugs, illnesses or blows can have an experience pure in the literal sense of a *that* which is not yet any definite *what*, though ready to be all sorts of *whats*. . . . Pure experience in this state is but another name for feeling or sensation. But the flux of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with emphases and these to become identified and fixed and abstracted; so that experience now flows as if shot through with adjectives and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions. Its purity is only a relative term meaning the proportional amount of sensation which it still embodies. . . . In all this the continuities and discontinuities are absolutely co-ordinate matters of immediate feeling."³

It is assumed, therefore, that within this first immediacy the distinctions characteristic of reflective thought are not present. To be in consciousness and to be apprehended are identical and it is a matter of no difference whether we speak of this *feeling* or feeling *this*. The first immediacy represents a totality or continuum holding wholly within its own grasp. Whatever the object may come to be, it does so through the process in

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 261.

² *Mind*, O. S. Vol. XII, p. 343. Cf. also Bradley, *Principles of Logic*, p. 457.

³ Quoted by Prof. Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 25.

which it arises. There is no distinction, within this early consciousness, between an object and our perceiving it, and the resulting construction represents the unity of the object in perception. The knower and his world stand upon the same basis of reality in undisturbed feeling. Any particular form of sense-experience is but a modification of the undifferentiated sensory continuum. As yet there are no distinct forms for the different senses and whatever of discreteness or discontinuity or variety may be found within this early experience must be sought for on the side of the sensory content. This content both stimulates the active processes of the individual and serves as a center around which these processes gather. Things and not isolated sensations thus come to be the first results reached by consciousness and while in this first experience there is no distinction to be drawn between things and thought, things are nevertheless to be regarded as having the unity of objects in perception. Whatever the presented object comes to be it represents thus an immediate unity of consciousness.

Emphasis is laid upon this first immediacy of consciousness in the present discussion since, by almost universal agreement, it is regarded as the type of consciousness in which we are brought into closest contact with what later becomes the coefficient of reality. Present-day metaphysicians are almost unanimous in maintaining that reality as an absolute experience is realized only in some form of immediacy of consciousness. Bradley explicitly holds that reality is a matter of immediate experience and his further characterization of such immediacy as a state of 'sheer sentience,' as a state of undifferentiated feeling, identifies his absolute experience with this first immediacy of consciousness. 'The will-to-believe' of Professor James and the 'volitional immediacy' of Professor Royce must be interpreted in a similar way.

Whether this first immediacy of consciousness be identified with reality as an absolute experience and all else made phenomenal, or used only as a type of experience in which reality is actually given, the fact remains that the analysis of this a-dualistic consciousness has been motivated by certain metaphysical presuppositions. Assuming that reality can be given

only in an immediacy of consciousness and assuming still further that this immediacy is due to the absolute simplicity of the primitive consciousness, metaphysicians at once proceed to analyze this first immediacy. As a result three types of epistemological theory have been brought forward in modern discussion, viz., the Intellectualistic, the Affectivistic and the Voluntaristic, each attempting to make some one aspect of developed consciousness the explaining principle of conscious development as well as the sole organ of reality.

Each of these three types of epistemological theory proceeds upon the assumption that consciousness is, in its primitive stage, wholly simple, in the sense that only one of the later aspects is present. Experience thus comes to be regarded as the realization of some one principle, that is, in other words, each stage of conscious experience is but the embodiment in a specific mode of this one principle and these successive modes in the actualization of this one principle differ only in the way in which it is embodied. Mental development thus becomes the necessary evolution, through various modes, of a single principle. Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* represents an attempt in this direction in assuming rationality as the explaining principle of the mind, while Herbert Spencer's *Synthetic Philosophy* represents a similar attempt, although in a wholly antipodal way. The more modern movement in philosophy generally known as 'Pragmatism,' with its characteristic interpretation of experience solely in terms of the practical and the identifying of the true and the beautiful with the good, is to be regarded not only as a revolt from Hegel and Green but also as an attempt to make *will* the explaining principle of mental development and the organ of reality.¹

From an analytical point of view, however, the simplicity of the first immediacy of consciousness is relative only. Every presentation is also a determination. From the beginning consciousness is active and constructive. "The so-called immediate intuition," says Green, "has content only in so far as it

¹ See James, *Pragmatism*, p. 76, and also Miss Adams, *The Aesthetic Experience*.

is not merely presentative.”¹ Consciousness is never purely a-noetic. Every ‘that’ is also a ‘what.’ What the presented content is determined to be depends upon the active, dispositional tendencies of the individual. To make these tendencies absorb the whole of the presented content would make impossible the later dualisms of thought, while to make the presented object the determining factor, as the empirical school in general did, would create an absolute *impasse* in knowledge. Both factors are present and operative and the significance of the first immediacy is that it represents a stage of experience in which these two aspects of all thought are held together. It is a psychological truism to-day that nothing can be in consciousness except what consciousness puts in. The unity, however, of this early consciousness is not a unity won from a disturbed situation, but the unity of a consciousness that has not lost its original wholeness. The experience is one in which there are no spheres of reference and control, since the later distinctions of self and not-self, and inner and outer, are not present.²

From such interpretation of the rise of consciousness there can arise no absolute *impasse* in knowledge. While as yet there is no distinction of means and end, of interest and datum, it is nevertheless true that the affective-conative dispositions seize and determine the presented content in congruity with themselves. Whatever conflicts may arise between these two factors in this primitive experience they can be said to be resolved by the processes creating them. It is precisely here that we are to seek for the rise of the aesthetic experience, whose function in the development of thought is the burden of the present inquiry. The unity of the first immediacy of consciousness represents the merging of the two aspects of thought which are not as yet distinguished within consciousness. There is no justification for regarding the first immediacy of consciousness as absolutely simple in character, nor for identifying it with either of the aspects of reflective thought. What we are to assume at the outset, is not the duality of subject and object,

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 48 (2d ed.).

² R. Adamson, *The Development of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 198.

but rather their unity. The real problem here, is not as to the character of the dualism of the perceiver and the perceived, but rather, as to the kind of unity that precedes them. This unity, from the present point of view, is to be regarded as the outcome of the activity of the perceiving subject and not the unity given it from without, which is the error of the dualistic theory of knowledge, nor wholly made by itself, which represents the error of subjective idealism. Confessing our own guilt of the 'psychologist's fallacy' but which fallacy, after all, becomes the only guide of the metaphysician (Ormond), it is to be concluded, that the unity of the first immediacy represents a unity of the active, constructive processes of the individual.¹ The thing perceived is the content of the act of perceiving, while the processes of perceiving are realized in the thing perceived. The relation between the two factors is not that between static entities, each fixed and complete, but a relation of 'togetherness' which, from a higher analytical point of view, represents a sort of universalization of an otherwise heterogeneous and meaningless content. The content of the object of perception thus becomes a related content, but in this early stage of conscious development, neither the object nor the relationships establishing it, are distinguished. The content of perception, when viewed from without, consists essentially of separable and distinguishable units; but consciousness in its first immediacy gets no such separable and distinguishable units, but things, 'projects,' which embody the unity of the primitive consciousness.

Of this early consciousness, before distinctions arise between content and control, it is to be said that, it acts in its entirety upon whatever content may be presented. There is as yet no manipulation of means with reference to a particular end, since these two aspects of thought are not held apart, but we have rather what Professor Ormond calls 'spontaneity of will-effort' which is selective and constructive without prior interest and purpose. Borrowing Professor Baldwin's formula of attention, $\text{Attention} = A, a, \alpha$, (in which A stands for the gross general activities of the attentive process, a the special class of

¹ Baldwin, *Mental Development*, p. 286 (2d ed.).

motor reactions attaching to classes of experiences and α the finer adjustments within a)¹ it is at once to be seen that the attentive processes of the first immediacy are confined to the element A . The control of the object is thus direct and immediate, because consciousness being a -dualistic, the process of determination and construction of the object is a self-contained process. The resulting construction thus holds true of the whole of experience and represents, therefore, a quasi-generalization. This, I take it, is precisely what Professor Baldwin has in view in speaking of these projective constructions as 'concepts of the first degree'² and Royce as 'vague universals.' All things are in this sense universal in this first immediacy, since not only is there no distinction between content and control, but even the content functions only as a whole. The unity of consciousness within this early stage may be said to be due to the fact that the affective-conative tendencies as the control factor seize, envelope and determine the situation as a whole. The resulting construction represents a 'projectification' of consciousness in all that it can apprehend. The whole of whatever meaning is possible to consciousness as yet a -dualistic is given adequate rendering. From the psychic point of view we are to regard the control of this early experience as being 'autonomic' in character. The unity thus preserved between these two factors of primitive thought is rather functional in character, in the sense that the self is not distinguished from the inner dispositional processes, thus illustrating the general conclusion of modern psychology, that within primitive experience, motor adjustment is the measure and test of mental unity.

It is also to be pointed out that, within this first immediacy of consciousness, the distinction of individual and social does not arise. The life of the individual is largely one of group maintenance, and custom, fixed and specific, determines conduct. Education in primitive societies is largely a matter of handing

¹ *Mental Development*, pp. 313.

² See Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I., whose terminology is followed in the present discussion. In the last edition of *Mental Development* (1906), Professor Baldwin applies the term 'Schematic Generals' to these first projective constructions.

down traditions. The exclusiveness of primitive society and the more or less constancy of the environment supplied both a common content and common control, while both were held in an undisturbed unity. The resulting constructions are thus common in character, but since the aspect of commonness is not psychic to the individual, it is rather to be regarded as 'aggregate.' No personality as such attaches to the constructions of this early experience and they are, therefore, to be regarded as anonymous as well as autonomous and collective in character. Thus the successful construction of a presented content makes possible communication with others and not vice versa as the Pragmatists contend. Moreover, the objectivity which attaches to the projects of the first immediacy, is not the result of their being communicable to others, but rather, they are common possessions precisely because of their being objective.

In conclusion it is to be said that the significance of this first immediacy of consciousness is, that it represents a stage of mental development, in which the several aspects of thought, while present and operative, are not distinguished, while the projects, as the resulting constructions, represent attempts at the maintaining of the equilibrium of stimulus and response, control and content, by reducing all presented content to terms of the inner dispositional tendencies. If, therefore, we define experience to mean the essential unity of subject and object, and further define such unity as the ideal toward which experience moves, it becomes evident that, in this first immediacy, we have to do with the first of the stages in this development.

Within the first immediacy, however, are found the materials and motives of its own polarization. Characteristic responses fail to bring the accustomed satisfaction and situations are constantly arising which put to confusion all earlier motor accommodations. Varied experiences with objects already familiar break down the equilibrium of stimulus and response. Thus while the object remains one, responses to it tend to multiply. The child's world as one of chance and change, creates at once the necessity and opportunity of thought. New presentations gain upon the individual's store of motor adjustments. Means

and end thus fall apart in consciousness and the need arises of a method whereby they may be brought together. Interest, which at the first is embodied in the affective-conative dispositions of the individual, which are not held apart in consciousness from the presented content, may make either of these two aspects of thought its objective, so that we have what Professor Baldwin has named the interest of habit and the interest of accommodation.¹ Each represents a form of control and the operation of the two forms of control in the presence of a common content, constitutes the dualism, whose reconciliation becomes the problem always of a dualistic experience. The epistemological problem arises only with the dualizing of consciousness, and its solution waits upon the setting up of a complete experience, which, at once explains and completes an experience otherwise fragmentary—the setting up of a whole which is not conditioned and controlled by its relations to other things, but is determined and complete within itself.

The employment of images to meet the demands of situations other than those in which they were originally given, tends to separate the images from the process in which they are contained. The memory image, as one bearing the coefficients of successful conversion back into the original experience, becomes distinguished from the images of fancy, which no longer possess conversion value. In a measure it is to be said, that fancy represents the freedom of memory run riot; it is, indeed, what Amiel has called it, 'La dimanche de la pensée.' But yet it seeks to be a-dualistic since while memory objects have no existence apart from immediate consciousness but find their sphere of reference beyond themselves, the images of fancy represent, by a complete removal of all external control, a return to an immediacy of consciousness. No distinction is made in fancy between the images wholly fugitive and fleeting, that is, wholly detached from their suggested termini or end-states, and the treatment given them in consciousness. As contrasted with the memory images, however, the dualism of inner and outer reference maintains itself.

¹ Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology, Feeling and Will*, ch. vii.

The significance of the fancy consciousness in the present connection is, that it represents the setting up of a world in which consciousness can move freely, freed from the hard facts of the world of sense-experience and the limitations of memory. Judged in the light of memory, the fancy constructions are worthless, but they nevertheless possess positive value in sundering the two aspects of thought as well as supplying tractable material upon which consciousness can exercise its dawning sense of agency and control.

But fancy is not creative. We are to distinguish between the reproductive imagination and the imagination proper. Ribot fails to make this distinction in his otherwise valuable work entitled, *Essay on the Creative Imagination*. In a general way it is to be said, that fancy represents the objectification of consciousness with complete spontaneity. The fancies of the individual, like the unreflective myths of his primitive ancestors, are embodiments of an a-dualistic consciousness, thus comprehensive and for the time sufficient for all things. "This," as Sully says, "is the happy age of childhood when a new and wondrous world created by a lively phantasy (fancy) rivals in brightness, in distinctness of detail, aye in brightness too, the nearest spaces of the world on which the bodily eye looks out before reflection has begun to draw a hard dividing line between the domain of historical truth and fiction."¹

Thus the first immediacy, despite its apparent all-sufficiency, carries with it its own instability. The complete swing from memory to fancy makes necessary a return movement. Fancy errs by its own defect and possesses contrast value only. The complete detachment of fancy, however, constitutes it a world apart. As peculiarly inner, it comes to have a persistence and value peculiar to itself. Consciousness is now beset by rival claims and the evident need is a completed experience which finds its control wholly within itself. It is precisely here that the epistemological problem arises for the first time, which finds its solution in the 'semblant' consciousness, to the study of which the next chapter is given.

¹ Sully, *Studies in Childhood*, p. 82.

CHAPTER II.

The Second Immediacy or 'Semblant' Consciousness, as the Merging of Dualistic or Mediate Controls.

From the standpoint of reflective thought, the development of cognition is to be defined as an increasing determinateness of its two factors, content and control.¹ The first immediacy was treated in the preceding chapter, as illustrating a mode in the development of cognition in which the two aspects of thought, while present and operative, were not held apart in consciousness. Within such mode of consciousness, undetermined presence was given all objects. Presentation and determination, content and control, interest and datum, were held in the most perfect equilibrium. Reality was a matter of pure feeling, while the attitude of consciousness toward the object constructed was one of 'presumption.'²

But, within the first immediacy were found the motives and the materials of its own polarization. Making the stimulus, rather than the response, the determining factor in the construction of sense objects, it is to be said further, that the breaking down of the original immediacy was due to the presence of changing stimulations. Memory objects are valuable only in so far as they bring sense confirmation and dispositional tendencies are recognized apart from their accustomed responses, only when they fail to reach their accustomed end-state. The presence of objects which resist immediate treatment, as well as the irregular behavior of persons, contribute also to the isolation of the inner as a world in itself. In general it may be said that the presence of the new and the failure of the old, contribute to the sundering of the two aspects of knowledge, which until now, were held in an equilibrium more or less stable. Moreover, the

¹ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, *Intr.*; reprinted in *Psychological Review*, Vol. XIII, No. 6, 1906.

² Baldwin (unpublished lectures).

individual's own body has long been the seat of certain definite experiences of 'storm and stress,' which, as being beyond his immediate control, come also to be regarded as ambiguous. Thus far it is to be said that the inner is such, as Professor Baldwin has pointed out, simply because it is not outer.¹ The outcome of the several movements already indicated, is the gradual formation of a sphere of images possessing a certain stability and character of its own. Unlike memory, however, the inner, as such, lacks all reference beyond itself and does not lead to anything beyond the process in which it is contained.² As thus separated from the outer as held in the net of memory the inner possesses as yet only the characteristics attaching to the images lying outside the established forms of control.

As the result of the element of detachment attaching to the memory object, both memory images and fancies come to be regarded as inner, in the sense of falling within the body of the individual. But the body is the starting place of the child's life of exploration and discovery. He has already learned that, by manipulating his members certain satisfactions are to be had. The child early imitates and strangely enough, as Professor Baldwin has shown, he begins by imitating persons. By this means, what was at first projective to him in the conduct of persons, comes to be associated with his own inner life. Imitation thus becomes the method of treatment whereby content hitherto untractable and capricious is carried over into the life of the individual. As the result of the absorption of what was at the first outer by the process of imitation, the inner is no longer regarded as made up alone of images that have lost all positive value, but is now recognized as being whatever lends itself to imitative treatment. Imitation, which is at first organic in character, comes to be applied to the whole inner content as detached from the external, and comes to be treated with reference to the fulfillment of inner purpose. It is evident, that with this separation of the images as content available for inner treatment, apart from its actual control in the outer, and with the

¹ *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, pp. 90 sq.

² *Ibid.*

adoption of imitation as the method of selection and reduction, knowledge has entered upon a higher mode of determination. Following the usage of Professor Baldwin we shall speak of this mode as the 'lower semblant' in which, by the merging of two sorts of control, consciousness regains a new and higher immediacy.

The Characteristics of the Semblant Consciousness.

The works of Groos,¹ Lloyd Morgan² and Professor Baldwin³ in connecting the aesthetic with the play consciousness, have opened a new epoch in the study of aesthetics, while the epistemological value assigned the aesthetic consciousness in Professor Baldwin's *Thought and Things*, supplies an adequate motive of aesthetic construction. The conviction is general that the aesthetic consciousness has not arisen to satisfy an already existing sense of the beautiful.⁴ This leaves open the question of the motive of the rise of the aesthetic, which in the present essay, is found within the general problem of knowledge.

It is quite evident, however, that the rôle assigned the aesthetic consciousness in the development of knowledge, depends wholly upon the characteristics found attaching to it. The conviction has long held that play is in some way a natural phenomenon of the mental life of the individual, while the closeness of its connection with art has been explicitly recognized since Schiller. We are not concerned with its biological and psychological value in the present discussion but rather with its epistemological value as coming in between the image and the reflective modes of consciousness, and thus standing mid-way between the first immediacy which is below reflection and the higher which extends above it.

According to Herr Groos the several theories of play may be

¹ *The Play of Animals and The Play of Man* (Eng. trans.).

² *Animal Behaviour*.

³ *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 148, ff., etc.

⁴ See Tufts, 'The Genesis of the Aesthetic Categories,' *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, Vol. III.

reduced to two: the first, dating back to Schiller and brought forward in more recent times by Herbert Spencer, has been most adequately defined by Wallaschek. "The surplus vigor in more highly developed organisms, exceeding what is required for immediate need, in which play of all kinds takes its rise, manifesting itself by way of imitation or repetition of all efforts and exertions essential to the support of the organism."¹ Play thus arises only when an excess store of energy has accrued to the organism and so has only a negative value to the organism, while art, as associated with play, comes to be regarded as a useless luxury—a sort of by-product—possessing no direct utility whatever for the life of mind or body. Professors Groos and Baldwin have pointed out certain facts that tell conclusively against the 'surplus-energy' theory, and the theory proposed in its stead corrects the limitations of the former theory and exhibits the real value of play. Limiting ourselves in the present connection to the epistemological value of play, it is said, subject to further elucidation, that the individual must be playful to be anything more. The several writers on the subject of play already referred to, have laid stress upon play as a sort of practice of what the organism already has for the sake of its retention and advancement. Professor Baldwin has shown that the method may be used for the advancement of the mental life as well as the physical and social. The several characteristics of the semblant or play consciousness treated in the present connection are selected with reference to the emergence of the epistemological consciousness and to the use made of the aesthetic, or semblant consciousness, as the organ of immediacy through a merging of two sorts of control.

(1) *The Content of the Lower Semblant or Play Consciousness.*

The inner-outer dualism, whose reconciliation becomes the epistemological problem of the semblant consciousness, is found to be a dualism falling within the field of images. Both the images of fancy and the images of memory are now inner, in the sense that they are alike materials for imitative treatment. To this

¹ *The Origin of Music.* Quoted by Lloyd Morgan in *Animal Behaviour*.

entire psychic field the imitative method is applied, with the result that the two types of images are redistributed and the images of fancy, lacking the coefficients of memory which justify their reference to a determined sphere, retreat again into the germinating sphere of the subject to which all else is object. The dualism is thus between two classes of objects, only one of which finds a determined sphere of reference and the epistemological problem is the erecting of a sphere of reference in which the two types of images are unified. Images, as Professor Baldwin has shown, are inner only because they are not outer. Lacking the coefficients of memory which justify and guarantee whatever use is made of them, the images of fancy are not available for imitative treatment. They lack the persistence and representing character attaching to the memory images and consequently have no reference apart from the process in which they occur. Having thus no field of reference, the images of fancy, might, like the stream, go on forever, but their flow would be aimless and meaningless. To have meaning and validity there must be some reference to a sphere of determined existence in which they hold true.

But only that which already possesses some determination as holding within a definite sphere of existence can be 'sembléd.' That which lacks determination altogether is not imitable. The defect of the fancies was their elusiveness. They err by defect.¹ But the images of memory are also found to be insufficient in the light of the demands of an increasing experience. From an analytical point of view it is to be seen, that we are in the presence of a real dualism and one which can not be transcended by ignoring either of its two poles. It is precisely here that we are to find the value and function of the semblant consciousness as the organ of reconciliation and unity. Since memory as the sole sphere of reference and control has proven itself limited, in the sense that it can not meet the demands of changed and changing experiences, and since the images of fancy functioning as a demand for unity and congruity have no field of reference whatever, a field of reference must be established in which the demands

¹ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 90.

alike of each are met and reconciled. But such sphere can be erected only as a projection from a sphere of reference and control already established, hence only the images of memory as held under definite coefficients of control are available for semblant construction. A further meaning is to be reached only by a reading forward of the present meaning, which is at once the function and value of the 'sembling' process. The absolute experience, at any mode of its genetic development, is but a projection of whatever meanings consciousness has at the time in question. To extend experience is not to break with experience, and if reality is to be immediate, it must needs be an immediacy which completes and merges all present meanings and interests.

To limit the semblant construction to the images of fancy would at once rob it of all variety and meaning and reduce it to a sort of empty immediacy, of which illustrations are not lacking in the history of epistemological theory. On the other hand, to limit the semblant to the memory images alone, would yield only a world of discrete and quantitative determination. But by an inner imitation of meanings already guaranteed, both aspects of the dualistic experience are at once recognized and reconciled. The semblant consciousness thus stands as a protest against any one-sided procedure and meets the several demands of increasing thought, by treating meanings already established as 'schemata' for the sake of further meaning, which while not as yet possessed, is nevertheless treated and accepted as already established. The reality-feeling, characteristic of the first immediacy, due to the immediate unity of the two aspects of the constructive process and which was lost in the mediate control of memory, is again possessed in the 'make-believe' character of the semblant.

(2) *The Control in the 'Semblant' Consciousness.*

Defining the development of knowledge as the increasing determinateness of its two aspects, content and control, the semblant consciousness, as a process of inner imitation, under the urgency of purpose selective of contents already established, is to be regarded as the first appearance of a relatively free sub-

jective control. Within the first immediacy no distinction was made between these two aspects of thought and the unity is to be regarded as a 'projection' embodying the affective-dispositional tendencies. Presentations were determined wholly in terms of what consciousness then possessed. From the vantage ground of reflection it is to be said, that consciousness, during its first immediacy, defined its world in terms of undifferentiated feeling.¹ It is further to be said, that within such consciousness, the emphasis is to be given rather to the subjective aspect. From the standpoint of the individual the process is 'autonomic,' since both aspects of thought are as yet involved in a psychic whole, while from the objective point of view the process is 'foreign,' in the sense that the presented object is the determining factor of the process. These two factors were detached in memory, but the mediate character of the control of memory shows that consciousness is yet a-dualistic. Fancy represented the detachment of memory become complete, in that a complete break was made with the outer as the sense-datum. In the semblant consciousness there is a return to the outer, as held in memory, but the return is not complete. The content is accepted as guaranteed by the coefficients of memory, while the control aspect is to be seen in the fact, that the images *are not used for the sake of regaining the original sense-control*. The content, thus guaranteed, is used for the sake of fulfilling inner purposes and thus given a determination which it does not have, but which its control coefficients justify. Consciousness, for the first time stands apart from its content and treats it with reference to its own purposes and demands. The semblant object thus represents an inner construction for inner purposes, but out of materials determined in earlier modes. It is neither a fancy object, nor a transcript of the outer as held in memory, but rather a 'prescript' for the reconciliation and unification of the claims alike of the two aspects of thought now present and operative. In fancy, the control aspect attaching to memory is wholly ignored and while recognized in the semblant is never-

¹ Professor Baldwin's 'Reality-feeling.' See *Handbook of Psychology: Senses and Intellect*, ch. vii.

theless lifted from its regular sphere and carried into another. The content accepted as a 'presumption' in the first immediacy is now carried temporarily to another sphere for the sake of further determination and made an 'assumption,' but an assumption justified by the already present 'presumption.'¹ As in the first immediacy the determination given presented content was regarded as an attempt upon the part of the inner dispositional processes to reduce the presented content into unity with themselves, so the semblant object is to be looked upon as an inner control of content with reference to its own embodiment. In the presence of the conflicting claims and demands of sense and memory, the semblant object, as an inner determination of presented content, restores unity and hence immediacy of consciousness, by merging these several demands into a whole that at once transcends and completes both without ignoring either.

(3) *The Immediacy of the Semblant Consciousness.*

A third aspect of the semblant consciousness is to be inferred from the attitude of consciousness toward the object thus constructed. Primitive consciousness was held to be only relatively simple, and its immediacy represented an equilibrium of the aspects of knowledge later to be distinguished. The determination given was found to be the issue of the affective-volitional tendencies and represented an attempt at a definition of the world in terms of feeling.² In the semblant consciousness the several aspects of thought have fallen asunder and each is present as a sort of demand peculiar to itself. Each of the two characteristics of the semblant already indicated has to do with one of the aspects respectively of the inner-outer dualism of the semblant consciousness. So long as consciousness remains a-dualistic the world of presented content is taken at its face value and 'things are what they seem.' Reality is solely a matter of feeling

¹ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, chap. i, §4. See Bertrand Russell, Meinong's 'Theory of Complexes and Assumptions,' *Mind*, 1904.

² Cf., Reality-feeling: Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology; Feeling and Will*, ch. vii.

or 'presumption,'¹ Both the content and the control aspects were placed upon the same basis of reality. Despite the detachment of the images of memory and their use as possessing conversion value into real facts of the outer world, the aspect of control is mediate, in the sense that it is vested in a content lying outside the control process. Fancies came and went, formed and dissolved, without prior interest or determination upon the part of consciousness. As a result no distinction was made within the field of fancies. But with the isolation of the inner as material available for imitative treatment, differences at once arise within the sphere of images between those that have outer reference and those that do not. The latter, as a sphere of reference, has as yet only negative value, being made up of images that can not be imitatively treated. Every image is determined as belonging to either one of these two spheres, but can not hold in both. In either case, the disposition of the images is through a mediational content, which means that the old-time immediacy is broken down. The obvious need is a sphere of reference in which the common content is treated with reference to the demand of the inner. The significance of the semblant is, that by merging these two aspects of control, it becomes the organ of a new and higher immediacy.

The semblant consciousness has objectivity as the first immediacy also had, but an objectivity secured *by taking over into the inner the outer pole of the inner-outer dualism*. It is in the the semblant, therefore, that we are to find the first instance of a real transcendence upon the part of consciousness, by the erection of a schematic object in which, for the time, its several aspects of control are completely harmonized. Thus consciousness transcends its dualistic experience by erecting an object in which the demand of the inner for unity and of the outer for consistency and meaning are merged in a new mode of control, which in turn becomes the organ of immediacy of the two aspects of knowledge. The semblant consciousness is immediate in character, an experience in which existence and content, interest and datum are merged into a common unity of reference

¹ Ibid.

and control. In the case of the first immediacy, such unity was secured and held in the absence of reflective analysis of the given into its characteristic aspects. In other terms, the first immediacy represents a rendering of the whole of consciousness, in its as yet unbroken unity, while of the semblant consciousness, it may be said that, it represents an experience in which the several aspects of thought are again merged in a complete and self-sustained whole.

(4) '*Syndoxic*' Character of Semblant Constructions.

The three aspects of the semblant consciousness thus far considered will later be found to be precisely the three criteria demanded by the several attempts at a solution of the epistemological problem of reflective thought, as well as the three aspects of the aesthetic experience *par excellence*. But there is another aspect of the semblant consciousness, viz., its 'commonness,' which is also a characteristic of both the reflective and the aesthetic experience. It has already been pointed out, that the 'projective' constructions of the first immediacy were 'aggregate,' that is, common to the group but not recognized as such by the individual. The anonymous character of the unreflective myth has often been noted but not as yet explained. No inquiry is raised as to the author of myths and fancies, still their value is not lessened in finding them both anonymous and collective.

Professor Baldwin has shown, that memory shows a form of 'secondary' conversion which is essentially social in character.¹ He has also pointed out how the individual in play comes to submit his creations to others for confirmation. The material thus entering into the semblant constructions is already under social guarantees and is selected because of its common character, while the images of fancy, as being purely private—rein innerlich—are at one relegated to the limbo of the illusory and meaningless. The semblant construction thus becomes an object for general acceptance. It carries with it a demand for general recognition. It is precisely here that we are to seek for the aspect of "shareableness" and 'universality' which attaches

¹ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 144ff.

to play and art alike. While the play object may be recognized by a few only, it nevertheless carries with it that common aspect which makes it hold for all competent observers. The objective character of the semblant object, like the projective character of the myths and fancies of the first immediacy, involves the aspect of commonness. It is precisely here that we are to seek for the normative and universal character of the semblant object.

It is very generally recognized in present-day aesthetic discussion, that the aesthetic consciousness has arisen from motives other than a pre-existing love of beauty. The determination of the motives from whence it has arisen remains as yet an open problem. Professor Tufts, of the University of Chicago, holds that we are to seek for the motives of the aesthetic in the field of social psychology. But Professor Tufts leaves open a still larger problem as to what makes social progress and intercourse possible. In the present discussion, following the conclusions of Professor Baldwin, thought is the matter of the social process and all thought is necessarily common. Accepting this conclusion, we are led to the result, that the motives of the aesthetic consciousness are to be sought in epistemology rather than sociology. At the several stages of the development of the epistemological consciousness the demand arises for an object which is not private, but which appeals to all members of the community. Thus we found that the fancies and myths of the first immediacy were 'aggregate' and non-individual. With the rise of the inner-outer dualism, the need is for an object which at once meets the demands of the individual and at the same time demands general recognition. At each successive mode of determination of thought, the purely private is eliminated and only materials under the test of secondary conversion, that is, tested by means of others, become available for imitative treatment. The problem of knowledge thus becomes not 'How can we think things together,'¹ but rather how can we manipulate an already common content for the effective embodiment of individual meanings and purposes.

¹ James, 'How can we Think Things Together?' *Psychological Review*, Vol. II, pp. 105ff.

It is thus seen that the characteristics of the lower semblant consciousness are precisely those demanded by the epistemological problem of the inner-outer dualism, whence the conclusion, that the two have arisen together, and that the motives and function of the aesthetic are to be found within the epistemological. By merging the two aspects of control issuing respectively from the inner and the outer, the aesthetic becomes the organ of world-unity and world-interpretation. The projects of the first immediacy were found to be 'synergetic' while the semblant objects are to be defined as 'syntelic' or 'contemplative.'¹ They are ideal, in the sense that they are neither pure fancies and thus private and subjective, nor mere transcripts of memory, which is mediate as to its control, but rather as Professor Ormond says a 'prescript' of a world in which the selective and the recognitive are reconciled.²

The semblant object therefore reconciles the inner-outer dualism by merging the two sorts of control issuing respectively from the poles of the dualism. It is neither inner nor outer, but it reconciles and satisfies alike the demands of each. The remote control of memory is, for the time, released. The control of the semblant construction is unique, in the sense, that the material entering into it is lifted, as it were, from its original control and used for personal purposes. The object thus constructed might be real but it is not, though treated 'as if it were.' The 'autotelic' character of the control of the constructions of the first immediacy was found in the fact that these constructions represented an attempt to fashion the presented world in congruous terms but without conscious separation of the factors involved. Interest then meant the whole of the affective-conative dispositions. But with the bifurcation of consciousness, interest may be directed either toward the content as held in memory, or to the control which is not yet able to function in its own name. But the very fact of the rise of the semblant object is indicative of a form of interest which does not terminate with the already guaranteed content of memory. It is precisely

¹ Baldwin, Unpublished Lectures.

² *Foundations of Knowledge*, ch. ix.

here that we are to seek the rise of the semblant as an attempt upon the part of consciousness to give expression and embodiment to the interest which gives it birth. The history of aesthetics would be simply the history of the rise and development of this *sui generis* type of interest. The several historically recognized art-periods of the world reflect the successive stages of the embodiment of the self. Within the first immediacy there is to be found what Vignoli has called "the objectification of the self in all the phenomena it can perceive."¹ But in the second immediacy, realized in the semblant consciousness, there is the fusion of two possible controls. Consciousness is now possessed of spheres of reference, only one of which, memory, is under its own characteristic coefficients of control. From this sphere the material of the semblant construction is drawn since it always gets its materials from the already established. But this material, as already established, is used in the semblant consciousness for the sake of a more complete embodiment of the self, which is accomplished by the self giving it a meaning of its own and not one guaranteed through something else. The 'reality-feeling' of the first immediacy which is lost in the mediate character of memory, is again reached in the 'make-believe' construction of the semblant construction. The self becomes one with its object in a new and higher immediacy. By a process of '*Einfühling*,' a reading of itself into the object, it completes itself, by setting up an experience in which all motives and controls are merged. The external world as held in memory is held up and treated schematically for the sake of further meaning. The aesthetic experience, at whatever stage of its development, is therefore an ideal experience in the sense that it does not mediate the original control. Its meaning is an *imported* meaning and comes *directly* rather than through something else. The control of the construction is not completely born of the self since the inner is yet lacking in determination. The semblant consciousness is, therefore, to be regarded as quasi-epistemological and the semblant construction in which new and higher immediacy is reached as quasi-aesthetic.

¹ Vignoli, *Science and Myth*.

CHAPTER III.

The Mediate and Dualistic Character of Reflective Thought as the Outcome of the Lower Semblant and the Prelude to the Higher Semblant or Aesthetic Consciousness.

The epistemological consciousness is dualistic.¹ To know implies and involves a knower as well as something known. Current epistemological discussion recognizes the subject-object dualism as the fundamental characteristic of thought. Inquiry as to the origin, nature and validity of knowledge arise only with the distinction of these two factors involved in every conscious construction. Paulsen is justified in the conclusion that since epistemological discussion arose as critical inquiry upon metaphysics, it arose late in the history of thought.² But it would not be true to say that epistemological inquiry was not present at a much earlier date than Locke's *Essay* and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is neither a matter of chance, nor arbitrary procedure, that modern philosophical discussion has gathered about epistemological, rather than metaphysical inquiries. Theory of knowing rather than theory of being is now to the fore. If epistemological inquiry did not arise as an independent discipline until the latter half of the eighteenth century, it was not due to an absence of the necessary motives and materials at an earlier period. The fact rather is, that epistemological inquiries were present long before the name, and the more exact statement of the problem of knowledge in modern times, represents the focusing of a long series of converging motives and materials of an epistemological character.

The epistemological consciousness must be treated genetically rather than transversely.³ It arises with the breaking

¹ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 266, and Vol. II, chaps. xiii-xv; Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 170, 175.

² Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 339.

³ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 12.

down of the first immediacy of consciousness and its problem becomes the erection of an experience in which the dual character of thought is merged and a higher immediacy established. In the preceding chapter it was shown, that the semblant or play consciousness represented the reconciliation and merging of two sorts of control.¹ With the breaking up of the first immediacy, in which content and control were held in a relatively stable equilibrium, memory and fancy stood for two possible ways of treating presented content. Interest, at first identical with the affective-conative dispositions, and unitary, has also been polarized, so it is possible to speak of an interest of a selective as well as interest of a recognitive character. These two types of interest represent two possible attitudes of consciousness toward its own content. The significance of the semblant consciousness was seen in the fact, that it represented the reconciliation of these two forms of interest by setting up of a detached and self-controlled construction.

Before the rise of the semblant, as an inner determination, the inner possessed value only in contrast with the outer. But the semblant, as merging both memory and fancy, is neither a memory object, nor a pure fancy, but in a sense both. The rise and progressive determination of the semblant supply the materials and motives of the substantive dualism of reflection. The sense of agency and control found present in the semblant becomes completely generalized for all content and functions as the presupposition of control. The quasi-logical character of the control of the lower semblant consciousness was found in the fact that the constructive self was still identified with a portion of its content. The epistemological consciousness is reached only when the self as subject is set over against its entire content.

No adequate solution of the epistemological problem is possible so long as the subject is identified with some one of its aspects. With the rise of the mode of reflection, in which the self is set over against the whole of its content, a content inclusive of mind and body, each under its own form of control,

¹ Ibid., p. 119.

the epistemological problem becomes the reconciling of a dualism both terms of which are equally under subjective control. There is no ground whatever for making either mind or body prior in the solution of the problem, since both have arisen together. Either apart from the other represents an abstraction and reality must be inclusive of both. Any form of interactionism makes the problem of knowledge insoluble, while a parallelism of the type that forbids all reconciliation, reduces the epistemologist to the same extremity.

In the preceding chapters the attempt was made to show, that the earlier dualistic experiences were transcended in an imitative treatment by consciousness of the meanings already acquired. The limitation in each instance was found in the fact that the constructive self was identified with one term of the dualism. The semblant consciousness was found to be 'pragmatic' in the character of its control, because the materials of its construction were borrowed from memory. The outer world, as held in the grasp of memory, was as yet the sole sphere of reference and control. But with the rise of the subject-object dualism of reflection, both mind and body are equally objects of thought and available for imitative treatment. *From the genetic point of view, therefore, the epistemological problem of reflection can be solved only by a re-statement of the subject-object dualism for common reflection, which will make possible the transcending and merging of the subject-object dualism. This requires the same process as that by which the earlier dualisms were also transcended and merged.*

Reflective thought is thus dualistic, since the dualism of substances has been redistributed, but has not disappeared. Thought has still to do with two opposed spheres with characteristic forms of control, the one constituting the content and the other the judging self. The conflict here is a dualism of control, both forms of which however, are mediated through a common content, and the solution of the problem waits upon the erection of a field of reference and control in which reality is given immediately, rather than through a mediating content, the erection of an 'absolute experience in which phenomenal dis-

tinctions are merged, a whole become immediate at a higher stage without losing any richness.¹

(1) *Dualistic Character of the Content of Reflection.*

Defining judgment as the acceptance or rejection of materials determined in earlier modes of cognition, the content of the logical mode may be said to be whatever the mind may think about. The whole content of experience, sense objects, memory objects, semblant objects, and even fancy objects are alike objects of thought to the subject which is now set over against all content as the controlling, directing and organizing factor of experience. Self in this sense may think about everything and anything.² But the content of thought is mediate in character, since judgment, as the redistribution of earlier meanings, must of necessity accept its content as held under certain presuppositions of control. Whatever the objects of thought and whatever use may be made of them, the control of the sphere from which they are drawn still holds. Judgment may be selective but is selective of facts only, so that the control of the judgmental process is beyond the judging self. In the Kantian sense, judgment is, therefore, *regulative* rather than *constitutive* of experience. It is precisely here, I think, that we are to seek for the limitation generally recognized as attaching to thought. Thought, as Bradley says, is always desiring another than itself, because its content is always in an incomplete form,³ and it seeks to possess in its object that whole character of which it already owns the separate features. But since such a complete object lies beyond thought, it must remain forever an Other.⁴

(2) *The Dualistic Control of Thought.*

The content of the logical mode thus carries with it certain determinations due to its having a certain 'make-up.' The

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 160.

² Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, pp. 1 and 2.

³ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 180.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

character of such determination reflects the stage of development which the constructive consciousness has reached. The aspect of control, as the second factor of conscious construction, is to be sought for in the process by which presented content is referred to its appropriate sphere of existence and control. The aspect of control, therefore, is, in the logical mode, mediate in the sense that the content is used as holding within a certain sphere of reference. Truth as the outcome of the logical process means precisely reference to a sphere, and thus involves something to which it is true as well as some one to whom it is true.¹ But in judgment these two are never the same, for if they were, judgment would be wholly meaningless. There is, therefore, a real dualism present in judgment, which thought can not of itself transcend. Mr. Bradley is quite right in saying that thought can not, in its actual processes and results, transcend the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what.'² Thought is relational and discursive, meaning that its control falls outside the subject, so that Bradley, and the Intellectualists in general, conclude that the real subject of judgment is *reality*, that is, a fuller experience in which thought is absorbed, the predication of a content consistent with and in entire agreement with the self. The control aspect of thought, like the content aspect, thus points forward to a more complete experience, in which the two aspects are merged and completed. But this represents the epistemological problem of reflective experience.

(3) *The Subject of Thought.*

Within the logical mode arises the distinction between the 'I' and the 'me,' the thinker and the things thought. In our treatment of the two aspects of thought known as content and control, we found that both alike pointed forward to an aspect of the process of thought that was not fully rendered in either of its two factors. It was found that thought as such was unable to get its materials into a harmonious system or to establish a control in which the subject, as the existence factor, and the

¹ See Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, chap. xiii.

² Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, ch. xv.

predicate, as the content factor, were brought together within some immediate experience. As a result of this embarrassment between subject and object, the Intellectualists identify the subject of judgment with reality as such. Mr. Bradley has shown that the thinking self can not be identified with any particular content. Thought thus seems always to be unable to render its own subject. Mr. Bradley appreciates this fact and goes over to what may be called an 'a-logical' experience, meaning an experience in which subject and object are contained in an immediacy of feeling.¹ What Mr. Bradley among the Intellectualists and Professor Royce among the Voluntarists are searching after, is a form of experience in which the self is able to completely embody itself. The problem becomes the further reading of *present* meanings, for the sake of *further* meanings. The function of thought is the employment of already established forms of control for the sake of increase of knowledge; but the problem now becomes the employment of already guaranteed meanings for the sake of control of future experience.²

The epistemological problem thus becomes the problem of erecting an experience in which all partial and fragmentary meanings are made complete and in which the subject finds itself completely reflected. The first immediacy was maintained by the self objectifying itself in all the phenomena it could perceive. Without the distinction of subject and object, consciousness nevertheless maintained its primitive unity and purity by reducing the object to the unity of pure feeling. In the 'make-believe' character of the semblant consciousness we found the merging of two forms of control, by the erection of an object in which the self identified itself with its object. It is therefore to this same mode of conscious construction that we are to turn for a solution of the dualistic experience of reflective thought.

Summing up the discussion thus far made, it is found that within the movements of the logical mode we have found two

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 172.

² See Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, chap. xiv, who distinguishes these two movements as 'knowledge through control' and 'control through knowledge' respectively.

types of meaning which were not only not rendered, but for the rendering of which consciousness within the logical mode was wholly inadequate. In the first place it was found that the thinking self could not be rendered in terms of logical thought and thus remains over as an element of 'intent.' Logical procedure can take place only within a related content. The thinker thus finds himself limited to and conditioned by the material with which he works. His point of view must be retrospective and his judgments must be of the factual type only. The personality of the thinker must be as completely lost as is possible. Formal logic by the use of a series of wholly neutral symbols represents an attempt to eliminate the personal element of thought. In the second place we have found that within the logical mode the control aspect of all thinking remains also unrendered. But we have also found that it was precisely by this means that thought was able to reconcile conflicting controls in earlier experiences and thus reach a platform for higher mental determinations and constructions. The projective constructions of the first immediacy were regarded, from the point of view of the consciousness that had them, as 'presumptions,' while the constructions of the semblant or play consciousness were regarded as 'assumptions.' The attitude of consciousness toward the first type of constructions has been characterized as 'primitive credulity' by Bain and 'reality-feeling' by Baldwin, meaning a sort of naïve acceptance of the object. In the case of play objects, in which the self stands apart from its objective constructions, there is a sort of identification of the self with the object, an acceptance of the object as constructed wholly for inner, personal purposes. Logic is not a matter of variable belief and every precaution is taken to rule out this aspect of thought. But thus far we have seen that consciousness has been able to unify itself and thus reach a platform for higher mental determination only by a reading forward of its present store of meanings and attaching to them meanings which they are not known to possess but accepting them and treating them as if they already possessed the meanings thus attached to them. Belief thus passes into 'faith,' the substance of things held as possible, the acceptance of something as if its reality were already realized.

In addition to these two types of meaning which the logical mode fails to render, Professor Baldwin has pointed out that it fails also to render certain 'singular' meanings. He points out, what is a matter of general recognition, that the singular judgment has been a sort of 'thorn in the flesh' to the logician and the philosopher alike. Traditional logic finds itself wholly unable to exhaust this type of meaning and as a result it is identified in some way with the universal.

The fact appears to be that there are two types of singularity, which Professor Baldwin has named 'essential' and 'imported' singularity, only the latter of which is of concern in the present connection. The first type is 'rendered only in community,'¹ whereas the second gives a judgment not of truth but of descriptive assertion. Its singularity is a matter of selection and appreciation, and thus can not be rendered in logical terms.²

There are therefore three types of meaning not rendered by the developments within the logical mode. Consciousness is again in the presence of a dualistic experience and the epistemological problem of reflection becomes the problem of erecting a whole of experience in which these several meanings are rendered.

The character and place of the ontological problem determine the character and function of the epistemological and the several historic types of reality reflect as well the several types of epistemological theory. Professor Baldwin³ has arranged those several types of theories of knowledge under two general types and his classification is here followed. Both types of theory which he knows respectively as the 'Identity' and the 'Representative' are found to proceed from ontological necessity rather than psychological analysis. Each alike assumes the subject-object dualism as the necessary presupposition of reflective thought and each also attempts to transcend the dualism

¹ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, chap. xiv, §8; and in the article 'Logical Community and the Difference of Discernibles,' *Psychological Review*, Nov., 1907, Prof. Baldwin shows that it is only by generalizing its successive appearances that a singular object can be made matter of judgment.

² Baldwin, loc. cit., Vol. II, chap. xiv, §4.

³ Unpublished Lectures.

thus established by establishing some sort of correspondence between thought and reality.

The Identity theories proceed upon the assumption that thought and its object can not be foreign to each other. The object of thought must necessarily be the product of thought. The dualism must therefore fall within the process which is responsible for its appearance. But since consciousness is recognized as three-sided, we are to expect that each of the aspects of consciousness will be made in turn the organ of knowledge and reality. Accordingly we have with us Intellectualists, Voluntarists, and Mystics or 'Affectivists.' By neglecting the existence aspect of thought, the representatives of an identity theory of knowledge reduce thought and reality to a system of 'implications.' That each is unable to carry itself through, is to be inferred from the fact to be discussed in the following chapter, that each, in the end, arrives at a conception of reality in terms of immediate and undifferentiated feeling.

The value of the identity theory resides in the fact that it represents an attempt to preserve and restore the aesthetic and religious ideas threatened by the attempts of the empiricists and finally destroyed by the materialists. But because the identity theory refuses to accept any object as an item of knowledge which can not be explained by analysis of the subject, it becomes fixed and static and in the end a purely formal discipline.

The representative theory of knowledge arises through a failure of the former type of theories to deal adequately with the more urgent and vital matter of life and experience. The rapid development of empiricism is to be found in its keeping close to experience. The object of thought must be other than thought, in which 'other' thought must find both its motives and sanctions. But in either type of theory reality is given as a fixed system in which, according to the Rationalists, thought must find its law and goal, while according to the Empiricists, thought is true only in so far as it adequately represents a world already organized apart from the knowing mind.

But as in the time of Kant, so also to-day, the conviction is felt that these two types of theory have run themselves out.

The fact that the champions of an identity theory of knowledge find themselves in the presence of an *impasse* which can be bridged only by a denial of the validity of the process by which it is established, reveals both the limitations and the defects of the theory. These writers proceed upon the assumption that reality must be one and immediate, but since thought is mediate in character, reality must, in the end, be gotten in terms of pure feeling. The Voluntarists also recognize the dualistic character of the practical life, but a dualism which conduct, as such, can not transcend, so that the 'other' in terms of which the self completes itself, must be gotten in an immediacy of the will. Thus in an indirect way the outcome of the rationalistic movement has been to arouse and ground the conviction that reality is larger than thought, and that the final interpretation and unification of experience will proceed rather from the affective-volitional aspect of consciousness.

The outcome of the several attempts to establish a representative theory of knowledge has been strikingly similar to that of the former type of theory. Proceeding from an inadequate notion of experience, the Pragmatists, as the avowed empiricists of the present time, find the highest type of thought and reality in undifferentiated and unreflective feeling. The plain man of the street who does not *think* but *knows*, represents the ideal type of thought. Thought arises only with the collapse of habit as an equilibrium of stimulus and response, and reality means simply its successful re-establishment. The upholder of the Identity theory of knowledge found that reality, as the ultimate subject of thought, fell outside the process of thought. The Empiricists, on the contrary, in seeking to emphasize the control aspect of thought, erred in making the empirical occasion the sole cause of thought. The lesson to be derived from the failure of each of these two types of epistemological theory is, that thought can not bring unity and completeness into its content without transcending itself. The epistemological problem thus becomes the problem of transcending the subjective. But the failure alike of each of the two attempts at a solution of the epistemological problem already referred to forbids any further attempt at effecting a solution at the expense of the one or the other of the two aspects of thought.

In the present discussion the term experience is used as applying only to consciousness after the subject-object dualism has been reached. The Rationalists are quite right in holding that experience proper connotes conscious relation to something, that is, the distinction of object, of which the individual is conscious, from the mind which is conscious. Such experience is, however, only of gradual attainment. To identify experience with the first immediacy, in which thought functions as a self-contained whole, and make such experience the type of the ultimate experience, means to reduce the highest conceivable experience to undifferentiated and unrelated feeling. The Pragmatists are also right in the contention that thought is a function within experience, if reflective thought is meant. To identify reality with an immediacy of consciousness can mean only that reality is the highest and most complete type of experience, 'an immediate, self-dependent, all-inclusive individual.'¹ Bradley identifies reality with the Absolute as that which is at once without distinctions and relations. Still later he identifies reality with 'sheer sentience'—a sort of Nirvana in which all the attainments of thought disappear in a life-less immediacy. But to reach such immediacy, the relational side of thought must be merged, since reality can be had only by getting a 'whole which is not anything but sentient experience.'² It is precisely here that Bradley differs from Green, for while the latter would make reality a matter of relations, Bradley would make relations a sort of screen, which thought throws over reality. In the latter case the attaining of reality means the undoing of thought. Thus the 'sheer sentience' of Bradley in which the dualistic character of thought is overcome is an a-logical or mystical experience—a 'consummation of thought in which thought is lost.'

Professor Royce in *The World and the Individual*, reaches a quite similar conclusion while proceeding from the more active aspect of consciousness. According to Professor Royce, reality is that in which the ideas find their complete embodiment and

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 179.

² *Ibid.*, p. 173.

meaning. Every idea, he continues, is as well an act of volition as of cognition, and possesses thus two meanings, an internal and an external, the latter being a sort of projection or a reading forward of the former, a discounting of future experience. The external meaning as the 'other' is that which the internal meaning seeks for its own realization. What is, or what is real, is the complete embodiment in individual form and in final fulfilment of the internal meaning of finite ideas.¹ Truth is no longer a matter of identity of subject and object, nor a more or less adequate representation of an external order of things existing either in the mind of God (Plato) or in the external world (Hobbes), but the conformity of an idea as an internal meaning with its own determined external meaning. "No finite idea can have or conform to any object save what its own meaning determines, or seek any meaning or truth but its own meaning and truth."² "This final embodiment is the ultimate object, and the only genuine object, that any present idea seeks as its Other." In a word, reality thus becomes the fulfilment of purpose.

"By thus distinguishing sharply between the conscious internal meaning of an idea and its apparently external meaning, we get before us" says Professor Royce, "an important way of stating the problem of knowledge or, in other words, the problem of the whole relation between Idea and Being."³

But how can the idea as a cognitive state, possessing only internal meaning, possess itself of an 'other' as an external meaning, as that which is essential to its own completion? Bradley, it will be recalled, was confronted with the same problem and finding that thought as thought is not able to grasp reality sought deliverance in an a-logical state of 'sheer sentience.' Professor Royce, on the other hand, finding that thought can not of itself create ideals, since it has to do with the categories of the true and the false, and holding that reality must necessarily be ideal in the sense of a more complete experience

¹ Royce, *The World and the Individual*, p. 339.

² *Ibid.*, p. 340.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

not as yet realized, finds in the moral consciousness the postulate of reality.

But *will* represents also a mediate form of experience. The object of moral conduct is under foreign control, in the sense that its value is not in itself, but in the end not as yet attained. Will, therefore, like thought, presupposes a reality which transcends it, a reality which it is forever pursuing but is never able to grasp. Professor Royce seeks to avoid the *impasse* into which the Intellectualistic position led him at an earlier period of his philosophic thought, by making reality an act of will, rather than an act of thought. "To be real," he says, "means to express in a final and determinate form the whole meaning and purpose of a system of ideas"¹—"A *totum simul*,—a single, endlessly wealthy experience."²

But Professor Royce nowhere points out the method by which the ideas as internal meanings are able to project a farther experience in which they find their final embodiment. The 'other,' as the object of the life of purpose, can not, in any sense, be foreign to the self. But the fact remains that every genuine act of will is actuated by an unrealized idea, hence the conclusion would seem to follow, that volition as such, can find no place in experience in which the aspects of existence and ideality, of the self that is willing and the object willed, are once for all finally united. Professor Royce appreciates the dualistic character of will, as well as the unitary character of reality, and in the end posits an immediacy of will in which the self identifies itself with the object necessary to its completion.

For both the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists the epistemological problem is the same, the problem of reaching a higher type of meaning in which the body of present partial and fragmentary meanings are explained and completed. Each alike arrives at the conclusion that reality must always contain a further aspect which is neither thought nor will and can not be apprehended under the form of either. Reality therefore can never be precisely what it is for thought or will. Neither proc-

¹ Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Vol. I. p. 545.

² *Ibid.*, p. 546.

ess is complete in itself, whereas reality must be an individual, all-inclusive whole. Lacking a method whereby consciousness can reach further meaning upon the basis of meanings already acquired, both Bradley and Royce find refuge in an immediacy of feeling. But to reach such a conclusion, each breaks with the principle which was made at the outset the explaining principle of the mind and the organ of reality.

In the preceding chapters it has been shown that consciousness is possessed of a method of treatment of its present store of meanings whereby it may be treated with reference to a more complete meaning. The dualism of reflection has been preceded by earlier dualistic experiences in each of which the aesthetic arose as a means of rendering content as a complete whole. In the discussion of the logical mode we have found three types of meaning left over after thought had exhausted itself, hence a dualism remains upon our hands. Bradley is quite right in holding that thought can not get its content into a harmonious system.¹ Volition necessarily carries with it the same limitation. Truth and good alike are under mediate control and are general, whereas reality is immediate and individual. But these are precisely the characteristics we found attaching to the semblant consciousness in its earlier modes and to it we are to return again as the aesthetic experience *par excellence*; and we shall find, upon analysis, that it arises with the epistemological consciousness as the necessary organ of rendering the meanings that have not been rendered in the logical mode.

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 179.

CHAPTER IV.

The Aesthetic Experience as a Hyper-logical Mode of Consciousness in which the Dualism of the Logical Mode is Overcome.

In the preceding chapter it was pointed out, that neither thought nor will is able to exhaust experience. In both types of conscious experience there is found to be something more than either thought or will. In either instance reality becomes that which satisfies both [thought and will and both the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists reached the common conclusion that reality is an immediate, self-dependent and all-inclusive individual. But since such type of experience can not be reached either in terms of thought, or of conduct, but is, nevertheless, the final realization of both, it is to be sought for in an immediacy which is the rather feeling in character. Mr. Bradley has also shown, that reality can not be regarded as a mere identity of thought and will, but rather the goal toward which both are striving—an experience in which both thought and will alike are present not, however, *formaliter* but *eminentur*.¹

Thus it is to be concluded from the outcome of the intellectualistic and voluntaristic discussions, that reality must always contain a further aspect which is neither thought nor will and which can not be fully given in either. Both types of epistemological theory reach the conclusion that thought and will are general and mediate, while reality is individual and immediate. But since neither thought nor will can establish an experience of such type, both must yield to an immediacy of feeling, which as being rather a-logical, in the instance of the Intellectualists and a-volitional, in the instance of the Voluntarists, is to be regarded as a mystical outcome.

Current epistemological discussion centers about the problem presented by the dualism of mind and body as representing

¹ See Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 469-485.

two antithetical substances. Accepting this dualism as a datum of logical experience, the attempt is made to bring the two together, either by reducing the one to the other, or by finding some third entity which issues in the two aspects of mind and body, respectively. To accept the dualism as a datum of logical experience and then attempt to reach a solution by reducing either one to the other leaves the problem unsolved, while the setting up of some *tertium quid* solves the problem by a sort of 'back-door' method. One grows tired reading that mind is a form of matter, or that matter is an aspect of mind, or still further that the universe is made up of 'mind-stuff.' To materialize the spiritual, or spiritualize the material rather pushes the problem farther back than reaches a solution. The individual is neither a thinking machine wholly impersonal in character, nor the creature of unreflective instinct, but has become conscious of himself as a thinking and acting personality and refuses to accept any solution of the problem of knowledge in which these two aspects of his nature are so etherealized or materialized as to lose whatever of vitality and value they have gained in the development of thought. The individual having become conscious of himself refuses to believe either in mutual exclusion, or ultimate antithesis of the two terms of the dualism. Thought has reached increased determination, not by the suppression or the elimination of either of its two aspects, but rather by merging both in a higher sphere of mental determination.

In the first two chapters above the attempt was made to show that thought reaches a higher plane of construction through an imitative treatment of its present store of meanings. The aspect of unity, what Bradley and Royce call individuality, is to be sought for on the side of the controlling self rather than of the controlled content. The more or less mystical outcome of the epistemological theories of Bradley and Royce (mystical in the sense of affectivistic) is the necessary outcome of any attempt to solve the epistemological problem by identifying the self, as the control moment of thought, with any one of its several aspects. Historically speaking, it is to be said that epistemological discussion has completely boxed the compass in that each

of the several aspects of developed consciousness has, in turn, been made the explaining principle of the mind and the organ of reality.

Each of the three types of epistemological theory referred to in the preceding paragraph is found to emphasize some one aspect of what later will be found to be the final interpretation of reality. The element of value in each particular theory represents also the limitations of the remaining types of theory. A more satisfactory theory of reality is to be reached, not by making a sort of composite picture of the three types of theory, but rather by the discovery of a mode of conscious determination in which the several claims of these otherwise partial and fragmentary theories are met and merged.

The Intellectualists maintained and still maintain, that the subject and object must be identical. "If" says Bosanquet, "the object-matter of reality lay genuinely outside the system of thought, not our analysis only, but thought itself, would be unable to lay hold of reality."¹ All knowledge is a product of thought in that it represents an immanent evolution from certain *a priori* principles which are neither derived from nor verified by experience. Experience is from one end to the other a realization of a spiritual principle. Thought can not exist apart from its object, nor can the object of thought exist apart from thought for which it is object. On any dualistic theory of knowledge, truth must mean some kind of agreement between opposed factors, which while opposed come into some sort of relation. This relation is generally spoken of as the reference of ideas to a reality beyond ideas.² The reference, however, is on the side of the knowing subject, while it also carries with it the conception of a real which always remains in some sense, external. But, the Intellectualists insist, while knowledge refers to reality, reality also refers to knowledge, that is, truth is a matter of accepted reference on the one side and an accurate reference on the other.³ The two references thus always concur,

¹ Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 2.

² Cf. Bradley's definition of judgment, *Principles of Logic*, ch. i.

³ See Baillic, *Idealistic Construction of Experience*, pp. 64.

since the dualism of subject and external object falls within the knowing process as mode of conscious activity. The distinction of subject and object is experience broken up into its diversity. The object as such is neither external nor internal for either term would make the problem of knowledge insoluble. The dualism, in fact, is the creation of experience itself. Such dualistic experience is, however, a wound, but a wound of consciousness' own making and truth represents the attempt upon the part of consciousness to heal the wound homœopathically.¹ The ideal experience represents that mode of conscious determination in which the mind as the subject has itself as a whole consciously before it. The problem of knowledge thus becomes the setting up of the ideal experience at the successive stages in the development of thought—a problem which Hegel, the 'Father of the School,' solved in terms of the aesthetic, while his later followers find the solution in an immediacy in which the two aspects of thought are brought into unity. The point of special emphasis in the present connection is, that the Intellectualists sought to harmonize the entire content of thought by identifying the two aspects of conscious determination. The object of knowledge must, therefore, be of the subject's own construction, in which the subject finds itself fully realized.

The outcome of the Intellectualistic movement was the setting in of what Höffding calls 'the logical ice-age,' and from which Voluntarism represents a reaction. It at once occurs that a thorough-going Intellectualism rates all purpose and value low. Following the *Second Critique* of Kant, the Voluntarists make the will the primary and constitutive function of consciousness and reality a matter of will-acts (*Thathandlungen*) rather than ideas. Thought to be vital and valuable must, they hold, be selective and purposive, and both these aspects of conscious experience are ignored in a rationalistic theory of knowledge. The object of knowledge to be real, must be something more than an object already identified with the subject in cognition. The object of knowledge must be in a real sense an 'Other.' To say that the object must become content of the

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 166.

self before it can become the object of thought makes an act of will an empty procedure. But reality is larger than thought, and back of thought lies a deeper part of the self. The categories of the will are more potent than the categories of thought. Reality is not something already given in a related content which only awaits further analysis, but something which we are striving to bring into being. Furthermore, reality is always ideal, in the sense that it represents that after which consciousness is aspiring in order to clothe itself with unity and completeness.

The real significance of the Voluntaristic movement is the emphasis placed upon the concrete and ethical character of thought. By their insistence upon the relational and discursive character of reflective thought to the complete exclusion of the existential import, the Intellectualists reduced thought to a wholly formal procedure and made the object the conclusion of a syllogistic process. But, as has been pointed out already, thought is never able to render harmoniously its own content. The meaning which connects the several phases of thought and adds unity to the process as a whole is found in the ideal of a completely individual experience, of which the several phases of thought are expressions. There can, therefore, be no real progress in thought, and truth and fact are identical, since thought is a self-contained process. That, however, which unifies thought in the sense of organizing and holding it together suggests alike the inadequacy of the Intellectualists and the starting point of the Voluntarists.

The Voluntaristic movement represents an attempt to render the 'intent' aspect of thought. The object of knowledge as that which will complete an otherwise inharmonious and incomplete experience, must be something more than an already contained experience, but rather that which calls forth effort for its possession, and in the possession of which consciousness experiences a positive widening of its active-emotional life. The 'other' of thought, as Professor Royce has pointed out, is precisely that which thought must needs have for its own complete realization. The object of thought must necessarily be beyond thought's present attainment or it becomes valueless either as object of thought or of moral endeavor.

But the practical life, like the theoretical, is also under a mediate form of control and the moral consciousness can no more realize its inner, organizing, controlling principle than can the theoretical consciousness. Each alike necessitates an absolute experience which is neither thought nor conduct, but an experience of an individual whole in which both thought and volition are lost in a higher immediacy. For the Intellectualists each phase of thought is significant and finds its interpretation only in so far as it represents a reflection of a higher experience. The ideal experience would be that in which the subject has itself as a whole consciously before it, or as Baillie has expressed it, "it would be the form of knowledge in which the object is the mind itself. But such experience is the condition which makes knowledge possible at any stage whatsoever, and is not merely the goal toward which the several modes of knowledge point, but the very principle which makes them what they are for finite consciousness."¹ But the problem at once arises, the epistemological problem par excellence for the Intellectualists, as to how any particular stage of experience as finite and fragmentary, can reflect a more complete experience. It will be recalled that Hegel made use of the art-consciousness as a sort of mirror in which the ideal experience was reflected, while Bradley and Bosanquet respectively fall back upon 'sentient experience' and a 'pure act of faith.' The Voluntarists are confronted by the same problem as to how present finite acts of will can reflect an experience in which the life of will is fully realized—an experience of 'purposiveness without purpose.'² In a later chapter it is shown how the earlier Voluntarists like Fichte and Schopenhauer made use of the aesthetic consciousness as setting up an experience in which the active life finds an object in which all its aspirations and appreciations are fully reflected, while in our day Professor Royce, as an avowed Voluntarist, finds the absolute experience in a 'volitional immediacy.' Thus it is seen that while the epistemological problem was the same for these two types of epistemological theory, they also arrived at

¹ Baillie, *Idealistic Construction of Experience*, p. 85.

² Kant, *Krit. d. Urteilkraft*, p. 87.

similar solutions. The immediate experience embodied in an individual form represents an attempt to unify and thus complete an otherwise mediate and incomplete experience by setting up an experience in which subject and object are completely merged in an all-embracing unity. Thus, the true and the good are transcended and completed in a whole of undifferentiated and unrelated feeling.

The character of the absolute experience thus reached proves, however, to be more or less meaningless and empty, since it has completely broken with the earlier partial meanings. The subject alike in thought and conduct is more than either. Both demand an 'other,' and such 'other' constitutes reality only in so far as it contains what at once puts an end to all thinking and willing. But in attaining this 'other' both thought and volition lose their essential character. Bradley seeks a way out of the difficulty thus presented by saying that the 'other' which thought is always seeking but which remains forever beyond thought is its own completion. "Thought," he says "can form the idea of an apprehension, something like feeling in directness, which contains all the character sought by its relational efforts. Thought can understand that, to reach its goal, it must get beyond relations. Yet in its nature it can find no working means of progress. Hence it perceives that somehow this relational side of its nature must be merged and must include somehow the other side. Such a fusion would compel thought *to lose and to transcend its proper self*.¹ And the nature of this fusion thought can apprehend in vague generality, but not in detail; and it can see the reason why a detailed apprehension is impossible. Such anticipated self-transcendence is an 'other;' but to assert that 'other' is not a self-contradiction."² But lacking a method of treating thought with reference to its own advancement, Mr. Bradley in the end sets up a conception of reality which is a-logical in character. The 'will-to-believe' of Professor James, 'the pure act of faith' of Bosanquet and the 'volitional immediacy' of Royce, are to be regarded also as

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 181, 182.

² *Ibid.*, p. 182.

postulates of reality of an a-logical or affectivistic character. With both types of theory the problem becomes the construction of a single whole of experience under some mode of conscious construction in which present finite meanings find themselves completely unified and realized.

In the preceding chapters the attempt has been made to show that consciousness is possessed of such a method whereby present guaranteed meanings may be treated with reference to further meaning. The first immediacy was found to represent a single whole of experience due to the fact that the affective-conative dispositions seized and determined the whole of the presented content. The resulting unity of this early experience, embodied in the 'schematic general,' under a form of naïve acceptance as an act of 'presumption,' represents in germ the two aspects of all thought, which, while already present and operative, have not been distinguished. Reality, in this early undifferentiated experience, is the 'projective construction' which represents the unity of the object in perception. The unity of the thing perceived represents the unity of the act of perceiving, or, in still other words, the unity of the thing perceived represents a specific activity of the perceiving subject. The unity of the projective consciousness is not given in the presented content, nor, on the other hand is it wholly made by the consciousness that has it, but the unitary character of the first immediacy, represents the realization, in a definite form, of the active-dispositional tendencies as a sort of embryonic self.

The significance of the 'lower semblant' or play consciousness was found in the fact that it is conscious of the merging of the two aspects of thought which were not held apart within the first immediacy. Imitation, as a method of manipulating a guaranteed content with reference to the fulfilment and embodiment of inner purpose, is now consciously applied to whatever content consciousness has. We found that 'semblant' control was not direct and mediate as in memory, but the content guaranteed in memory is lifted from its original moorings and used with reference to the fulfilment of dispositional tendencies. Play thus becomes a sort of self-contained process in the sense

that it finds its end in the process itself. It is indulged for its own sake and hence lacks all conscious utilitarian or experimental value. There is complete identification of the player with the object thus constructed—a reading-in, as it were, of the person of the player into the object thus constructed. As the 'projective' construction arises in an undifferentiated experience, so the semblant object represents an object, which while not true to any established form of control, is nevertheless accepted and treated 'as if it were' real. It is evident that we are in the presence of an wholly new form of control—a control of an already guaranteed content in the form of a completed whole of content. There is a detachment of the self from the stern realities of real life whose limitations are transcended by the erecting of an experience, not as yet realized, but which can nevertheless be treated as if it were already realized. The semblant construction thus becomes a personal, all-inclusive, self-contained construction, in which the self as the controlling and organizing principle of thought reaches, by a process of merging and unifying the several aspects of thought, a new and higher plane of mental determination.

Having shown that, in the earlier modes of consciousness the aesthetic and the epistemological arose together, and that the former was found in each instance to possess those characteristics demanded by the latter—whence the conclusion that the aesthetic experience functions as an epistemological postulate—it now remains to show that the aesthetic experience, when once reflective thought is reached, still possesses the characteristics which make possible a solution of the epistemological problem of reflective thought. Making use of the generally recognized characteristics of the aesthetic experience we will now show that the aesthetic experience possesses precisely those characteristics which qualify it to render the three types of meaning which the logical mode as such is unable to render.¹

¹ In this procedure, and in the results, the writer is following Professor Baldwin's unpublished lectures in which he has presented some of the material of the third volume of his work *Thought and Things*.

(1) The Objectivity of the Aesthetic Experience.

The failure alike of the Rationalists and the Empiricists to arrive at a satisfactory theory of knowledge is to be found in the fact that each starts with an assumption which lies outside the accepted analysis of knowledge, but which has nevertheless to be admitted into the result as the underlying presupposition. Hegel was wholly justified in describing Kant's theory of knowledge as but another expression of Lockeanism. Both assume a dualism of subject and object which must somehow be maintained. It is of interest to note in passing, that the correction of each took an idealistic direction; for as Berkleianism represents an attempt to remove the unknown substratum of the thing substance and to show that cognitive experience can get on without it, so the critical successors of Kant attempt to drop the 'Ding-an-sich.' For both Locke and Kant, knowledge must find its standard beyond itself in the sense that reality is necessarily larger than thought. This same position is reflected in the statement of Lotze that 'reality is richer than thought' and in that of Bradley that 'knowledge is unequal to reality,' or still again in the statement of Kant that 'beyond the bounds of knowledge there is a sphere of faith.' All these expressions are based upon the same presupposition, that thought implicates always a reality beyond itself. But it at once appears that reality beyond thought is not only unknowable but valueless; for either knowledge determines reality, in which case the nature of reality falls within the limits of thought, or there is, from the outset, a fundamental cleavage between knowledge and reality which can never be healed by either. The significance of the Intellectual movement is to be sought in the fundamental presupposition that knowledge must, in some way, determine its own conditions, that is, it must be a self-contained experience.

The object of knowledge can be neither external nor internal; it is not the product of interaction between subject and object, but rather a unity reflected in the object as constructed within consciousness. The 'projects' of the first immediacy represented a unitary experience secured and held in terms of 'motor synergy.' While within this early consciousness pro-

ess and product were not distinguished, the point of insistence was, that within this first experience we found the condition which was to make real and possible all modes of knowledge whatsoever. The 'projective' experiences of this early consciousness were neither transcripts of the outer order of things nor complete determinations of presented content in terms of the affective-conative tendencies, but represented the unity of the two processes functioning as yet in an undisturbed immediacy.

In the 'semblant' consciousness, the resulting object in which the dualism of inner and outer was merged was shown to be clearly a matter of inner determination. The value of the object thus constructed was found to consist, not in its reference to the object as such, but to the subject that determines the object. The object is one in which the subject finds himself reflected and enlarged. If we were to define the ideal experience as that in which the subject found itself fully reflected and embodied, it is evident that in the lower semblant construction we have at least a type and an illustration of such experience. Taking its material at the place at which it finds it, the semblant consciousness erects this material for the sake of completing itself in a further experience. While therefore the semblant object is not an object held in memory, neither is it a break with memory but it is the memory object lifted from its guaranteed forms of control and used for the sake of further meaning. Thus it is seen that both in the early immediacy, in which there was no separation of the two factors of thought, as well as in the second immediacy, in which the two factors of thought were distinguished, consciousness is possessed of a method of treating its content for the sake of advancing its own meanings. The resulting object in each mode of consciousness represents a merging of the two aspects of thought in a construction which becomes a platform for still higher conscious determination.

But objectivity is a universally recognized characteristic of the aesthetic experience. Santayana defines beauty as pleasure objectified.¹ Kant uses the terms 'universality' and 'necessity'.²

¹ Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty*, pp. 44-49.

² Kant, *Kritik der Urteilkraft*, sec. 6.

Cohn in his *Allgemeine Aesthetik*, uses the term 'Forderungs-character,' while Volkelt has defined the objectivity of beauty as due to the 'fusion of feeling and contemplation.' What is meant in the several attempts at a definition of aesthetic objectivity is, that the aesthetic object and the consciousness in which it arises are no longer held apart. The self becomes identified with the object as peculiarly its own. Thus it is to be said that the self that could not be rendered in terms of logical meaning finds in the aesthetic experience its complete rendering at the stage of development thus far reached. It becomes true, as Professor Baldwin has pointed out, that the aesthetic reflects the stages in the development of the self. The aesthetic object is therefore not an external object as the Intellectualists well saw, but only a farther experience. The object which they attempt to set up represents always a more complete experience in which the self as the thinker would complete itself. But lacking a method whereby consciousness could extend its present store of meanings in an object in which thought finds its limitations transcended, the 'ideas of the reason' of Kant, the 'pure act of faith' of Bosanquet and the 'sheer sentience' of Bradley, become empty categories in the sense that they tell us nothing whatever about the reality beyond thought. To say with Kant that the object of knowledge represents a 'possible experience' is meaningless unless there is some point of contact with the actual, for possibility can only be determined upon a basis of what is already real. To treat a thing 'as if it were' is possible only when the thing as a further experience finds grounding in present experience. To ask 'How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible,' means for a genetic psychology, 'How can thought legitimately refer to a reality beyond itself?' But it will occur at once that no such transcendent object can be reached by a process of analysis of thought-content. It is precisely here that we are to seek for the inadequacy and failure of the intellectualistic programme. "The Absolute does not want," says Bradley, "to make eyes at itself in a mirror, or, like a squirrel in a cage, to revolve the circle of its own perfections. Such processes must be dissolved in something not

poorer but richer than themselves.”¹ But how can thought do so? Bradley himself has said, that if ‘thought becomes other than relational and discursive—that is, mediate in control,—it brings about its own destruction;’² while it has been shown in the preceding chapter that there are meanings present in reflective thought which reflection cannot of itself render? But why limit thought to the movements within the logical mode? May it not again be true, as Hegel pointed out, that the wound occasioned by the presence of a dualistic experience has been made by consciousness which is also able to heal it? And did not Hegel show remarkable insight in holding that the nature of objectivity depends wholly upon the way in which experience as a whole is conceived? Both the attempts and the limitations of the Intellectualists to establish the objectivity of thought as a perfect whole of experience, lend confirmation to the assumption of the present investigation, that the aesthetic experience is precisely the organ of this sort of objectivity. The self, as the one meaning which the Intellectualists admit can not be expressed in terms of thought, once again, as in earlier experiences, embodies itself, as the presupposition of control, in a whole of experience. Objectivity thus becomes the unity of control issuing from the individual himself upon a content already set up. In a word, objectivity means only the unity of all experience as such and such unity is secured in terms of the aesthetic experience.

The aesthetic indeed as an experience in which the subject completely embodies itself in an object erected under its own presuppositions of control, an experience in which the subject identifies itself with its object, indicates not the completion of the process of thought but rather makes ready and possible a new and higher mode of mental determination. *It is, therefore, a sign that thought can proceed, rather than a sign that the work of thought is ended.* The latter view of the aesthetic experience, which is admirably worked out by Miss Adams,³ would reduce the aesthetic experience to a sort of epi-phenomenon of smooth-working thought. It, at the least, reduces the

¹ and ² Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, ch. xv.

³ Miss Adams, *The Aesthetic Experience: its Meaning in a Functional Psychology*, 1907.

beautiful like the true and the good to the practical, and Miss Adams would doubtless say with Professor James that the beautiful must also be considered as a good. The outcome of the present investigation, however, leads to the conclusion that, the beautiful has a value and function of its own in experience and that instead of being given a place and value subordinate to either the true or the good, it is rather to be said that the true and the good are such only because they are also moments in the larger whole of the beautiful.¹

According to Kant the object of knowledge must be both universal and necessary. It is of historical interest to observe that he found these two characteristics attaching to the beautiful. Bain also notes the fact that the beautiful is shareable. But still the question remains as to whether objectivity lends universality and necessity or whether universality and necessity lend objectivity. Professor Tufts, in his article entitled 'On the Genesis of the Aesthetic Categories,' attempts to show that the objectivity attaching to the beautiful is due to the elimination of the subjective and private and the setting up of a social standard of value, so that his solution of the above question as to the priority of the objective or the universal is that the 'universalizing or socializing' of the standard is the ground, rather than the consequent, of the objectifying. Beauty thus becomes a social phenomenon and its several categories are to be sought for in social situations and social demands; while art, instead of being the embodiment of an interest *sui generis*, has arisen to satisfy other motives largely of a social character. In the present discussion, however, reasons have been found for regarding the aesthetic experience as a *sui generis* experience, whose function is to be sought for in epistemology. The objectifying of consciousness has been found to be a matter of unifying of consciousness and the aesthetic has been found to have arisen as the organ of such unification. Within the first immediacy, 'motor synergy' was found to be the measure and test of mental unity. The 'projective constructions,' as the embodiments of the first immediacy, were found to be 'objectifications of con-

¹ Cf. Baldwin, *Fragments in Philos. and Science*, Introduction.

sciousness in all the phenomena perceived.' They were also found to be 'aggregate' in character, that is, common although not so to the constructing consciousness. But the point insisted upon in the present connection is, that they were aggregate in reference because they were 'projective' and not 'projective' because they were 'aggregate.' Likewise play was found to be 'syndoxic' and not private in character. Play always involves and demands an audience. The material that becomes available for play is found to be under social control. Moreover, it has been pointed out, that play is essentially a re-construction of a social milieu. But as Professor Baldwin has pointed out, play is not real, in the sense of setting up an actual situation. Memory is present as a sphere of reference and control, but the play object as the merging of two sorts of control represents a detachment from any exclusive claim that either form of control may make. The interest in preserving a social situation is precisely the interest which is lacking. The fact is that play never goes over to real life and is not indulged in for the sake of mediating real life. And so also of art. To make art social means to place upon the aesthetic experience the very limitations from which it is seeking to free itself. Likewise to say that art must be true, in the sense of mediating truth, means to involve art in the limitations from which thought is seeking, through the art-consciousness, to free itself.¹ It is not true, therefore, as Professor Tufts holds, that objectivity, as characteristic of art, is due to the universality of the experience, but rather that the universality is due to the objectivity of the aesthetic experience. 'Common' thought alone makes socialization possible and objectification gives the ground and possibility of universality.

The universality and the necessity which the Intellectualists sought for and which were found in an experience in which thought with its dualistic limitations and implications was transcended, are found among the generally recognized characteristics of

¹ Baldwin, Unpublished Lectures. Professor Baldwin holds that the universality of art comes from its use of materials already, in some degree, universalized in thought, and reflects the degree of commonness or 'social' meaning of the material; but that the aesthetic experience as such is not social in the sense that it lacks anything of full and immediate personal appreciation.

the aesthetic experience, so that it can be concluded that the demand of the epistemological problem for objectivity is supplied in the aesthetic experience,

(2) *The Aesthetic Experience as a Furthering of the Self.*

It has already been pointed out, that the several stages in the development of the aesthetic experience, represent and reflect stages in the development of the self, as the control factor of all mental determination. The child and the race alike project into things, including persons, the experiences passed through in connection with things. Primitive thought is animistic. Play was shown to be the setting up of a situation in which the feeling of self was involved. The significance of play, in the development of the individual, was seen in the fact, that it indicates the isolation of the two aspects of thought which were held together in the earlier modes. Professor Baldwin and others have characterized this aspect of play as 'the sense of agency.' The point of interest is, that the play object is one set up for the satisfaction of inner, personal purposes and indulged as such. As a semblant object, it is neither memory nor fancy but stands as an object in which both are merged and completed. As a type of interest it finds its end-state in neither memory nor fancy but in itself as a detached and self-controlled meaning. It thus represents a furthering of the self, as the pre-supposition of control, so that the value of the construction attaches to the subject rather than to the object constructed.

In the higher aesthetic experience this same characteristic has been noted and described by Volkelt as the "widening of our life of feeling toward the typical, the comprehensive and the universal." This characteristic is to be found in all stages of the aesthetic experience as attaching to the subjective aspect of the process. It is treated here, not only because it is a generally recognized characteristic of the aesthetic experience, but rather because it satisfies the demand made by the Voluntaristic type of epistemological theory that the object of thought shall in some way represent that in which the subject finds itself enlarged and realized. The meaning of experience is not to be found in the essential identity of subject and object but in an 'other' in

which the subject finds itself furthered and completed. The 'other' thus becomes a deliverance of the practical rather than the theoretical consciousness, and the moral consciousness is made the postulate of an all-comprehensive and individual experience. Thought not being able to encompass the object in which it finds itself fully reflected and its limitations overcome, seeks deliverance in the will. Growth, development, implies struggle and struggle implies something to be overcome, so that the object of knowledge is posited for the sake of moral struggle and perfection. To be vital and fruitful the object of knowledge must lie beyond the subject, whose attainment of the object brings the experience of an enlarged and increased self. The Voluntarists from Fichte to Royce emphasize thus the control aspect of thought rather than the relational aspect.

But will is also found to be dualistic and can, no more than thought, come to final fulfilment. Moral struggle always involves a struggle between existence as it is and what our active nature is seeking to make it. It is precisely this dualism that Professor Royce seeks to explain in terms of the two-fold meaning of ideas, the internal and the external. The epistemological problem from this point of view becomes the erection of an object as a not-self or an external meaning in which the self finds itself revealed and realized. The earlier rationalistic position of Professor Royce is still present despite the more voluntaristic statement of the problem of knowledge. The external meaning of the idea is a necessity inherent in the nature of the idea as a cognitive state. Experience is purposive and reality can be only the embodiment of a single, all-inclusive purpose. Thought is barren and judgment dead unless both are concerned with the more concrete matter of actual experience. Every idea is as much an act of will as an act of cognition and reality is an experience in which purpose, as a singular meaning, is embodied. Will, therefore, like thought, presupposes a reality beyond itself, in which it finds its partial and mediate meanings completed in the all-embracing immediacy of a single purpose.

But the Voluntarists, like the Pragmatists of the present, by ignoring the relational aspect of thought, reduce the acts of will in which the 'other' is erected to a sort of leap in the dark. Will

as function, must have something to work with and upon, and by ignoring the content aspect of thought, the control aspect becomes more or less capricious and arbitrary. Admitting that thought implies a situation in which the two aspects of knowledge have fallen apart, the question remains as to what sets up the situation that makes thought possible and necessary. The 'other' of thought, as Royce well sees, must not be a complete break with consciousness, *but must be a meaning for the consciousness which sets it up as an 'other.'* It is precisely here that the position of Royce is the more fruitful and which will not permit his being grouped with the Pragmatists. The epistemological problem for Royce thus becomes the setting up, by the ideas as internal meanings, of an external meaning as a single, all-inclusive whole of experience, in which consciousness is furthered and completed. But one seeks in vain for even an attempted solution of the problem as thus stated. The Voluntarist and the Pragmatist thus find the limitations which they found in the Intellectualistic position lying at their own door. Will, like thought, can complete itself only by becoming what is not will. Reality, as an absolute experience, can only be an experience in which the subject is one with its object, a sort of immediate apprehension in which the dualistic character alike of thought and will is merged in a single, harmonious experience. Professor Royce reaches therefore the conception of a 'volitional immediacy,' which being an essentially a-volitional experience must be regarded along with the 'will-to-believe' of James as a sort of mystical postulate.

Professor Royce's position represents an advance over the earlier intellectualistic position, *in that the object of knowledge is necessarily a meaning for the consciousness that has it.* The dualism thus falls within experience and represents a dualism of consciousness toward its guaranteed content, rather than a datum of immediate experience. But still the question remains as to how consciousness can erect a meaning as an 'other' in which it finds itself furthered without breaking with its store of present meanings? Or as Professor Royce himself puts the question 'How can the subjective transcend itself?' The 'other' of thought to be valuable, must be neither identical with the

subject, nor a complete break with experience, but a meaning external only in the sense that it represents a further but nevertheless possible experience. The outcome of the voluntaristic programme is identical with that of the Intellectualistic and each alike seeks a solution in an immediate experience, which must issue from the experience which is seeking its own completion. In the case of the Intellectualists, it was shown that consciousness is possessed of a method of extending its present guaranteed content for the sake of embodying the interest of an inner and personal sort without breaking with the meanings already acquired by thought; so it now remains to indicate that consciousness is also possessed of a method of postulating further meanings, in which the present limited and fragmentary meanings are merged and completed, without breaking with the values already acquired in consciousness.

Professor Baldwin and others have found the 'self-exhibiting' activities of the individual to be involved in the rise of the aesthetic experience. The burden of the present discussion has been that the aesthetic in the several stages of its development reflects the development of the self. Play was shown to be always the setting up of a situation of a personal sort. The limitations of the play mode are to be found in the material held in consciousness under its own coefficients of control; this determines and limits the possible construction which consciousness can make of it. As between memory under the most rigid control as representing an external order of things and fancy as wholly detached content, play as an essentially inner construction was neither and yet satisfied the demands of both. The motive of the play-construction is a motive *sui generis* and to reduce play to work would mean to destroy the essential character of play. The object thus constructed, while not real if tested only by memory, is nevertheless accepted as if it were real. The 'reality-feeling' of the projective consciousness, reflecting the unity of subject and object as the two factors of all mental construction—which unity was broken down by the mediate character of the control of memory—is once more secured by the playful setting up of a 'make-believe' object as the 'assumption' of still farther meaning. The limitation of the lower semblant con-

struction is to be sought in the material available for such treatment. Only when the logical mode is reached do the two types of meaning, with one or the other of which the self as control factor has been identified, become the content of the self as the presupposition of control. The failure of the Intellectualists to deal adequately with the epistemological problem is to be found in the assumed identity of the self and its related content. The Voluntarists on the other hand identify the self with the practical will. But both thought and will were found to be dualistic in character, so that the self could never embody itself fully and immediately in either. Both alike reached the conclusion that reality must be some form of immediacy of consciousness, as a sort of hyper-experience in which both thought and will are realized in an object which is neither exclusively. But the aesthetic experience as a hyper-logical mode of conscious determination is found to be possessed of a method of manipulating both types of meaning with reference to their being brought together under the presupposition of a control issuing from within. The object thus constructed under the presupposition of inner control, is accepted as meeting the demands alike of the life of thought and will, without being held under the mediate form of control of either, but at the same time standing for a type of mental determination in which both are advanced without breaking with the meanings already acquired.

Defining the development of cognition as a series of determinations of the two aspects of thought, the attempt has been made to show that consciousness has from the outset advanced from one mode of determination to another only by a process of advancing the meanings already acquired under definite forms of control. The object which made thought possible and fruitful at each of the successive modes of mental determination now falls wholly within experience without at the same time being a mere duplicate of an already acquired meaning. The unity of subject and object implied in all knowledge is the unity of the self acquired through an imitative treatment of its present supply of meanings. The resulting identity thus becomes a matter of acceptance, of belief, rather than an analysis of present content. The object is a semblant construction erected for inner, personal

purposes and wholly under inner determination. The identity of subject and object, which the Intellectualists were in search of is to be sought in aesthetic experience which permeates consciousness as a whole rather than in some Absolute, which lies, as it were, beyond the process of mental determination and operates upon it from without. But because the object is thus erected as having further meaning and thus serving to unify and complete all partial controls and meanings, it is also an object not as yet possessed; and hence it functions as an 'other' thus meeting the demands of the Voluntarists. Thus the self, which the Intellectualists identified with related content and the Voluntarists with the practical reason, but which as a meaning could not be rendered in terms of either, *becoming detached from both types of meaning, restates both for common reflection, and transcends the dualistic experience due to the presence and functioning of the two antipodal methods of control of content, by the same method by which the earlier dualisms were transcended.*

Thus it is to be concluded that the aesthetic experience as being an experience of unity of subject and object, as the two aspects of thought and will, as well as being also a furthering of the self toward what Professor Tufts has called the 'broadly significant' fully meets the demands of the epistemological postulate in these two respects.

(3) *The Aesthetic Experience as Meaning the Singular and Immediate.*

But while the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists differ as to what constitutes an object of knowledge, the former emphasizing the subjective aspect, the latter the objective, both agree that the object of knowledge as that in which the subject finds itself fully reflected must necessarily be one of single, immediate experience. The absolute, according to Bradley, must hold all content in an individual experience where no contradiction can exist—a unity which transcends and yet contains a manifold appearance.¹ He also describes such an immediacy of thought and existence as being nothing but 'sentient experience.'² Pro-

¹ and ² Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, ch. xv.

fessor Royce makes objectivity a matter of purpose. Ideas are selective. They seek their own. They attend only to what they themselves have chosen. Moreover they desire in their own way. The object thus comes to be precisely what it is because the ideas as internal meanings mean it to be the object of the ideas themselves. Ideas are also to be judged in the light of what they intend and the world of the ideas is simply will itself determinately embodied. The only possible object that an idea can ever take note of is precisely the complete content of its own conscious purpose, and the limit of the process would be an individual (singular) judgment wherein the will expressed its own final determination. "What is real," he says, "is, as such, the complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas."

This common demand upon the part of the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists alike, that the object of knowledge must needs be individual and immediate—while representing the 'other' of knowledge as that which while not yet real is to be treated as if it were, what Bosanquet calls 'an act of pure faith'—is to be regarded as an attempt to express two types of meaning which we found were not embodied in the logical character of thought, namely, the attitude of belief and the 'singular' type of judgment. But once more we find that these two types of meaning are rendered in the aesthetic consciousness. The immediacy of the aesthetic experience has been long recognized. Plato speaks of it as 'pure pleasure free from desire.' Schopenhauer calls it a 'stilling of the will,' while Kant refers to the same experience under the aspect of 'disinterestedness or contemplation.' In more recent literature it is known as 'conscious self-illusion,' imitation and 'make-believe.' Cohn, in his *Allgemeine Aesthetik*, assigns to the semblant construction an intensive or immanent value as opposed to the consecutive or trans-gredient value of the true and good as pointing always beyond themselves. Psychically play is wholly non-utilitarian in value. The child does not play for the sake of some further end. The play-object while recognized as not real is nevertheless indulged in as if it were real and is so for the time being. It is unreal only with reference to the interest which erected it.

As Professor Baldwin has expressed it in his as yet unpublished lectures, the semblant object is a construction that claims one control and has any form of control except the one claimed. But only because of this is it fitted to supersede and transcend the control of any particular kind. The disinterestedness is due to the union of motives which point toward and terminate in some form of indirect or mediate control. In fact, it is to be said, that the resulting immediacy is due to the absence, through suspension for the time being, of the motives that would make the situation a real one. It is accepted and treated as being what it is not. It might be true or good or real but immediately rather than through some external form of control. The situation is one wholly determined from within as satisfying the inner demand for unity. The content thus treated is detached from its original moorings and erected into a world apart. But this world is a closed world. Consciousness and its object are one and immediate, in the sense that the self finds itself fully absorbed in the object of its contemplation. The aesthetic experience thus represents a furthering of experience by widening the process of comprehension and at the same time reveals and enlarges the self that has been hidden, as it were, behind the mediate and discursive operations of thought. The process of world-construction and world-interpretation is essentially a process of embodying the self in what hitherto seemed wholly foreign to us.

Hence it is that all art is animistic and religion anthropomorphic. Thought and conduct can be generalized and the true and the good become so in their own right only in so far as the individual can identify himself with his world. But since such identity can be attained neither in thought nor will, as is to be inferred from the fact that both the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists seek such identity of the self and its object in an immediacy of experience which is neither thought nor will, it must be sought in some ideal construction. There is, therefore, a further agreement among writers upon epistemological theory that the transcendent notion which serves to unify the dualistic character of thought and will bears the impress of art rather than of science. The type-phenomenon which appears as

the solution of the epistemological problem at the several stages of its development are characterized always by an appreciative or selective element. Every philosophical system appears as a work of art. Lange has called philosophical construction an art because of the idealizing tendency exhibited in it, the tendency to look for the highest expression of the real in the ideal.

But knowledge has been found to be essentially an idealizing process. The various stages of this process are reflected in the several stages of the development of the aesthetic experience. Hegel shows remarkable insight in insisting that knowledge as a process reflects the coming to full consciousness of the self. But the self also passes through a series of stages in the course of its development, so that each object determined by the self is also a further determination of the self. The aesthetic experience represents always a construction of the self out of its own materials for the sake of its own embodiment, a construction in which consciousness has to do only with its own. The semblant object thus becomes an object for sensuous apprehension and consciousness accepts it, not because of its truth or goodness but rather because it finds itself expressed in it in individual form.

Such an experience meets the demands alike of the Intellectualist and the Voluntarist. In it the three types of meanings left unexpressed by thought are given complete embodiment. In the object thus erected the mind rests satisfied as with something complete, self-sustaining and unique and which leaves no purpose unfulfilled, no estrangement of self and not self unreconciled. In the work of art the form and matter, the content and the control are inseparable. As an ideal, it is not to be contrasted with the real world which stands hard-and-fast, but is the embodiment of an exclusive interest. The ideal does not necessitate a break with the real, but is only the real raised to a higher plane. The 'other' of Bradley and the 'external meaning' of Royce, reach after ideal constructions in which the self realizes itself. The individuality which each attaches to the object as the other of thought and volition is an 'intent' meaning and is what it is only because the self sets it up and accepts it for what it reads into it. It is an 'other' only

because it is ideal and it is ideal only because the self erects it under its own presupposition of control. It is immediate and singular because the self finds itself fully reflected in the object thus constructed. As freed from all sorts of foreign and mediate control, such as characterize thought and volition, the self can now move about in a world under its own form of control. The embarrassment and limitations of the dualistic character of thought and will are removed by the setting up of a new and higher immediacy, so that the work of thought can proceed to new and higher determinations. The aesthetic experience, it is thus concluded, functions as the epistemological postulate of world unification and world interpretation.

Miss Adams is quite right in seeking to place the aesthetic experience within the general process of thinking, meaning by thinking the attempt upon the part of thought to escape from a dualistic experience. But in placing the aesthetic experience at the close of the thought-process, as a sign that thought as unimpeded action may go on, she appears to reduce the aesthetic experience to a mere accompaniment of thought, rather than as serving some function within the thought-process. Thought, for Miss Adams, and the Pragmatists generally, means the breaking down of an immediacy of stimulus and response, and finds its function in restoring the immediacy thus lost. From immediacy to immediacy thus represents the whole of thought. Upon the analysis of the aesthetic experience, she finds that it exhibits precisely those characteristics attaching to an immediate experience, whence the conclusion that the aesthetic rises at the end of and indicates the success of the thought-process. The aesthetic experience thus becomes a sort of by-product—a feeling accompanying a smooth working experience.

In the present discussion it has been shown that the aesthetic experience arises with the epistemological consciousness. The latter is a dualistic experience occasioned by the presence in consciousness of contrasted meanings. The reconciliation and completing of these contrasted meanings becomes the epistemological problem at the several stages of mental development. The development of thought has proceeded only by an increasing determinateness of its two aspects. Unless the content of

thought at any stage of its development can be treated with reference to a further meaning, the content becomes at once fixed and static. On the other hand, unless the control aspect is informed and limited in its operations it becomes, as in the case of fancy, a meaningless and valueless dynamic. The epistemological problem thus becomes always the search after a mode of conscious determination in which these contrasted meanings are brought into a whole of meaning without the loss of either. As Professor Baldwin has put it,¹ "a discrete unintelligible dynamic is no better than a contentless formal static."

It has also been our purpose to show that thought is reduced to the postulate of an empty and mystical experience when a solution of the problem presented by the presence in consciousness of contrasted meanings has been attempted by exclusively emphasizing the one of these two aspects of thought to the complete exclusion of the other. From our present point of view the epistemological problem becomes the setting up of a mode of experience in which to use the same author's words, thought has a way of finding its dynamics intelligible as a truthful and so far static meaning, and also of acting upon its established truths as immediate and so far dynamic satisfactions.

The point of view contended for in the present investigation is that the aesthetic experience represents a mode of mental determination in which these two types of meaning are reconciled and thus unified and completed. In tracing out the several stages of the development of the aesthetic it is shown that each such stage reflects the character of the epistemological problem at the corresponding stage of its development. When the reflective mode of consciousness has been reached, with the presence of meanings which thought as mediate and discursive is unable to reduce, it is shown that the aesthetic experience, as a hyper-logical mode of consciousness, has those characteristics which enable it to set up an experience in which the dualistic character of thought is transcended. Our conclusion then is that the aesthetic experience has arisen with the epistemological,

¹ *Psychological Bulletin*, April 15, 1907, p. 124; see also *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, Appendix, II.

has passed through a corresponding series of stages of development, and has throughout functioned as the epistemological postulate of unification and completion. It is not therefore to be placed at the completion of thought but must rather be regarded as marking the pausing place in reflective thought brought about by a process of mediating and thus reconciling the otherwise dualistic character of experience.

Reaching thus the conclusion that the aesthetic has arisen with the epistemological and, as representing the expression of a type of interest *sui generis*, functions as the epistemological postulate of the unification and completion of experience, it is to be shown in the following chapters, that in the development of thought in the race, the two types of experience have arisen and developed *pari passu*, and that here also the aesthetic has functioned as the postulate of a unified and completed thought.

PART II. HISTORICAL.

CHAPTER V.

Greek Thought from the Earliest Beginnings to Thales: A-dualistic in Character, hence Pre-Epistemological and Pre-Aesthetic, and Illustrative of the First Immediacy.

In the following chapters an attempt is made to trace the development of thought with reference to the rise and development alike of the Epistemological and the Aesthetic, together with the use made of the aesthetic Consciousness as the organ of world unification and interpretation. It will be shown that the aesthetic and the epistemological have arisen together, and that each, in the course of its development, has passed through a series of well-defined modes, all of which may be reconstructed with a tolerable degree of completeness. It will also be shown that the several modes of development of the one are in essential agreement with the corresponding modes in the development of the other.¹ In other words, each mode of thought will be found to have had its corresponding mode of aesthetic expression.² It will also appear that the conflicts and embarrassment of the epistemological became the occasion and opportunity of the aesthetic. The character of the aesthetic at the several stages of its development will be found to have been determined by the character of the epistemological problem demanding solution. The motive of the aesthetic is, therefore, to be sought in the epistemological. Professor Tufts has insisted that the motives are to be sought within the domain of social psychology. This conclusion is reached only by making the social prior to thought, whereas in the present connection, thought as common, is made the material of the social process. The conclusion upon which the present attempt is based, is

¹ F. Hegel, *Phil. of Fine Art*, trs. by Bosanquet, p. 101.

² Cf. Hirn, *The Origins of Art*, p. 2.

that the motives of the aesthetic consciousness are to be sought in *epistemology* rather than *sociology*.

It has already been pointed out that the epistemological consciousness must be treated genetically and that the several dualisms, through which thought passes in the course of its development, are to be regarded as the successive modes of its development. At each of these dualistic experiences the epistemological problem arises anew. These successive dualisms are, furthermore, to be regarded as situations into which consciousness grows, rather than states imposed ab-extra.¹ If we are to regard the several dualistic experiences into which consciousness develops as 'wounds,' they must be regarded as wounds of consciousness' own making, the leaves for whose healing are found arising with the wounds, since as Hegel says "the hand which inflicts the wound is the hand that must heal it."

The subject-object dualism of reflective thought within which the epistemological problem par excellence arises, is not, therefore, a datum of immediate experience, but represents that mode of conscious determination and control of experience made possible and intelligible by a series of earlier dualistic experiences. Within each of these earlier stages an epistemological problem arose whose solution made possible the next higher mode of determination and control of presented content. But in each instance, the problem became the problem of the unification of experience. From the analytic point of view the epistemological consciousness is dualistic, the unity of which can only be secured by the healing of the breach. But since the dualism is of consciousness' own making, there is the presumption that it will also bring about its own healing. In the present attempt, the purpose is to show that the aesthetic consciousness arises with the epistemological and presents always an ideal unity in which the unity and completion of experience are obtained.

Maintaining the dualistic character of the epistemological consciousness there is no need of carrying our investigations beyond the thought of the Greek world.² "The birth-day of

¹ Cf. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II.

² Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 23; Erdman, *History of Philosophy*, p. 13; Gomperz, *The Greek Thinkers*, Introduction.

our modern world" says Hegel, "is the moment when the Greek sages began to construe the facts of the universe. Before their time the world lay as it were in a dream-life. Unconsciously in the womb of time the spirit of the world was growing—the faculties forming in secrecy and silence—until the day of birth when the preparations were completed and the young spirit drew its first breath in the air of thought. Among the Greeks the Reason first became conscious, since they were the first to make the distinction between sense and thought."¹

But the distinction thus referred to was only gradually reached. The earliest conceptions of the Greeks are found to be those possible at a period when consciousness is relatively a-dualistic. The earliest Greeks possessed no clear distinction between mind and matter, the material and the spiritual.² One must, therefore, be naïve, as Professor Dewey says, in dealing with Greek philosophy and not introduced distinctions which only arose later. Throughout the period indicated at the head of the present chapter Greek consciousness was the rather vague and undifferentiated. Here as in the Orient custom forbade any separation of fact and meaning. The 'fatal boon of knowledge' had not yet been born and the immediate unity of consciousness was as yet undisturbed. Sensuous presence was the only reality and the world was one of pure appearance.

As the world on the banks,
So is the mind of man.

* * * * *

Only the tract where he sails
He wots of; only the thoughts
Raised by the objects he passes are his.³

The researches of the archaeologist and the comparative anthropologist have succeeded in pushing farther back the boundary line of the historic past, and the period of Greek philosophy before Thales has been reconstructed with great fulness and accuracy. Regarding consciousness as active and

¹ Wallace, *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 261.

² Janet and Seailles, *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 214.

³ Matthew Arnold, *The Future*.

reconstructive, rather than passive and receptive, its active and reconstructive processes are here seen in their entire spontaneity. Primitive man unembarrassed by a dualistic experience and wholly freed from the compelling character of external control and the demands of rational conceptions gave the freest embodiment to his active, dispositional tendencies. This stage in the development of the thought of the race, not unlike the corresponding period in the development of the individual, is characterized by the creation of myths. As the product of an a-dualistic consciousness the myth is to be defined with Vignoli as "The psychological objectification of man in all the phenomena he can perceive."¹ From the analytical point of view it may be said that the world presented is determined largely in terms of the affective-volitional disposition without any distinction whatever appearing to consciousness between the two factors thus involved.²

This first stage of thought must, therefore, be regarded as one of relative immediacy—a stage in which thought is free from internal complexity and in which stimulations call forth immediate responses. The unreflective myth, as the characteristic product of this first immediacy, is to be regarded, neither as a thing of pure presentation, nor of existential judgment, but rather one of pure 'presumption.'³ The deliverances of this a-dualistic consciousness are accepted as real, since no disturbing experiences have as yet arisen within the sphere of reality-feeling.⁴ These unreflective myths have been regarded, and rightly, as the first attempt at a metaphysics of nature. In fact, from the beginning until now, whenever pure reason has been found inadequate, thought has sought refuge in some form of mythological construction. Whatever theory of the universe primitive man possessed, is to be sought in the myth. It at once includes both science and religion and regulates both social and private life.⁵

¹ Quoted by Ribot, *The Creative Imagination*, p. 121.

² Cf. Wundt, *Outlines of Philosophy*, trs. by Judd, p. 303 ff.; and Perry, *The Approach to Philosophy*, p. 225.

³ Urban, *Psychological Review*. Two Articles, Vol. XIV, Nos. 1 and 2.

⁴ Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology, Feeling and Will*, pp. 148 ff.

⁵ Cf. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Arts*, p. 375.

A. Lang and others have shown that the social life of the Greeks before the dawn of reflective thought, was a matter of group maintenance, controlled by specific and traditional customs. The individual was in unconscious unity with the community of which he chanced to be a member, and both regulated and justified his life through reference to the ideals incarnate in the habits and customs of the community.¹ Then it was true that the individual did not think but knew, since there was neither occasion nor opportunity of thought. The individual was one with the situation in which he lived. In fact, he carried the entire situation within himself. Primitive man was thus social from the outset and there is no justification for the later contention that the individual when first found stood alone and had in some way to be made social. The materials and motives of whatever determinations of presented content the individual might make were common to the group, but since they were not psychically common, they are rather to be regarded as 'aggregate' in character.² We should expect to find, what in fact we do actually find, that the unreflective myths are wholly anonymous as to their origin and collective as to their reference. It is not without significance that no names are found attaching to the myths. There was, as yet, no distinction between the producers' and the spectators' point of view and the myth became the sole means of expression of the social and mental life, and like the fancies of the individual, at the corresponding period, became the sole reality of primitive man.

Regarding the unreflective myth as the product of a primitive and uncritical consciousness and characterizing primitive thought as the representation of concrete objects in terms of the subject himself, without the distinction between subject and object coming into consciousness, the materials and motives of the polarization of the a-dualistic consciousness are already present. There follows close upon this early period of spontaneous myth creation a period of transformation and decline. Accepting the classification of the myths proposed by Ribot into explica-

¹ Cf. A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, Vol. I, ch. 9, Vol. II, ch. 17.

² Vide Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 148 ff; cf. A. Lang, *Custom and Myth*, p. 5; Paulsen, *Introd. to Philos.*, p. 6.

tive and non-explicative,¹ it becomes extremely easy to indicate the influences that tended to make a reconstruction of the former necessary. Primitive thought, as anthropologists and ethnologists have shown, is anthropomorphic in character. The earliest conceptions of the world were purely mythical, because none other were possible. The myth thus becomes the response to a series of needs both theoretical and practical, but which have not as yet become distinct from each other. The resulting interpretation is not however subjective, as Ribot insists, but rather 'projective' thus corresponding to what Urban has called pure 'presumption.'²

The subsequent stages in the development of thought represent stages within this first immediacy, so that using the term objective in a somewhat loose sense, it can be said, that the development of thought is not from the subjective to the objective but a development within the objective.³ The embarrassments that supply the materials and motives of a new determination of thought, are to be sought in the increase of inner possibilities and differences of attitude toward presented content, rather than in the compelling character of the outer. The several movements both in the land of Greece and the outlying colonies referred to in the present connection are selected for the purpose of showing how they contributed to the isolation and deepening of the inner, in contrast with the outer, thus making a reconstruction of experience both possible and necessary.

Then as now, 'tempora et res mutantur,' and the fact of change, as Windelband says, became the stimulus to reflection; and the rise of reflection means that the old-time equilibrium of stimulus and response, motive and sanction, is breaking down. It is precisely within these changed and changing conditions that we are to seek the rise of the inner-outer dualism. Sense-perception and memory alike are questioned in a world whose scenes are constantly shifting. The unreflective myth-making consciousness loses its position and supremacy as the organ of world interpretation and unification. The multiplicity of myths

¹ Ribot, *Essay on the Creative Imagination*, p. 131.

² Cf. Urban in *Psychological Review*, Vol. XIV, 1907, Nos. 1 and 2.

³ Cf. Bosanquet, *Essentials of Logic*, p. 22.

and the host of deities become a stumbling block to some and foolishness to others, while the legends clustered like 'weeds in the pathless and primeval forest.' The thinning ax was everywhere in demand and as well the hand that could wield it with cunning. The familiar attitudes no longer bring the old-time satisfactions, and new experiences are constantly arising that throw the individual into confusion. Custom forbade the separation of fact and meaning, but the familiar supports are failing precisely when and where most needed. The world long held together is fast falling asunder. Things are no longer what they seem, and fact and meaning are no longer identical.

As has been indicated the unreflective myth served to satisfy both theoretical and practical needs which are not as yet distinguished from one another. The explicative and the non-explicative myths are significant as indicating the presence and operation of the materials and motives of the differentiation of the primitive constructions within the first immediacy. What is especially significant is, that when the demand for a transformation of the myths came, it was with reference to the former rather than the latter. It is important also to observe, that within the sphere of the explicative myths, the process of transformation did not issue in philosophic speculation wholly free from mythical elements. Hence from the beginning until now, despite the increasing skill and strength of science as the rival of the imagination, the latter has not lost its position as an interpretative and reconstructive principle of thought.¹

The increasing failure of the explicative myths in the presence of increased knowledge, tended to throw the non-explicative in greater relief and thus sharpen the contrast between the inner and the outer. In the race, as also in the individual, the embarrassment occasioned by the failure of the 'representing' and 'conversion' value of images² became the need and opportunity of fancy, which by a relatively spontaneous flow of images detached from the process in which they occur, seeks to regain the original immediacy and thus end the con-

¹ Cf. Urban, 'Appreciation and Description and the Psychology of Values,' *Philosophical Review*, Nov., 1905.

² Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, ch. v.

flict arising between expectation and reality. "Nothing" says Sully, "seems more to characterize the childhood of the race than the myth-making impulse which by an overflow of fancies seeks to hide the meagerness of knowledge." Thus the world of fancy, not unlike the primitive myth-world, becomes a 'projective' world in which thought can once more wander with absolute spontaneity. The naïve consciousness accepts it without question and, while neither science nor history, serves for both in the primitive mind. Both the myths and fancies of the unreflective consciousness are frankly naïve, claiming neither meaning nor moral, but loved for their own sake, as children delight in Fairy Tales and as even the wise of the 'grown-ups, have not outgrown genuine delight in pure romance.

The value of the myth is to be sought in the *process* rather than the *product*. The failure to estimate the myth from this point of view has led both anthropologists and ethnologists to attribute to it only a negative value in the development of thought. Max Müller thus defines the myth as a 'disease of language,' while Herbert Spencer finds its origin in the worship of the dead. In the present attempt, the myth-making consciousness, while looked upon as pre-aesthetic, is nevertheless regarded as the rise of a process of world objectification and unification continuous with the mental life. Thought is at the first 'projective,' in the sense that it reduces the presented world into terms of what it itself has, and fancy is to be regarded as the beginning of the process of unification of experience which will be shown to develop along with the increasing demands and possibilities of thought.

But the spontaneity of fancy does not sweep away the persisting character of the outer as held within the net of memory. Both the demand of the inner as embodied in fancy and the control of memory are now present and operative in consciousness and the first real sundering of consciousness is upon us. But the dualism is not complete, in that the inner as yet possesses only a contrast value. The presence of alternative responses and the compelling character of the new objects of presentation contribute to the separation of fact and meaning, datum and dispositional tendencies, stimulus and response. Neither mythological cosmology nor aphoristic ethics is ade-

quate to the demands which the individual now makes of them. As Professor Caird says: "The delicate moon-lit web of poetic fiction which the Greek imagination (fancy) had woven around the crude naturalism of pre-historic religion, insensibly coloring and idealizing it, could not maintain itself in the light of a critical age."¹ The myths of the early cosmogonists and theogonists yield to a poetry in which a subjective element appears. The naïve culture of Mycenae so beautifully pictured in the Homeric poems began to yield to individual thought and treatment. The primitive myths were recast by the masters of choral song and "The neutral tints of the back-ground were ever more and more relieved by strong self-conscious figures standing out from the uniform mass."²

Until now no question is asked touching the meaning and origin of things and the emancipation of thought from habit and custom means that the power of grasping the meaning of things apart from their actual existence has really come. "The Greeks" says Zeller, "were the first who gained sufficient freedom of thought to seek for the truth respecting the nature of things, not in religious tradition but in the things themselves; among them a strictly scientific method first appears, a knowledge that follows no laws except its own, became possible."³ Reality is no longer a matter of undisturbed feeling, and presence and meaning are no longer identical. The images detached from their original sense moorings and used as ideas, meanings, the problem at once arises of adapting these meanings to new situations and the satisfaction of varied interests. The problem of the inner and the outer has come, whose reconciliation became the burden of thought and the epistemological problem of all Greek thought. The rise of a dualized experience is significant as indicating that the epistemological consciousness with its characteristic problem of unification has come and it remains to show in the next chapter that the aesthetic consciousness has also arisen and, as 'semblant' consciousness, becomes the appropriate organ of the interpretation and unification of the inner-outer dualism.

¹ Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, Vol. II, p. 41.

² Gomperz, *The Greek Thinkers*, Vol. I, p. 11.

³ Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 133.

CHAPTER VI.

Greek Thought from Thales to Neo-Platonism as Illustrating the Epistemological Use of the Aesthetic Consciousness as the Organ of World Unification and Interpretation.

That outward circumstances and thought act and re-act on each other is a truth that has passed into a truism in our day, but in Greece it was a fact preëminently true and important. From Thales to the death of Aristotle must be regarded as the great epoch of Greek speculation within which is comprised all that is most perfect and brilliant in ancient philosophy. When the period began, Greek thought was just beginning to emancipate itself from the mythological cosmogonies and theogonies,¹ while at the close of the period, thought had mapped out, and to some extent formed, the paths along which subsequent thought has been forced to travel. But, as Gomperz remarks, before reflection could flourish, a considerable mass of detailed knowledge had to be accumulated. Both geographical and temperamental conditions were highly favorable in Greece for such enlargement of knowledge during the period from Thales to Plotinus. The growing power of reflection and acquaintance with the knowledge of the East awakened the notion of stability and law, which brought the problem of matter into the foreground of human thought.

Other tendencies were at work which tended to throw the individual back upon himself and thus sharpen and deepen the inner life. The development of industry and commerce, of war and politics, brought the individual face to face with other occupations and aims. Frequent changes in the polity of the state led men to regard it as a creation more or less human. The presence of cases, which could not be dealt with by any law already in existence, necessitated a modification of the ideas themselves. The friction of circumstances tends always to

¹ Ferrier, *Institutes of Metaphysics*, p. 165, et seq.

dissolve the rigidity of custom and discussion is born, which, as Professor Dewey says, led among the Greeks to the generation of logical theory.¹ As the result of these repeated failures of the moral law, morals, like politics, was regarded as the product of individual creation and hence as personal.

The beginnings of Greek thought are to be sought in the colonies rather than the mainland, which as Gomperz says 'became the play-ground of the Greek intellect.' Reflection takes its rise in the presence of change, and science working outward and backward, has, from the time of Thales, until now, been seeking the ἀρχή, the 'what' as the fundamental stuff out of which all things have come, and in which their explanation is to be sought.² Beneath all change there must be that which does not change and which gives unity to the otherwise chaotic manifold. The so-called 'Physiologers' from Thales to Democritus were seeking a postulate which would make all change intelligible. By one fell stroke Democritus reduced all phenomena to the mechanics of atoms. The things perceived by the several senses are to be regarded as a sort of mazy dance of physical points, since the atom was characterized by an abstract corporeality. The atoms are as manifold, and are assigned whatever attributes, the problem of knowledge may demand. They were mechanically and mathematically arranged and determined. The outer world is no longer to be looked upon as a "play-ground of innumerable capricious and counteracting manifestations of Will,"³ the expression of unknown and unseen powers shifting the scenes from behind, but rather as composed of an infinite number of atoms determined in all their movements and combinations by unchangeable law. Thus, as Professor Baldwin says, "The outer was stripped of those relative and ambiguous predicates which embarrassed earlier speculation."⁴

¹ 'Stages in the Development of Logical Theory,' *Philosophical Review*, Vol. IX, No. V.

² Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 3, 983, b6.

³ Gomperz, *The Greek Thinkers*, Vol. I.

⁴ *Proc. St. Louis Congress Arts and Science*; reprinted in *Psychological Review*, Vol. XII, 1905.

But the treatment of the inner did not keep pace with the treatment of the outer. By Democritus and the Atomists the mind was looked upon as a series of images produced by the movements of the atoms constituting the outer. The images were reduced copies of external objects. The contrast between sense-perception and thought, which was raised by Socrates was explained by the Atomists by establishing a quantitative relation between them.¹ The psychology of Democritus, established upon a materialistic basis, recognized no independent mechanism of ideas as conscious states.² The Atomists emphasized the physical side of the dualism of inner and outer and while the objective, as the external, was carried very far toward our more modern conclusions, the subjective, as the inner, was given only negative consideration and treatment.³ The general recognition of the relativity of the data of sense-perception by Democritus and others, contributed, however in an indirect way to the isolation and deepening of the inner. Democritus was convinced that knowledge was not possible upon a basis of relativity. Atomism represents a search after an epistemological principle in terms of which the world of experience can be explained and unified. The atoms of Democritus serve as 'schemata' the twofold purpose of scientific description, namely, communication and control of experience. They are however '*symbols*' not '*concepts*,' and thus illustrate the fact that all description involves an appreciative or selective element. The character and extent of the appreciative element thus employed depend upon the purpose in view. While therefore, the primitive explanations of the world have yielded to a more scientific, the selective element has not wholly disappeared, and whatever unity and stability were found in the world of Democritus and his contemporaries must be sought for in the aesthetic consciousness, as a mode of mental determination of presented content.

With the change of the seat of philosophy from the outlying colonies to the home-land, there took place also a characteristic

¹ Aristotle, *De Anima*, I, 2, 430b b 30 (Wallace).

² Vide Theophrastus, *Phys. Opin.*, 3 (Diehl).

³ Vide Ferrier, *Institutes of Metaphysics*, pp. 161, et. ff.

change in the character of philosophy itself. Hitherto philosophy was concerned primarily with the physical universe. But with the Sophists, the practical aspect came forward. The Protagorean 'homo mensura omnium' is significant as the first explicit recognition of the inner as a center of organization and control. The Sophists, as pure subjectivists, reduced knowledge to mere opinion.¹ But making the individual the measure of all things, they were unable to justify knowledge as a common possession and in the end gave up its pursuit. The urgent problem of the age, how to secure knowledge which would preserve the social and moral life of the nation in the presence of the continued failure of the old-time supports, while formulated, was not solved by the Sophists. To the solution of this problem a greater Sophist gave both his thought and life, whose 'γνώσις ἀνθρώπων' is significant as indicating the change of emphasis in philosophic thought.

Socrates raised the question and called upon every individual to raise it for himself; but of its solution, he confesses himself as ignorant as any other individual. The outcome of the Sophistic movement was the discrediting of all thought—"the futile attempt to spin truth out of one's own inner consciousness."² The epistemological problem was the finding of the common element of all thought—a problem which Socrates set himself to solve. To know, is in order to do, so that with Socrates the moral consciousness functions for the first time as an epistemological postulate.

To think, according to Socrates, necessitates common premises, as well as a common end. That the outer is the determining pole in the inner-outer dualism of the age, is to be inferred from the fact, that the general conceptions which Socrates established by means of his characteristic method, represent the things of abiding worth in the existing social situation. Meaning is no longer identical with sense-perception, but is rather what one *intends*. Social life demands community of conduct and therefore common meanings, but since consciousness is still

¹ Dewey, 'Stages of Logical Theory,' *Philos. Review*, Vol. IX, 1905.

² On the Sophists, see Aristotle, *Met.* III., 2, 1004; Plato, *Protagoras*, Jowett's Trs., beginning at p. 310 A; *Theaetetus*, *Ibid.*, p. 151E.

regarded as passive and receptive the aspect of commonness must be sought without.¹

The latter part of the life of Socrates covered the period of the loss of Athenian prestige and supremacy, and his philosophy has been defined as an attempt to hold up consistently the better ideals of Athenian life.² With Plato, Athens having yielded to Macedonian rule, philosophy came to be an attempt to reconstruct the original Greek City-State. His philosophy, like that of his master, is primarily ethical, but the complete failure of the outer makes reconstruction possible only to the philosopher. Once more the epistemological problem becomes the obtaining of knowledge which will justify and guarantee conduct in the midst of constant change. Plato also recognized that neither thought nor conduct is possible upon a relativistic basis. The senses are deceptive and perception can yield opinion only. Only the ideas are real. Sense experiences become real only in so far as they participate in the ideas or imitate them. The ideas, however, are 'schemata,' and while they can not be verified in terms of sense-experience they are the necessary presuppositions of thought. They are also practical as were the notions of Socrates, as representing the things of most value in the social situation.

But Plato was poet as well as philosopher, seer as well as scientist, and his solution of the epistemological problem is poetical rather than logical.³ The myths which bulk so largely in the Dialogues are not to be regarded as instances of defeat or graceful embellishments merely, but rather as Westcott says "Venturous essays after truth—embodiments of definite instincts—material representations of speculative doctrines which while affirmed by instinct can not be verified by scientific process." As the unreflective myth represented an attempt to hold together the two worlds of sense-presentation and dispositional tendencies so in the hands of Plato, the myth, now become conscious, bursts in upon the Dialogue with the revelation of a world trans-

¹ Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, p 133.

² Dewey, *Lectures on Greek Philosophy* in Johns Hopkins University, 1906-1907 (not published).

³ Cf. *Phaedrus*, Jowett's translation, p. 265 D; *Symposium*, Ibid., p. 201 D.

cending the world of sense-experience by which the latter is transfused and reduced to unity. The myths of Plato are, therefore, vital and integral parts of the Dialogues and represent deliverances of that larger aspect of consciousness which as Stewart says "Is not articulate and logical but which feels and acts and wills—to that major part of our nature which while not able to explain what a thing is or how it appears but feels that it is good or bad and thus expresses itself in judgments of worth or value rather than in existential judgments of fact."¹

Whatever unity therefore, the Dialogues of Plato contain, is to be sought in his artistic rather than in his logical treatment. Still Plato is unable to distinguish between the True and the Good; and this limitation is significant as reflecting both the character of the epistemological problem and the nature of the aesthetic consciousness which is used as the appropriate means of reconciling the inner-outer dualism. The two spheres of reference into which consciousness is now polarized are the world of sensible phenomena and the world of ideas. To the former Plato ascribes no specific value whatever. The world of ideas is the only true and essential world. The phenomena of sense may lead us to the realm of the eternal ideas, but to enter the latter, we must break with the former. The original beauty is both bodiless and colorless and bears no likeness whatsoever to the things of sense-perception. Like philosophy, the organ of artistic creation is a sort of higher inspiration. The artist is no longer guided by scientific methods but by a 'sort of uncertain and tentative empiricism.' Art products are therefore for Plato, a species of phantasy and while he nowhere defines precisely what the term phantasy means as used by him, it nevertheless appears to be a creation lying mid-way between the phenomena of sense-perception and the immutable ideas, corresponding to what in the case of the development of thought in the individual we found to be a process of 'sembling' as the form by which contents of thought are advanced and accepted as 'assumption' as compared with 'pure presumption' of the first immediacy. In one connection Plato hints that there might be

¹ Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, p. 21.

a more perfect art because of a complete knowledge, but then art and philosophy would become identical. If we define the epistemological problem as it presented itself to Plato, as the unification of experience now sundered by the inner-outer dualism and known as the problem of the one and the many, we are justified in concluding that by the use of the aesthetic consciousness Plato sought to solve the problem thus presented by reducing his world to an artistic whole. Thus the expression of the 'one in the many,' of 'unity in variety' which represents the truly aesthetic principle of Greek thought touching the beautiful, represents also the urgent problem of Greek speculation and its characteristic solution. Plato clearly recognized the epistemological problem set by his two-fold world of ideas and sense-phenomena, and sought its solution in terms of beauty, which placed between the two worlds became the abiding sign and evidence of the presence of the Absolute and the stimulus to the development of higher possibilities.

The continuity of Greek thought must be sought in Aristotle, rather than in the several Platonic Schools that arose after the death of the Master. Both Plato and Aristotle agree in defining philosophy as the science of the concept, as the universal element of thought and conduct. But while Plato makes the universal the starting point of his philosophy and attempts to deduce the particular from it, Aristotle begins with the particular datum of experience and seeks to ascend to the universal. For Aristotle experience is the true cause of knowledge rather than a mere occasion, as Plato taught. The former universalized the concept by placing it in a world apart and above the particular, while the latter makes the universal an attribute of the mind itself.¹ Form and matter, the universal and the particular, actuality and potentiality, are related, and the determination of the relations existing between them becomes the chief task of the philosopher.

The philosophy before Aristotle represented a series of attempts to regulate and reorganize the social situation fast disintegrating, hence its practical character. By the time of

¹ *Met.*, III, 4, 999; *De Alma*, II, 5, 417.

Aristotle, social life has disintegrated beyond all hope of successful reorganization, so that thinking can be followed because of its own interest. Since the State, as the sphere of abiding truth and values, has wholly failed, such sphere can be sought only in and through thought. In fact, as Professor Dewey has shown, two short generations sufficed to effect a complete divorce between philosophy and life, and the isolation of reflective thought from practical conduct.¹ Philosophy now became an organ of vision, an instrument of interpretation, rather than a series of attempts to reclaim and reorganize a social situation that had wholly failed.

The limitation of the Aristotelian procedure is to be seen in the fact, that Aristotle was obliged to assume, as self-evident, certain fundamental truths which were neither established nor modified by thought, but which stood in their own right.² Apart from such truths the mind is still in the grasp of fancy and opinion.³ It became necessary to assume these fundamental truths as posts to which to fasten, organize and control the otherwise particular and contingent experiences. No question was asked, at the first, touching the universality and credibility of the truths thus assumed. Later however the problem of the 'quod semper, ubique, ab omnibus,' became one of special importance. But with Aristotle "commonness" was assumed and as in the case of Plato it may be concluded that the material thus assumed by the philosopher was of a 'syndoxic' character. The sphere of presuppositions was therefore 'common-as-common,' so that the use of it was more like to obtain general approval and acceptance.

Aristotle's philosophy represents an attempt to solve the dualism inherent in the Platonic conception of Ideas. But while he did not solve the problem presented by the dualistic consciousness, he cleared the way for a solution not hitherto possible. For Plato the world, as objective, is just the universals of thought, which in his abstract fashion, he separates

¹ Johns Hopkins University Lectures on Greek Philosophy (not published).

² Aristotle, *Ana. Post.* II, 19, 99b, 20.

³ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, 9, 1086, b 8.

completely from the particulars of sense by setting them apart as self-subsisting realities.

To bring these two worlds together represented the epistemological problem which Plato bequeathed to his successors. The positive contribution of Aristotle is his contention that the universal and the particular do not dwell apart in complete isolation, but that the universal existed only in and through the particular, while the latter existed only in and for the former.¹ Reality, therefore, must be found in the indissoluble union of these two aspects of thought. Thought and sense can not be taken apart from each other, except by a process of abstraction. The individual is not, therefore, the given of sense, as Plato held, but the joint product of sense and the universals of thought, of matter and form. In fine, the aspects of the problem presented by the epistemological consciousness are rather two aspects within the same process. Matter as the unformed tends toward form with something akin to desire, so that matter is not *negation* as Plato would say but *privation*. Form on the contrary as the final and efficient cause is the source of specific determination, actuality and perfection, while matter remains nevertheless a real principle of being.

The process of world-construction was considered by Aristotle after the analogy of the plastic arts in which the materials employed serve not only as a limit to the realization of formative thought, but as the means of the revelation of thought itself. The artist is not confined to a slavish imitation of things as they are but it is possible for him to reproduce things as they might be. Art is no longer the imitative reproduction of nature, which is itself a copy only, as Plato taught, but an act of creation in the form of an image in which the incomplete purpose of nature and her defects are corrected.²

Aristotle thus saw in art, as Butcher says, a rational faculty which divines nature's unfulfilled intentions and reveals her ideal to sense.³ The illusions which it employs are of consciousness' own making and acceptance and instead of cheating the mind

¹ Aristotle, *Ana. Post.* I, 11, 77 a 5; *Met.* VI, 16, 1040, b27.

² Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and the Fine Arts*, pp. 110, 144, 150.

³ *Ibid.*

as Plato thought, image forth the immanent idea which can not find expression under the forms of material existence. Poetry is, therefore, more philosophical than history according to Aristotle,¹ and when we recall the long and bitter feud between poetry and philosophy the conclusion becomes extremely significant. Between poetry and history, however, there was no such feud and in primitive times the two are identical. Poetry, according to Plato, is only fiction and all fiction is necessarily immoral, hence poets must be denied citizenship in the ideal republic. In the *Poetics* of Aristotle there is a manifest attempt to heal this strife and Aristotle finds in art the meeting point of the universal and the particular, of form and matter.² Poetry is thus related to philosophy in that it seeks also to express the universal as pure form. It finds its differentia from philosophy in the fact that while their content is identical, the method of expressing the content is wholly different. Given reality is still the sphere of reference and control, but to Aristotle it must be ideal.

But if reality is thus preserved, in what direction does the process of idealization proceed and what is the standard by which such procedure is to be judged? Thus far, we have seen, that moralistic considerations embarrassed aesthetic speculation and artistic creation. This was due to the fact that the theoretical and the practical activities of consciousness were not clearly differentiated. With Aristotle the two forms of activity are clearly recognized as distinct and the attempt is actually made to give each independent treatment. With Aristotle the practical is made subordinate to the theoretical. Art, however, is for Aristotle a practical science, since distinction between the fine and useful arts was not reached by the Greeks at all.³ Nevertheless the recognition of the beautiful as subordinate to the practical is significant as indicating the rise of the sense of value and the interpretation of the world from the standpoint of meaning. But these meanings, values, ideals, can not be

¹ Ibid., p. 153 ff.

² Butcher, *op. cit.* p. 360 ff.

³ Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetics*, p. 22; cf. also. Butcher *op. cit.*, 144, and ch. iv.

expressed in terms of the theoretical reason which must take things as they are. In the instance alike of the theoretical and the practical the control is mediate in character which indicates that consciousness has lost its old-time immediacy. Theoretical philosophy sought some unifying principle but could only arrive at the conception of unity in terms of content and control outside the process of determination and construction. Art, on the contrary, as the expression of unity in direct and sensuous form, supplied the postulate demanded alike by the theoretical and the practical reason. Thus both Plato's 'reminiscence,' and Aristotle's 'blessed contemplation,' represent aesthetic attempts as a solution of the epistemological problem of the age.

In the presence of the dualism of inner and outer, form and matter, the actual and the ideal, consciousness at once bounds beyond 'flamantia moenia' and finds refuge and victory by identifying itself with the object of aspiration and contemplation, in a state of immediacy—a state in which reminiscences passes into intuition, faith into sight and in which the individual enters into the contemplative blessedness of the Deity in a life of 'wishless absorption.'

The significance of the several schools of thought that arose after Aristotle, is to be found in the several attempts to find the criterion of thought and conduct within the individual. The thought of the whole period is ethical, but of a negative character. Both the Stoics and the Epicureans were materialists in their conception of nature and sensuous in their theory of knowledge. The former were fatalists and taking life more seriously, their philosophy became the more popular. Nature was their great word as a whole in which every thing is necessitated and purposive. The world of nature, as comprehending the things of supreme worth, is given the place of respect and authority formerly enjoyed by the outer social order. The fatalistic character of the Stoics shows both the strength and limitation of the will. Thought being unable as yet to create a world for the will, the latter, by the aid of the imagination, from which it is never separated, attempts to carry itself through. The Stoics at once turned Pantheists, which means always an identification of the actual and the ideal, 'of what is and what ought-to-

be.’¹ For the Stoics, there was no margin between the actual and the ideal, hence the static character of the system. The eschatological element, which bulks so large in the literature of the Stoics as well as in other literature of the time, represents an imaginative embodiment of human belief touching the final outcome of things and in the case of the Stoics represents the carrying of aesthetic insight to a cosmic conclusion. The dualism which runs through Stoicism is a dualism within matter, the terms of which differ only quantitatively (a sort of materialized idealism), hence the control is as yet in the outer. Thus as Bosanquet indicates, “The mechanical view of the imagination, the negative or intellectualist view of the emotions, the complete subordination of the theoretical to the practical, all these influences hindered the Stoic from completing his conception of man’s place in nature by an adequate theory of aesthetic expression.”² By universalizing the individual they found neither need nor opportunity of individual activity and construction and the doctrine of imperturbability or complete freedom from the outer represents an attempt to merge, in a mystical consciousness, the social and individual aspirations in a far away dream of a common fellowship of wise men.³

The Epicureans made the ‘reasonableness of feeling’ the criterion of conduct and made the world the work of chance. In matters of cosmology they revived the atomic theory of Democritus, while they drew their ethics and theory of knowledge from Aristippus. Being casualists they refused to acknowledge the objective value of art as expressing a definite content and even went so far as to reduce all imitative art to the level of cookery. Nevertheless, the Epicureans, with their characteristic emphasis on feeling, contributed in an indirect way to the isolation and deepening of the inner. Their general likeness to the Stoics is to be inferred from the fact that with both the highest ideal conceived was negative, both abhorred the conditions in which they were placed, and agreed in seeking happiness by freeing the individual from all disturbing elements.

¹ Martineau, *The Study of Religion*, Vol. II.

² Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetics*, p. 100.

³ Cf. *The Republic of Plato*, for an Ideal State for Philosophers only.

Both the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics and the individualism of the Epicureans contributed to the loosening of the ties that bound the inner to the outer and the search of both after a criterion of truth is significant as indicating that the standard of truth and conduct is regarded as a matter of inner determination.

Kuno Fischer suggests that the philosophic problem after Aristotle was the problem of freedom, that is, the freeing of man from the world whose dissolution became daily more evident. The Stoics would have men attain freedom by becoming dead to the world about them, while the Epicureans would have men enjoy as much as possible and suffer as little. The Skeptics went still farther and sought to convince men that the problems pressing for solution were after all insoluble. These three movements, while differing in details, nevertheless spring from one motive and aim at one end, namely, the freeing of the individual from the world and the attaining of a self-consciousness contained within itself with entire self-sufficiency.

To ground the individual thus freed from the outer world, and to create for him a world in which he can 'live and move and have his being,' becomes the urgent problem of the age. While freed from the outer, the individual has come to perceive that the inner is also a part of the outer.¹ Whether the inner be made pure will as with the Stoics, or feeling as with the Epicureans, or thought as with the Skeptics, it comes to be regarded as outer also, so that the outer now claims to be both inner and outer.

In chapter II it was shown that the individual is brought face to face with a similar experience, owing to what Professor Baldwin has called the 'anomalous position of the body;' the resolution of this double claim of the body issues in the substantive dualism of mind and body.²

But while widening to the utmost the chasm between the inner and the outer, the individual also seeks their union. The epistemological problem as to the reconciliation of the corporeal and the incorporeal, the physical and the spiritual, the temporal

¹ Plotinus, *Enneads*, IV., 7, sec. 2 (Creutzer text).

² *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 95ff.; cf. chapter ii of this paper.

and the eternal, represents the philosophical problem of the last years of antiquity. The historians of the period agree in holding that the thought of the period is characterized by a search after aid in all possible sources, but more especially in the Orient. The motive for such procedure is close at hand. Since the outer has failed, only two possible modes of reconciling the dualistic experience are open: either by supernatural revelation on the part of God or supernatural illumination on the part of the individual. Accordingly aid was sought in two principal sources. In the first place deliverance was sought in the Jewish Scriptures, which had been made known to the Greek world through the Septuagint translation. It is to be noted also that the external fortune of the Jews at this time made them kin to the individuals of the Graeco-Roman world, while the ardent hope of future restoration, the spiritualized conception of God and the conception of angels as mediating between God and man, made the Jewish Scriptures extremely attractive to the individuals of the Graeco-Roman world. But while Greek thought was purely intellectual and thus made thought and reality identical, Jewish thought conceived of God as the highest reality in terms of will. The world is regarded as the expression and embodiment of the will of God and is therefore purposive, rather than mechanical, while the Messianic Hope, which unifies the Jewish Scriptures, reaches its climax in the Incarnation, which has been called the 'Poetry of Conscience.'

The reconciliation of the two worlds is thus secured by means of the working will, which has now become conscious of itself as apart from the materials with which it operates.¹ The resulting construction is neither a transcript of the outer, nor a creation of pure fancy, but a world which while not existent is nevertheless accepted and treated as if it were in actual existence. The world thus erected in which the several demands of consciousness are recognized and reconciled is no longer a 'presumption' such as characterized the first immediacy, but rather an 'assumption.' In the construction of this world materials are borrowed from any source whatsoever. The

¹ Plotinus, *op. cit.*, IV, 7, sec. 7; V, 11, 128, 1, 3 et seq.; IV, 7, sec. 8.

period therefore is comparable to the corresponding period in the development of thought in the individual, which we know as the 'semblant' or play consciousness. The result is that we are now presented with an aesthetic of the will, and beauty comes to be regarded as *coördinate* with morality rather than *subordinate* to it as in the earlier aesthetic theory.

The selective aspect of the thought of the period is to be seen also in the tendency to go back to the older conception and the selection made is extremely significant as showing the epistemological value of the earlier mythical constructions. The individual, in turning to the past finds two movements of thought which answer his need, namely, the teachings of Pythagoras and Plato, and both are at once surrounded with a halo of divine authority. But since the Pythagorean numbers must be taken conceptually only, the Neo-Platonic philosophy becomes the more valuable.

Plato's doctrine of the Ideas, as descending step by step from the highest unity to the lowest limit, where form enters into matter, is at once seized upon as supplying the reality of the two poles of the dualism, as well as supplying the series of intermediate beings which as rungs in the ladder become the means of communication and thus of reconciliation of the two worlds, otherwise completely irreconcilable.¹ The primordial Being, as the Idea of the Good, is placed beyond the world of men and things.² The intermediate beings are not the result of the creative act of God, but rather emanations of his fullness.³ The significant aspect of these emanations is that, as emanations rather than determinations of either thought or will, they become the plastic material of aesthetic or semblant treatment. It is precisely here that we are to seek for the general advance in aesthetic theory and construction in Plotinus.

According to Plotinus and also Dio Chrysostom and Philostratus, art is not a more or less exact imitation of an outer copy-world, which is itself only a copy, but the expression of a selective will in sensuous form. But since Plotinus was an emanationist,

¹ Plotinus, *op. cit.*, V, sec. 1; II, 168.

² Plotinus, *op. cit.*, VI, 9, sec. 6.

³ Cf. The Pleroma doctrine of the New Testament.

rather than an evolutionist,¹ that which is realized in the form of art is necessarily less than the idea—the created less than the creator—but he nevertheless insists that “If any one condemns the arts because they create by way of imitation of nature, first we must observe that natural things themselves are an imitation of something further and next we must bear in mind that the arts do not simply imitate the visible but go back to the reason (Logous—Ideas) from which nature comes and that they create much out of themselves and add to that which is defective as being themselves in possession of beauty.” Art, therefore, is no longer slavishly *imitative*, but rather *symbolic*.

Nevertheless by making matter wholly antipodal to mind, a complete reconciliation of the dualism is impossible. To solve the epistemological problem thus presented the individual must rise above the material and temporal world² and grasp the eternal idea from which all things proceed and which therefore gives meaning and value to all things.

The moralistic considerations which embarrassed the aesthetic theory alike of Plato and Aristotle are removed by Plotinus and beauty comes to be regarded as the direct expression of reason by means of aesthetic semblance. Still, the Absolute Reason, while within the universe as the outer, is not contained by it, hence it can not be given in terms of external nature. Thus one must go beyond the process in which the dualism originated for its solution. Ecstasy rather than reason becomes the organ of the apprehension of beauty. Above the intellectual intuition is the ecstatic intuition of the One in which the duality of the human and the divine, the corporeal and the spiritual, the temporal and the eternal, of thought and being is reconciled through an immediacy of contact with the Primordial Being. Ecstasy, therefore, as a symbolic experience, becomes the means of transcending self-consciousness by erecting an object which transcends all particular determinations. The beautiful is more than a matter of unity in variety; it is the whole in which the parts are lost to view and which bodies forth in symbolic fashion

¹ Plotinus, *loc. cit.*, V, sec. 2.

² Ibid., VI, 9, 10.

the eternal beauty and significance of the universe.¹ Insisting upon the epistemological problem as the unification of experience, it is to be concluded that in transcending the inner-outer dualism the Neo-Platonists made use of the aesthetic consciousness as the organ of world unification and interpretation.

¹ Vide, *Enneads*, IV, 1, a passage in which Plotinus bids us mount by means of the beauty of the external world, to the contemplation of the 'ideal form,' the 'universal world.'

CHAPTER VII.

The Development of Thought from Neo-Platonism to the German Mystics of the Sixteenth Century, as Illustrating the Progression from the Inner-Outer Dualism to that of Mind-Body, in which the Mind Term of the Dualism is Distinguished from the Body Term only for Theoretical and Theological Purposes.

The mystical reconciliation of the inner-outer dualism by the Neo-Platonists represented the merging of a two-fold control. There was, in the first place, an actual turning to the past for materials already under definite and guaranteed coefficients of control. The imperturbable self-certainty of the post-Aristotelian philosophy had been so completely shaken with the continued failure of the outer order, that man everywhere as in need of help and no longer finding his own insight sufficient turned to the 'records of the past.' These writings of the earlier periods were regarded as the means of a higher revelation. As Windelband has pointed out, the striking characteristic of the period after Aristotle is the search after authority, and not capable of being spun out of one's own inner imagination and thus gotten immediately, was sought in historically accredited revelations. Divine revelation thus became the highest source of all knowledge.¹ But the selection and manipulation of these materials were matters of individual illumination and thus *immediate* in character. The Neo-Platonic Mysticism represents a theory of knowledge, which as Windelband says, contains a heightened value of the individual as evinced in feeling and as the attempt at a fulfilment of the longing of the age that truth might be arrived at by experience as an inner communion of the individual with the Supreme Being. But since the dualism was not complete, the inner possessing 'contrast value'

¹ Windelband, *History of Phil.*, ch. vii, p. 102.

only, the symbolic constructions of the Neo-Platonists, as the semblant or imitative treatment of the material borrowed from the past under the urgency of practical need, must be regarded as the rather quasi-aesthetic; while the epistemological consciousness with its characteristic problem of unification of experience must be regarded as quasi-epistemological. It is to be inferred, therefore, that the aesthetic arose with the epistemological as the appropriate organ of world reconciliation and interpretation and that the character of the aesthetic construction reflects more or less faithfully the character and demands of the epistemological.

In the case of the development of the thought of the race, as also in the case of the growth of thought in the individual, the erection of a semblant object under inner control and assigned meaning which it does not as yet possess brings forward the problem of a further determination of the inner. Until the rise of the semblant, the body was recognized as the abode of both the outer and the inner, while the latter was wholly lacking in positive determination. As the result of the imitative treatment of the body it is at once assigned to the outer as a sphere of material available for inner treatment and the fulfilment of inner purposes. But with the rise of the semblant, the same method of manipulation is applied to contents once inner, so that what was once inner, is now made outer, while the inner, as such migrates still farther within. It is precisely here that we are to seek for the materials and motives of the dualism of the material and the spiritual, the corporeal and the incorporeal, that ran throughout the philosophy of the Middle Ages and which finally issued in the mind-body dualism of Descartes.

The development of the epistemological consciousness is thus seen to be the separation and increasing determinateness of the two factors that enter into its objective constructions as embodiments of meaning. These two factors are the content and the control. The characteristic of consciousness in its first immediacy was that it involved no separation of these two factors. In classic Greek, thought was largely 'projective' and philosophy represented a series of attempts to secure tranquillity in the midst of certain failure. Both the epistemological

problem and its aesthetic solution were rather objective—in the sense however of ‘projective’ that does not imply the corresponding subjective. The continued failure of the outer as held in memory and the rapid enrichment of experience in the fifth and fourth centuries made necessary and possible the distinction of theoretical and practical interest. With Plotinus, however, we find the first instance of the determination of an object as possessing a meaning and existence determined by the mind itself. But it remains to be pointed out, that in the end, the thought of the Neo-Platonists terminates, on the objective or content side, in a sphere which lies beyond existence and, on the subjective side, in a mystical illumination, which is after all the negation of thought.¹

But the erection of a semblant object as representing the coalescence of two controls raises the problems connected with the terms meaning, existence, reality, together with the larger problem of individuation, which has so far been raised only. As has been indicated, the semblant constructions of the Neo-Platonists represented an imitative treatment of materials borrowed from other sources and accepted as being under a definite form of control but which was lifted from its original moorings and made the object of inner manipulation and thus assigned to a sphere which is neither outer nor inner, but in which the demands of both are recognized and realized. The resulting construction was due very largely to religious interests and in the disposition of the object thus erected the two attitudes merged in its construction at once issue and set the problem which made necessary a similar construction toward the close of the period under discussion. The theory of Inspiration or Illumination, which as the merging of two controls and thus the symbolic means of an immediate unity of the individual with the Supreme Being at once diverged into two wholly different forms. In the case of the Church, borrowing the material and model of its organization from the Graeco-Roman world, revelation as Windelband says, became fixed as histor-

¹ Vide, *Enneads*, VI, 7, 34, where Plotinus says that ‘he who would rise above reason, falls outside it.’ Cf. also Bigg, *Neo-Platonism*, p. 199. Cf. also Siebeck, *Religionsphil. Studien*, 119.

ical authority and thus became the source of the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages; while the continuation of the inner control factor of the Neo-Platonic symbolism became the source of the Mysticism of the same period. The tracing out of the development of these two streams of thought with the emphasis however upon the former is the matter of present concern.

In its organization the church made free use of material which represented the generalization of a past experience, so that from the standpoint of the content of its organization the church represented a mixture of Greek and Jewish elements. The idea of God was made transcendent and the doctrine of divine election is only the carrying over of the old Greek ideas of aristocracy into the realm of the spiritual.¹ This transcendent view of things contributed to the separation and sharpening of the spiritual from the sensuous. But as thus organized out of materials that represented the generalization of a past experience, the kingdom is still interpreted outwardly, so that both the thought and the conduct of the Middle Ages terminate on an existence which lies beyond both.² The real treasures of earth still lie beyond it, and the kingdom that is to be, already is, and at a later day shall descend as the New Jerusalem from the clouds. The Church of the West was thus organized upon a thoroughly transcendental basis.

But having taken under her charge the highest interests of the individual, the Church at once proceeds to take control of the State. The separation of Church and State referred to as representing the ethical climax of antiquity is to be undone by bringing the two realms under a common organization with Rome as its center and the bishop of Rome as its common head.

Nevertheless, the attempted union of Church and State contributed to the farther isolation and deepening of the inner as the second aspect of the Neo-Platonic symbolism. The individual sought the Church because the State as the existing outer failed him when most needed. The ideas around which the doctrines of the Church gathered represented a generalization of

¹ Cf. Nash, *Genesis of the Social Conscience*, ch. ii.

² Cf. Baldwin, 'Sketch of the History of Psychology,' *Psychological Review*, Vol. XII, 1905.

a stage of knowledge already outgrown, hence the struggle between the Nominalists and the Realists. In fact, both as regards external organization and inner content, the Church stood above the individual, with the result that the individual is once more thrown back upon himself and compelled to go beyond the Church for the expression and realization of his ideas and aspirations. The age was characterized by the increasing presence and number of Saints, Knight-errants and Magicians. The growth of Monasticism, as a Church within the Church, kept pace with the increasing secularization of the Church Universal, and within monastic walls, were in process of forming the ideas and ideals which at a later period burst forth and became the formative principles of modern culture and religion.

At this time were produced the great epics of the German people—"Creations alive with all the stir and strife of the time, retaining an afterglow of the oldest mythical traditions but strangely tinged with the recent historical experiences, representing the old Germanic ideas of uprightness, devotion and fidelity, but also the loosening of all social bonds and the rule of vile passions brought about by this age of revolt."¹

By the ninth century the work of subjugation and conquest was completed. 'The greedy, untrained individual of the North had drunk the wine and eaten the food of the Graeco-Roman civilization.'² The authoritative truth contained in the mediaeval Church and State had accomplished its work of disciplining the untrained masses. What was at first purely outer has now become inner in the sense that the individual has made it his own. By a process of imitative absorption, the rude conqueror of the Roman world, has in turn, been captured by it, and a new civilization arises. But in the process of absorption, the appetites and impulses of the individual of the North, while controlled are not destroyed but quickened, so that he at once comes to make increased demands of materials which have been so fully and faithfully doled out to him. The immediacy of

¹ Francke, *loc. cit.*, p. 16.

² Dewey, 'Significance of the Problem of Knowledge,' *University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, No. III (1897).

stimulus and response, of motive and guarantee of thought and conduct, is again broken down, and the individual of Germanic origin, no less than the Graeco-Roman individual, must seek these beyond the Church-State community of which he is now a member.

That the burden of metaphysical discussion has shifted from the ontological to the epistemological—from the outer to the inner—is to be inferred from the character of the philosophy of Saint Augustine. The *Confessions* is significant as indicating the rise and potency of the principle of individuality. The placing of psychology in the very fore-front of his philosophy and his making will the chief factor of conscious life, are further illustrations of the change of attitude toward the inner. It will be recalled that with Socrates, thought and will were completely identified. To know is to do; and sin is a matter of ignorance. Aristotle made the will more central, but in the end his conception of the will is made to conform to his conception of the Deity. The emanational and dualistic conceptions of antiquity are the necessary conclusions of a static view of things. "Pagan antiquity" Baur says, "never got beyond the antithesis of matter and spirit and could not conceive a world produced by the free creative activity of a purely personal will."¹ With both Plato and Aristotle and the Post-Aristotelians, including the Theologians of the Church, the outward movement of thought into a reality already determined, rather than the treatment of the inner receives the emphasis. The large place assigned the will by the learned Bishop of Hippo illustrates the passage of thought from a static to a more dynamic conception. The relations obtaining between God and the world come to be regarded from the ethical point of view. "The peculiarity of Christian philosophy" says Windelband, "consisted essentially in this, that in its apprehension of the relations between God and the World it sought to employ throughout the ethical point of view of a free creative action." The Greek conception of an uncreated matter is part of a dualism which may be refined but never reconciled with the other

¹ Baur, *Church History*, Vol. I, p. 193.

term of the dualism, while the presence of an unreconciled dualism, means the presence of some element in the universe that successfully withstands the intellectual and ethical process.¹ But the conception of the freedom of God and the creation of the world as the outcome of a purposive act of a holy will, places at once the dualism of form and matter, of ideal and actual, in such relations to each other, that their reconciliation becomes the burden of philosophic discussion.

It is interesting to observe that the development of the subjective and the dynamic view of the world arise and develop together. The conception of the freedom of God, as embodied and illustrated in the creation and maintenance of the world, drew after it the conception of the freedom of the individual. Still, human freedom was regarded as a divine gift, rather than a natural attribute. The soul is not a *gift* but a *task*, while freedom no longer implies the identification of the real and the ideal but the opportunity for the most perfect realization of the individual. Hitherto the summum bonum represented the unchanging nature of things and virtue was only a capacity for its contemplation. But the highest good is now an *infinite force* rather than a *fixed quantity*. The realm of thought and conduct is not a completed and static universe in which means and end are identical, but a historic process in which the two aspects are correlative and determining factors. The old-time dualism of form and matter, the actual and the potential, still remains but finds now a new basis within the individual.

The limitation of the thought of Saint Augustine is to be seen in the fact that he holds the Church before him always as the ultimate criterion, while at the same time, he gathers all his ideas about the absolute and immediate certainty of consciousness. Although a virtuoso in self-observation and self-analysis, his separation of the soul from the body, the individual from the universal, was motivated by theological and practical purposes. The individual as erected by Augustine was wholly

The identifying of the Absolute experience with unformed matter, thus making the Absolute matter without form, was the outcome of Neo-Platonism. Cf. also the Absolute of Herbert Spencer.

religious in character. The idea of God is immediately involved in whatever certainty the individual consciousness has of itself.

But he also insists that the essence of truth is its existence, and since truth is absolutely incorporeal, it can only be thought as the ideas of God after a Neo-Platonic fashion. All rational knowledge is thus knowledge of God. The relation of the individual to truth is therefore passive and receptive; hence it can be reached only through a process of illumination or revelation.¹

It is thus seen that the issue of the two types of thought in Augustine, the metaphysical and the theological, is the dualism of the individual and the universal whose reconciliation extends far into the Middle Ages. Saint Augustine however found the secret of the unification of experience, not in the restless activity of the will with Plotinus, but in the rest of contemplation, an experience into which the individual after the struggles and exertions of the present life are over may enter and by becoming absorbed in the divine truth may once more enjoy the perfect identity of the divine and the human, the individual and the universal.²

By the middle of the tenth century is seen for the first time in the history of the Western world a distinctly German State, which is not only able to maintain its own identity, but has already entered upon that struggle against the Church, out of which the modern individual is to emerge. Within this long drawn-out struggle is produced a literature which is significant as indicating the effective working of the two contrasting tendencies, not only in literature, but in life as a whole. By the end of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth, mediaeval society was at its height. The long struggle between the Church and the Empire assumed its largest proportions and out of it there issued the most signal expressions of a collective consciousness. The whole national existence had been quickened and deepened by the Crusades and attempts are everywhere made to give expression to the fulness of human nature. Chiv-

¹ God is above all that may be said of Him; He is best known by nescience, best described by negatives. *De Trin.*, VII, 7; *De Civ. Dei*, IX, 16.

² *Ep.*, 120, 20; *De Ord.*, II, 16, 42, 59; *Conf.*, VIII, 10 (Bigge's translation).

alry has become the recognized foundation of public life. "In the Minnesong; in the rejuvenated and transformed German Epic of the Migration period; in the adaptation, through the medium of the French, of the Celtic and Graeco-Roman traditions, the chivalric ideal receives its poetical expression."¹

Throughout the entire period, from the ninth to the thirteenth century, the most striking characteristic is the attempt upon the part of the individual to reach beyond the limits of the culture of the age as contained in the Church and State—a sort of divine anticipation of a new social order. Once more as in the days of Socrates, the individual can no longer find the motives and sanctions of conduct within the community of which he is a member. While corporate life is still the chief concern of the individual there is everywhere to be seen the development of the spirit of self-assertiveness which will later bring about the dissolution of the present régime. "In the directness of the Volklied and its subjectivity; in the sturdy realism of the religious drama; in the glorification of the inner union between God and the soul by the Mystics; in the proclamation by the Humanists of the sovereignty of the individual intellect we see the different phases of that revolt against mediæval society which culminated in the religious Reformation."²

With the twofold movement called on its religious side the Reformation and on its secular the Renaissance, the individual, freed himself from the immediate past. "The sum of the whole matter is" says Nash, "that the individual fashioned by the combined influences of the Graeco-Roman Empire and the Bible, drilled in the monastery, called forth from the monastery by the revival of culture and religion on the one hand and by the growing power of the State on the other, stood free in the open field of history."³ Having thus risen above the ideas that had been handed down to him from the past, by regarding them as material available for personal treatment, the problem of the reconciliation of a dualistic consciousness is once again the urgent problem of speculation. The fact that consciousness

¹ Francke, *Social Forces of German Literature*, p. 45.

² Francke, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

³ Nash, *Genesis of the Social Conscience*, p. 259.

now distinguishes itself from the materials of its manipulation, presents a problem not hitherto found. The atmosphere became one of invention—the search after control over natural forces. The Renaissance placed at the command of the individual the resources of the ancient world which by contributing to the deepening of his intellectual powers, also enabled him to free himself. The Reformation contributed to the quickening of his conscience so that with quickened will and intellect the individual goes forth to create his own world.

The individual thus become self-confident and self-assertive reduces authority to a matter of individual opinion. The external world thus freed from the element of caprice and animation is gradually reduced to an order in which law reigns with mechanical exactness and rigidity. The early Italian philosophers of nature re-stated the pressing and vital problem of metaphysics in terms of nature rather than God—from the standpoint of philosophy rather than religion. Many of them were persecuted by the Church but their influence is to be traced throughout the whole of modern thought.

Along with the pantheistic conception of the physical world there go also the secularization of religion and the deification of the State. The spirit of the Renaissance was concerned with the present order of things and led to deification of both State and Nature. The inner, as the creative self, seeks to embody itself in a new principle of world interpretation and world reconstruction, and as opposed to the religious-philosophical view of the Middle Ages, which is everywhere in process of dissolution, seeks to establish what has been named a natural-philosophical view of the world. "The spirit of the Western people," says Windelband, "has now taken up into itself the entire material which the past offers for its culture, and in feverish excitement into which it is finally put by direct contact with the highest achievements of ancient science it struggles upward toward the attainment of complete independence." One feels the impulsive blood of youth pulsate in its literature as though something unheard of, something which had never before been must now come into being. The men of the Renaissance announce to us nothing less than the approach of a total renovation of science

and of the state of humanity. The warfare between the transmitted doctrines leads to a surfeit of the past; learned research into the old wisdom ends with throwing aside all book-rubbish, and full of the youthful joy of dawning life the mind goes forth into the cosmic life of nature ever young.¹

The outcome of the entire movement of the thought of the Middle Ages was the absorption in the inner world of the life of the soul.² Within the Graeco-Roman world, interest in the inner was determined by its relations to the outer. Throughout the Middle Ages, on the contrary, the fate of the individual was determined by the development of the inner life. The spiritual world came to be regarded as the abode of the individual and to which was ascribed as much reality as to the world of matter. The grand outcome of the whole movement of thought during the Middle Ages, is the bringing forward of the materials and motives of the mind-body dualism, whose reconciliation was at once undertaken, but which was hindered by the lack of a free and comprehensive treatment of the world of Nature.

The religious Reformation of the sixteenth century is to be regarded as the expression of individuality in matters religious. The Church was no longer able to mediate between the individual and the sources of all spiritual values. He now asserted the right to touch the eternal without the mediation of another. Thus as Nash says, "The idea of God came forth in unveiled majesty to wed itself to the idea of the individual."³ This means that the individual is now rated high and has the highest good opened to him. But the Church makes a final attempt to withstand the new thoughts and ideals by fortifying its own traditions and at the Council of Trent made the philosophy of St. Thomas eternally valid and binding. Luther, on the contrary, attempted to re-establish primitive Christianity as against Catholicism and went back to St. Augustine for guidance and authority. Thus by these two tendencies and systems of thought, the metaphysics of the Middle Ages was split in

¹ Francke, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

² Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. I, Intr.

³ Nash, *op. cit.*, ch. viii.

twain. To dogma is assigned the whole realm of the super-sensuous while the world of experience is reserved for philosophy. But before thought had time to come to itself and to appreciate the problem before it, and the necessary method of solution, the whole Platonic *Weltanschauung* came in and philosophy at once turned from theology to natural science. The epistemological problem which thus presented itself for solution, the problem of the Macrocosm and the Microcosm, was solved in the light of the imaginative conception of the divine unity of the Living All.

In many respects the epistemological problem of the two Platonic periods shows marks of similarity. Then as now the characteristic problem was the merging of two contrasted forms of control in some form of immediacy of consciousness. The symbolism of Plotinus was seen to be an imitative or experimental treatment of materials under definite guarantees of determination with reference to the fulfilment of inner purpose. But after Plotinus, the element of Mysticism was ignored and the ideas of the Graeco-Roman world became the motive and sanction of conduct and thought. But the element of immediacy, as seen in the Neo-Platonic Mysticism, continues its development and is especially seen in the increasing appreciation of external nature which sometimes approaches the modern. Referring to this aspect of appreciation, Bosanquet says, that it "Emphasizes unmistakably a new attitude of aesthetic perception to external nature the like of which we have not found in any Hellenic or Graeco-Roman writer."¹

Defining the epistemological problem of the age as the unification of experience by the reconciliation of the subjective and the external it is at once seen that Mysticism became the organ of world unification and interpretation. In the work of Bruno is to be found the most characteristic products of the period of the Renaissance. In him the enthusiasm for natural beauty which had long been held in abeyance became an all-absorbing passion. The investigations of Tycho Brahe, Copernicus, Galilei and Kepler produced a profound impression upon the

¹ *Hist. of Aesthetics*, p. 129.

human mind and made impossible the holding any longer of the narrow and earth-centered theological views of the universe. The earth is round and moves and God can no longer be conceived as having His local dwelling in the heavens. A wholly new way of looking at the world has now come into the human mind, and along with the conception of a new and vaster universe comes also the conviction that it can be grasped as a whole. The absolute unity of all knowledge and being is, however, inaccessible to human reason and must therefore, become an object of faith. The problem of thought thus becomes the elevating of itself from the confused and chaotic manifold of sense-experience to the unity present in all things. The aesthetic character of the attempted solution of the problem thus presented is to be seen in the Hylozoistic character of the philosophy of Bruno. All nature becomes alive. A world-soul pervades everything. Looking out upon the world, man everywhere beholds the embodiment and working of a power like to himself, 'nearer than breathing and closer than hands and feet,' yet present in the remotest star-spaces and informing all things. The distinction between the human and the divine is no longer tenable. Reality is an eternal spirit, one and indivisible, from which all things flow and of which all things are only images. Within this whole all differences disappear. As opposed to the abstract unity of Spinoza, Bruno insists that God is the whole, present in every individual thing and present as a whole. Man, as an individual, is a mirror within a mirror, whose perception of things is only a reflection of nature which in turn is a reflection of the thought of God.

The problem of knowledge becomes with Bruno the problem of the identification of the microcosm and the macrocosm. How is it possible for any particular aspect of the whole to reflect the whole of which it is an aspect? It is sufficient to indicate that the problem as thus stated was solved by making a sort of subjective leap beyond the actual limits of knowledge. As in the earlier periods, so once more, the individual explains his world by projecting himself into all the phenomena perceived. Reason failing, Mysticism as an immediacy of feeling becomes the sole resource. "The world-joy of the aesthetic Renas-

cence," says Windelband, "sings philosophical dithyrambs in the writings of Bruno and a universalistic optimism that carries everything before it prevails in his thought."¹

In the philosophic thought of Jacob Böhme, as Windelband points out, Neo-Platonic Mysticism is given complete religious coloring. As against the hylozoistic unity of Bruno, Böhme posits a duality from the beginning. Strife is the mother of all things. Things not falling under one or another of these terms are dead. The world becomes thus the conflict between two opposing forces, a conflict ending only at death. Antithesis is the law of being, and in 'yes' and 'no' all things consist. Activity connotes a dualism, but every dualism is harmonized in the divine nature. This struggle is also present within the experience of every individual. Salvation means escape from this struggle which can be secured only by a desire within the soul for God. It is at this point that Böhme makes use of the doctrine of the 'Divine Spark,' a doctrine that at once suggests the Platonic doctrine of 'ἀνάμνησις' only put in Christian language. The moral struggle that characterizes human experience is due to a power within, for 'what could begin to deny self, if there were not something in man different from self?'² Still the self is lost, as it were, in the supernaturally determined order of things. For its freedom from a self-perceived bondage the soul must wait for the time, 'the time of the lilies' as Böhme calls it, when all nature will be delivered. Thus it is to be said with Inge that the "dim sympathy of the human spirit with the life of nature which Plotinus felt but which mediaevalism had almost quenched, has now become an intense and happy consciousness of community with all living things as subjects of one all-embracing and unchanging law, the law of perfect love;"³ and with Höfding that Böhme's thoughts have traveled far from those of a distinctly religious man, so that it is no small wonder that his mythologic fancy completely overpowered his thought at this point.⁴ Despite the far-reaching assumptions found in

¹ Windelband, *Hist. of Philosophy*, p. 368.

² Overton, *Life of William Law*.

³ Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 285.

⁴ Höfding, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, Vol. I, p. 80.

the beginning of his speculations, he was unable to carry them through and in common with the thinkers of his age finds refuge from the limitations of thought in an immediacy of consciousness in which by a process of divine illumination the world of opposites as distinguished by thought is united and the individual moves about in a world of his own determination.

The epistemological problem of the age under discussion was the erection of a world in which thought and conduct could find sanction and support in the midst of a world fast slipping from beneath the individual's feet. The self as the inner, organizing principle has risen above the established order of things, because of its increasing failure, and seeks in terms of feeling to erect one more permanent and satisfying. The pantheism of Bruno is wholly hylozoistic, the attempt to unify and explain the world in terms of the self, but a hylozoism characterized by the presence of reflective aspects wholly lacking in the earlier attempts in the same direction. The Mystics assert the immanence of God without qualification. In both attempts there is a complete identification of the two worlds now fallen apart in consciousness. Both attempts are to be regarded as attempted embodiments of the self gradually freeing itself from some aspect of its content. Thus the period of philosophic thought under discussion proceeded from the immediacy secured in Neo-Platonic Mysticism, through the dualism of a Microcosm, with its ideal struggling for realization, and a Macrocosm in which that ideal is conceived as completely realized of the Renaissance, and reached another immediacy through the merging, of a dualistic experience in terms of an aesthetic construction.

CHAPTER VIII.

Modern Philosophy from Descartes to Kant and the German Mystics, as Illustrating the Rise and Development of the Subject-Object Dualism, together with the Use of the Aesthetic Consciousness as an Epistemological 'Postulate.'

Descartes and the Cartesians.

The primary assumption of Descartes, that of the dualism of mind and body, is but the expression of what had already been worked out in the consciousness of the individual. In Greek thought the individual and the universal were wholly identified because of the a-dualistic character of consciousness. Throughout the Middle Ages the attempt was made to retain this old-time immediacy by making the individual wholly dependent upon the universal as organized in the Church. But the attempt to unify the individual with the universal by making the latter transcendent only contributed to the isolation and deepening of the individual. In the attempt to make the general notions of Aristotle sufficient and valid for all eternity, the Church prepared the instruments of its own overthrow. Authority failed finally to compensate the meagerness of ideas. The manipulation of these general notions had reached perfection and it was useless to go over the field again. Thought must therefore find new fields of operation and as Professor Dewey says, Galilei and Copernicus were as truly travelers as Marco Polo and Christopher Colombo. "Inventio rather than judicium, discovery rather than proof, became the burden of the age." The outcome of this search after a method of manipulation was the separation of the individual and the universal, so that by carrying over to the realm of the outer what was once inner and the making of it material for imitative treatment, the inner now possessed of a persistency of its own is also to be

reckoned with as outer, but differing in its content and control from the original outer.

But while Descartes may be said to have generalized the motives of his age he failed to treat the mind term of the dualism as under continuous and ordered change.¹ He did not establish his psychology upon the facts of experience. The poles of the dualism are not distinctions falling within consciousness but are two wholly opposed and disparate spheres of existence. The assumption of mind and body is both realistic and dogmatic. As an individual Descartes is unable to break with the Church and accepts its dogma as it came floating down to him. While he made it the fundamental rule of his life to look within for the criterion of thought and conduct and even boasted of being self-educated, the objective world still finds its guarantee in the veracity of God.

The more positive and naturalistic treatment of the outer world made possible by the advance of the physical and mathematical sciences, with which Descartes shows himself to have been familiar, did not serve, however, to detach the inner from the outer and bring it under like treatment. The advance made by Descartes in the solution of the epistemological problem is to be sought in his assumption of the 'subjective as the starting point of all scientific inquiry. Immediate consciousness thus becomes the criterion of reality. But his statement must be taken as representing an immediately given datum rather than the validity of judgment. Reflection, as issuing in judgment, must be brought within the judgment process as involving the mutual reference of subject and object. The limitation of Descartes is to be inferred from his surreptitiously introducing the object into the subject, rather than detaching the subject. Thus, despite his efforts to the contrary, the philosophy of Descartes begins and ends with a dualistic consciousness as a datum of immediate experience.

Modern philosophy, dating from Descartes, opens with a subjective note. The individual emptied of all content and given a self-centered and self-dependent isolation can find no

¹ Cf. Baldwin, St. Louis Address, 'Sketch of the History of Psychology,' *Psychological Review*, Vol. XII.

way of relating itself to the necessary object of thought. According to Descartes, to exist is identical with to think. But to think is to think something. A thinking being can become conscious of its own existence and identity as subject, only by knowledge of objects. Thinking involves and implies the relation of subject and object and to assign either an independent existence is to make the problem of knowledge unsolvable. The famous dictum of Descartes, from which modern philosophy is dated, is in reality, false, since it represents a premature plunge into ontology before the way was prepared by an adequate theory of knowledge.¹ Regarding the perceptions and ideas as purely inner, that is, having no reference beyond the mind having them, Descartes prepared the way for a subjective idealism. Nevertheless the ideas are representative of things outside the mind, that is, are symbolic of something beyond themselves, which aspect alone makes them ideas and determines them as either true or false.

It is precisely here that we are to seek for the epistemological problem of Descartes. The problem at once arose as to the reference of ideas to objects or defining the problem in our own terms, 'how can the ideas as unrelated mental facts transcend themselves? It will become evident later, that if we start with a self-contained subject we shall find no justification whatever for the objective reference which knowledge implies and involves. It is evident that Descartes appreciated the problematical character of his attempted solution; but he nevertheless defends the truth of his position by reference to the veracity of God. The abstraction of the thinking substance finds its counterpart in the abstraction of the extended substance. The original whole of consciousness is broken up into two inert entities. The knowledge of either is the result of a sort of mechanical interaction between the two substances at a single point in the brain.

The limitations of the contentions of Descartes are best seen in the attempted solution of Descartes' dualism by the later Cartesians. Occasionalism, which is only Cartesianism carried to its logical conclusion, denied the possibility of any interaction

¹ Seth, *The Scottish Philosophy*, p. 12.

between the two substances. Between mind and matter, the extended and the unextended, there is an impassable gulf which the Deity alone can bridge. Malebranche goes farther and holds that the sole object of knowledge of the material world is the idea of extension which we know only by virtue of our union with God who illumines our minds. The external world is not known to exist but believed to exist on grounds of supernatural revelation. God thus becomes the true cause of our ideas apart from whom we can neither perceive nor will. We see things truly only as we see them in Him. The outcome of the philosophy of Malebranche was the simplification of the Cartesian problem by making matter non-existent, so that our belief in the reality of the objective order is rather an article of faith.¹

It is important to observe in passing that Malebranche distinguishes between sensation, which is of the nature of feeling, and understanding. The former is a subjective process only while the latter is constituted of the clear and distinct ideas which arise on the presentation of sense objects. These ideas are, however, transcendent so far as the individual is concerned and are thus both universal and objective. Still further the ideas have to do only with the essence of things, while the sensations are concerned with the particular existences. For Malebranche the epistemological problem arises in connection with the relation between the ideas and the particular sensations. The question which at once presents itself, is as to the passage from the particulars of sense to the universality and objectivity of ideas. But Malebranche in common with the age looked upon the mind as passive rather than constructive, so that there being no ascent from the subjectivity of the sensations to the objectivity of the ideas such objectivity must be given the mind from without. Here Malebranche, like Pascal and Geulincx, only brings out the latent mysticism of Descartes in insisting that causal efficacy is the prerogative of the Deity only. Hence God is the true cause of all our ideas and in Him all things are to be seen. God therefore is in immediate relations with every thinking soul. The mysticism of Malebranche thus becomes

¹ R. Adamson, *Develop. of Mod. Phil.*, Vol. I, p. 52.

an immediacy of consciousness in which the dualism of sense and idea is transcended by the vision in which all things are seen in God.

Spinoza.

Höfding makes Spinoza the central thinker of the seventeenth century, since his philosophy represents an attempt to reconcile and unify the several tendencies of the thought of the age. His pantheism represents a brilliant attempt to merge the mystical and the mechanical, the scientific and the teleological attitudes of thought which had been developing together during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. If the mysticism of Geulincx and Malebranche represent attempts to solve the epistemological problem set by the dualism of Descartes by merging the two antipodal worlds in an immediacy of consciousness, the pantheism of Spinoza represents a similar attempt by making the content of the two worlds identical. Mind and body are aspects of one and the same reality. The Cartesian presupposition that all things exist only in God becomes the chief corner stone of the doctrine of Spinoza. Extension and thought, mind and body, are not two substances, but ultimate attributes of one substance. These two attributes of thought and extension are regarded as antithetical ways of looking at the one substance rather than antithetical substances.

Descartes held that while the interaction of mind and body was not evident it was nevertheless actual. For Geulincx and Malebranche the interaction was occasional rather than immediate and mediated by the will of the Deity. In either instance it leaves the matter of relation of mind and body wholly inexplicable. Spinoza at once denies the possibility of any interaction whatsoever between mind and body. To admit an interaction destroys both the duality and the substantiality of each. There is only one process of becoming and the material and the spiritual are but two aspects of the one necessary process. Particular things, whether thinking or extended, are but modes of the one eternal, unitary world-ground. Thus, as Falkenberg has pointed out, necessity in becoming, unity in being, mechanism

and pantheism, represent the controlling conceptions in the Spinozistic scheme.

Spinoza's theory of knowledge is comparable to that of Plotinus. The mind's first knowledge is individual and fragmentary. To acquire more perfect and adequate knowledge the mind must pass beyond the individual and particular point of view. To reach the more perfect knowledge Spinoza recognizes two stages: first, that of reason (*ratio*) by the employment of which we come to know the essence of things. This sort of knowledge is obtained by the process of deduction and is therefore *mediate* in character. Rational knowledge is, however, necessarily incomplete, as Spinoza holds, because it enables us to arrive only at a partial view of things and can not lift us to that plane of knowledge at which we behold all things perfectly unified, *sub specie aeternitatis*. To reach the point at which all things are completely unified Spinoza introduces his second stage of knowledge which he calls the intuitive, by which we proceed not inferentially from one particular to another but by taking a comprehensive view of all reality see things in the light of the principle from which they proceed. He who has reached this point of view says Spinoza, "evolves all his ideas from that which represents the origin and source of all nature, so that the idea appears to be the source of all others."

He considers intuitive knowledge the highest, not because it yielded a greater speculative insight into the nature of things, but because it frees the soul by transcending the limitations and imperfections of sense experiences. "He aimed," says Höfding, "at the highest knowledge, that is, the most intimate union of the individual and the universal, of the particular with the sum total of constant relations, and succeeds only by postulating an intuition which reminds us now of the artist's conception, now of the mystic's vision according as the stress is placed upon the individual or the universal moment."¹

¹ *History of Mod. Phil.*, Vol. I, p. 307. Cf. E. Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, Vol. I, pp. 104, 105; and *Ethics* (Elwes trs.), Pt. V, 41 and Scholium.

The British Development.

The empirical movement, which found its largest and freest expression in England, represents a series of attempts to reconcile the same dualism by reducing mind to matter. As opposed to the mystical and theoretical character of Continental philosophy, British philosophy was the rather positive and practical. The thinkers on the Continent were interested rather in the *form* of thought, while the English thinkers from Locke on were interested in the *content* of thought. Modern epistemological inquiry is usually dated from Locke and it is quite true that the *Essay* gave birth and currency to the terms and distinctions of modern philosophy. The *Essay* is also significant as indicating the fact, that the ideas are, for the first time, detached from the presuppositions of belief, and given independent treatment. In Locke we have the first approach to a more subjective treatment of the mind as constituted of a series of ideas. In the fourth book of the *Essay*, Locke attempts a theory of knowledge. His definition of knowledge as the "perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas," leads at once to a subjective idealism. But Locke attempts to save himself by insisting that some of our ideas are 'representative,' in the sense, that they "exactly resemble the modification of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us." These are the so-called primary qualities, which Locke proceeds to enumerate as solidity, extension, figure etc. The patterns of these Locke would say really exist in the bodies themselves. But in the case of sounds, tastes, etc., only an uninstructed mind can suppose that there is anything like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. These are the so-called secondary qualities which according to Locke are "nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by certain modifications of their primary qualities."

His real contribution to the philosophic thought of the time is to be seen in his endeavor to apply the critical method of Bacon to the study of the mind. He thus succeeded in reducing the mind to a series of unrelated atoms of sense experiences which neither afford nor justify a reference beyond themselves.

"All general knowledge," Locke repeatedly says, "lies only in our thoughts and consists barely in the contemplation of our own abstract ideas."¹ Still Locke appreciated the fact that knowledge being thus limited we want something else.² This 'something else' he attempts to obtain by the employment of the judgment which he defines as "the presuming things to be so without perceiving it." Locke as an epistemologist at once goes beyond the conclusion of his psychology, and it is to be said that Locke really stopped where the problem of knowledge properly begins; and despite the evident psychological character of his work he inconsistently maintained the spirituality of the soul and the existence of purely spiritual substances.

The general advance made by Berkeley over Locke is to be inferred from his attempt to prove that not the secondary quantities only, but the primary ones as well, are the products of the human mind. The world about us is much more dependent upon the mind than we have hitherto thought. Matter is a mere abstraction, one of those words which serve only to throw a 'veil and mist' between the mind and truth. There is no material substratum of things and *to be is to be perceived*. But as Reid says, "The pillars by which the existence of a material world was supported were so feeble that it did not require the force of a Samson to bring them down." For Berkeley matter is reduced to simple ideas with the notion of some cause.³ Thus at one fell blow Berkeley identifies the objects of knowledge with the ideas of the mind. "The very existence of ideas constitute the soul. Mind is a congeries of perceptions. Take away perception and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind."⁴

Here, apparently, a complete break is made with the external world and the mind's ability to construct its own world vindicated. But Berkeley did not make good his contention. His denial of the existence of matter was made primarily for the sake of refuting atheism and materialism. But with the denial

¹ *Essay*, Bk. I and IV, ch. iii, 14.

² *Ibid.*, Bk. IV, ch. iv, 3.

³ *Treatise*, sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.

⁴ *Life and Letters*, p. 438; also, *Treatise*, sections 68, 75, 80, 19, 20.

of the material world, the question at once arose as to the origin of our ideas, to solve which Berkeley substituted the laws of the Eternal Spirit for the laws of nature.¹ Like Plato, with whom he was familiar, Berkeley came to estimate low the knowledge derived through the senses and in the *Siris* concerns himself with the problem of showing how we may arrive at a higher knowledge of the Eternal Spirit than that afforded by the phenomena of sense.² It is true, he insists, that God speaks in nature to us, but it is only through rational faith in causality, that we come to discern the chain running throughout the whole system of things and only by a process of ascending from the lower to the higher can we reach a knowledge of the Highest Being.³

The consequences of the metaphysics of Berkeley are pointed out by Hume who is the legitimate outcome of British Empiricism from Bacon and Hobbes to Berkeley. With Hume, on the contrary, the mind's break with matter is made complete. His attempt to solve the Cartesian problem is in reality the denial of the problem, by denying substantial existence to both mind and matter. According to Hume, the mind is its contents. These contents are of two sorts, impressions and ideas which are only fainter impressions. These alone constitute the objects of thought. The substantiality of the self is a delusion and what we call the mind is but a heap of perceptions united by certain relations. Causality itself is only the succession of phenomena—relation between our ideas—and arises only from experience.

The outcome of the philosophy of Hume was the reducing of mind as well as matter to mere phenomena and the denial of any causal nexus between cause and effect. There is therefore no permanent element in the world of experience and no valid element whereby thought may justify the objective validity of knowledge. Hume holds, that to form the idea of an object and to form an idea simply, are one and the same thing, the reference of an idea to an object being an extraneous denomina-

¹ *Op. cit.*, Sections 26, 65, 31, 32.

² *Op. cit.*, 90, 91.

³ *Op. cit.*, 148; *Alciphron*, Dialogue IV.

tion of which the idea itself bears no mark or character.¹ It was this complete subversion of the necessary and universal character of knowledge which awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber and gave birth to the common-sense philosophy of the Scottish School.

Leibniz.

Before proceeding to the philosophy of Kant, it is necessary to take note of the attempt of Leibniz to remove the antithesis between mind and matter, without surrendering the aesthetic and religious conceptions which were dangerously threatened by the Empiricists. Leibniz, like Spinoza, appreciates the unphilosophic character of the *Deus ex machina* of Descartes, but likewise appreciates that the *Deus sive natura* of Spinoza solves the problem by a sort of back-door method.

The epistemology of Leibniz is to be regarded as a *via media* between two extremes, of Empiricism which reduced knowledge to a series of sensations externally produced and thus lacking both universality and necessity, and of Rationalism that made knowledge consist only of clear and distinct ideas. Like Spinoza he considers that the notion of substance is the necessary starting-point of metaphysical inquiry, but while the former defined substance in terms of independent existence, the latter defines it in terms of process. "La substance ne saurait être sans action." Thus while Spinoza attempted to reconcile the dualism of mind and matter in terms of identity of content, Leibniz made a similar attempt in terms of *process*.² According to Leibniz perception and apperception, sense-perception and thought can not be completely sundered. They differ not in kind but in their degree of development, so that body is to be defined as confused soul while soul is body become clear and distinct. Either mind or body represents a meaningless abstraction apart from the other and neither exists apart from the other. Reality is therefore partly material and partly immaterial. The law of continuity demands that the soul always thinks

¹ *Treatise*, I, Pt. III, 8, 14.

² Leibniz, *Monad.*, 66, 67, 69.

and that while sense knowledge precedes rational knowledge they differ in degree only. Whence then the origin of our ideas? In the *Nouveaux Essais*, Leibniz insists, as against Locke, that all our ideas are *innate* but *implicitly* rather than *explicitly* so.¹ The soul is windowless facing the eternal world so that all our knowledge is developed from the possibilities of thought within itself. Ideas as little as anything else are given to the mind from without.² The Monads are simple, indivisible and indestructible units and differ from each other only in the degree of the clearness with which they represent other monads. Each monad however is a little world in itself, a mirror of the whole of reality. Each one has also a dual nature, that is, it is partly active and partly passive, the passive element corresponding to the Aristotelian *matter*, the active aspect to the *form* or *entelechy* of the monad.

Leibniz saves himself from a subjective idealism by his postulate of Pre-established Harmony, according to which the ideas come to possess objective value since the development of the psychic monad is paralleled by the development of the cosmic monad.³ The idea of God, as pure actuality, plays a determining part in the Leibnizian scheme; but he guards against the mechanical necessity of Spinoza, by insisting that of all possible worlds, God chose the best, and even apart from divine choice the best would in the end prevail over all others and become actual. The *lex melioris* by which Leibniz sought to give meaning and beauty to the world-order, is established upon the law of sufficient reason which is both a law of thought and a law of being.

Both in spirit and method the philosophy of Leibniz is strikingly comparable to the Platonic and his attempt at a reconciliation of opposing systems of thought is poetic rather than scientific. According to the programme laid out by the philosopher the dualism must necessarily fall within consciousness and in his defining the epistemological problem as the passage from the realm of unconscious ideas to the realm of the clear and distinct

¹ Cf. *Petites Perceptions, New Essays* (Latta's trs.).

² *Monad*, 78.

³ *Ibid.*, 83, 86.

ideas. It is interesting to note, that in so far as he dealt at all with the problem and place of the beautiful, Leibniz places it on the border-land of the conscious and the unconscious, the active and the passive, aspect of ideas, as partaking of the nature of both and serving as the common ground of both.¹

The Faith Philosophers.

With the recognition of the limitations of reason, there is also to be seen an attempt to vindicate the rights of feeling. Both Rationalism and Empiricism, as final interpretations of human experience having failed, the search of the age is for some 'transcendent notion'² which shall reconcile the unending conflict between the mechanical and the teleological, the material and the immaterial, between the naïve and the ideal concepts of causality. We have indicated the rise of the same problem under different conditions and at different times and have attempted to show that the final interpretation reached in each instance was *aesthetic* rather than *scientific* and *discursive*. At such periods, as Lessing has pointed out, thought must proceed *gymnastically* rather than *dogmatically*. The recognition became a contagion by the middle of the eighteenth century, that the art, science and literature of the past are but idealized expressions of the inner life of feeling and will. Winckelmann (1755) in his *Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Kunstwerke*, showed that Greek life was the source and the prototype of Greek art and literature. Lessing in the *Laokoon* (1766) attempted to point out not only the 'that' but the 'how' of Greek art, and contributed to the casting aside of the false interpretations and arbitrary rules in which a pseudo-classicism had wholly submerged the works of the classic artists and authors. For Lessing, Greek art is essentially the expression and embodiment of the inner vision, and instead of its being a slavish imitation of nature according to certain prescribed rules, it is a free creation, in which the individual lifts himself above nature. The forms of the Greek artists were not born of external con-

¹ Lotze, *Geschichte d. Aesthetik*, p. 275.

² Höffding, *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 100.

straint, but were rather conceived in the sphere of pure beauty which thus awakening no desire, at once transported the mind into a dream of undisturbed immediacy. Therefore Winckelmann concludes, that if we would produce works of art like the Greeks, we must learn to feel and live as the Greeks lived and felt, that is, we must be as true, as noble, as free in our nature as they were.

According to the Faith Philosophers, who carried forward the attempted vindication of feeling, the source of truth is to be sought in intuition rather than in discursive thought.¹ The highest truths are to be *felt* not *demonstrated*. The most detailed statement of the Faith philosophy is to be found in Jacobi and we limit ourselves to a resume of his thought. He held that the understanding alone can not guarantee reality, and in harmony with the conclusions of Lessing and Winckelmann, insists that reality can only be presumed and felt.² Pure reason, as the doctrine of concepts, can lead only to atheism and fatalism. The conditioned can be made intelligible only by means of the unconditioned which lies beyond the reach of reason. It is only by the intuitive knowledge of feeling that we are able to transcend our finite and limited selves, and reach in beauty that perfect union of the parts of being in virtue of which it becomes a symbol of the inner life.

It is also to be noted that with Herder the individualism of the Illumination yields to the conception of humanity as one great individual which has passed through a series of stages in its development, strikingly similar to the stages in the development of the individual himself from infancy to old age. These conceptions of the faith philosophy were carried out in the mystical extravagances of the Romanticists after Kant, so that we turn now to a study of the philosophy of the Sage of Königsberg in whom the several streams of pre-Kantian thought met and from whom issued the characteristic tendencies of the philosophy of the modern period.

¹ Vide, Falckenberg, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, pp. 310; Also Höffding, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, p. 3-18.

² Falckenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

Kant.

The epistemological problem set by the antithesis of mind and matter, sense and reason, which had been the burden of discussion from Descartes to Wolff and from Bacon and Hobbes to Berkeley and Hume remained yet unsolved when Kant came into the field. The two-fold problem as to the origin of our ideas and the validity of their objective reference, which the Empiricists attempted to solve by holding that all our ideas are the result of pure experience, and the Rationalists by making the ideas an original possession of the mind, was clearly appreciated by Kant who at once set himself to its solution. He appears to have fully appreciated the fact, that both parties in the discussion were partly right and partly wrong, since each was concerned with an indispensable factor of all thought; but each was wrong in that thought to be vital and fruitful must be equally concerned with both factors. Perceptions without conceptions, he insists are meaningless, while conceptions without perceptions are fruitless. The Rationalists pursued a wholly analytical procedure and sought to explain all things by subsuming them as predicates under definitely given subjects. But Kant's acquaintance with the results in the field of science revealed the fallacy of evolving a system of reality from a number of given definitions. Still farther the discoveries of Galilei, Newton, Huygens and others were presenting a series of predicates which could not be explained by an analysis of any given subject.

According to Kant, the object of knowledge, is neither making explicit what was already implicit in the mind, nor the chance coming together of impressions from the external world, but the construction of an object within consciousness. The objects of thought can be none other than the product of thought. As to its content the object of knowledge is particular and contingent, while the form, which is of the mind's own contributing lends universality and necessity. The antithesis in knowledge is not between subject and object, as independent substances, but an antithesis between the activity of the understanding and sensuous perception. Thinking, according to Kant is the categorizing of sense data and the categories are the relations estab-

lished by the mind among phenomena. These categories are, however only regulative, and add nothing to experience. They are neither subjective dispositions, nor completely developed ideas, but 'forms' which the mind employs in making articulate an otherwise chaotic manifold of sense-experiences. Their value according to Kant is the making of *synthetic judgments a priori possible*, thus establishing, in opposition to Hume, the objective validity of knowledge.

The criticism has been made of the Kantian conception of the categories, that they were independent of the intuitions of sense, and remained so, as far as the work of Kant goes. But Kant appreciated the nature of the distinction and his doctrine of the 'Schema' represents an attempt upon the part of the synthetic imagination to mediate between the *a priori* forms and the manifold of sense—"an art" as Kant says "hidden in the depth of the human soul, the true sense of which we shall hardly ever be able to understand."¹

But while the categories are *a priori*, that is, independent of the manifold intuitions of sense, they do not extend our knowledge beyond the phenomenal world and can not, therefore, lead to a knowledge of the noumenal world given in sensation. "The understanding *a priori* can never do more than anticipate the form of a possible experience, and as nothing can be an object of experience except the phenomenon, it follows that the understanding can never go beyond the limits of sensibility. As phenomena are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to a something as the object of our sensuous intuition. This means a something equal to x, of which we do not, nay, with the present constitution of our understanding can not, know anything."² The outcome of the *First Critique* is that there is no transcendent knowledge, that is, no possible knowledge beyond the limits of experience. Reason proposes questions which it is wholly unable to answer.

But the limit of that which can be experienced is not necessarily the limit of that which is or of that which ought to be, or

¹ *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 116.

² *Critique of Pure Experience*, Intr.

in other terms, the practical reason is not necessarily limited because we have found that the theoretical reason is thus limited. We are active and volitional creatures and while we find ourselves unable to know things-in-themselves, we can nevertheless postulate them. The unconditioned, therefore, which makes the conditioned significant and intelligible, must be sought in the Practical Reason. Between things as they are known to us and as they are in themselves, there is, for Kant, an abyss which the understanding can not cross. Thought, therefore, as Caird says, may like a physician, cure the ills of others but can not meet the challenge to heal its own.

But if the *Critique of the Pure Reason* was sceptical toward the ideas which made reason possible, the *Critique of the Practical Reason* sought at once to establish the validity of these ideas from the standpoint of the moral life. Thus once again, though with a material and a technique wholly impossible at an earlier period, the moral consciousness functions as an epistemological postulate. According to Kant the moral consciousness alone can carry thought beyond the phenomenal to the universally valid ground on which all higher truth rests. The active, volitional life outruns the theoretical, and Kant, with a long line of idealists, finds a solution of the epistemological problem in terms of the working will. Upon an analysis of the moral consciousness, he finds that its characteristics are precisely those demanded by his analysis of the epistemological consciousness.

Mediating between the pure reason, which is the faculty of the *a priori* forms of knowledge, and the practical reason, as the faculty of the *a priori* principles of conduct, is the judgment, which is the faculty of the *a priori* forms and principles of the aesthetic feeling. For Kant, therefore, the beautiful, which is the object of the judgment, mediates between the true and the good which are the objects of the theoretical and the practical reason respectively.¹ The judgment as the faculty by which the manifold of sense is unified, and the phenomenal world brought under the principle of design, thus awakening in consciousness the sentiment of the beautiful, becomes the principle

¹ Cf. Bosanquet, *Hist. of Aesthetics*, p. 256.

of world interpretation and unification.¹ But the judgments are two-fold in character: First, the teleological judgment that has to do with the problem of *adaptation* and arises only when the mechanical explanation fails. The teleological concept is, however, only regulative of experience, as appears from the antinomy which Kant treats in the dialectic of the teleological judgment. Thus it is to be inferred that Kant appreciated the limitation of the mechanical view of the organic world which prevailed during the seventeenth and the opening years of the eighteenth centuries. Mechanism and teleology are, as doctrines, irreconcilable and impossible, but as points of view, attitudes toward a presented content, they are both necessary and compatible. Thus Kant appears to have felt, what is more strongly felt in our day, that description and appreciation can not develop independently of each other, and that the theoretical and normative sciences are not developed in entire isolation.

In pointing out the several movements of thought before Kant, the Faith Philosophers were cited as bringing forward and emphasizing the feeling aspect of consciousness which had hitherto been completely ignored, or at least, made subordinate to the other aspects of consciousness. The Empiricists had insisted, however, that it is only in feeling that genuine contact with reality is had and a personal guarantee of truth secured. The attempt was made, therefore, to reduce all things, including beauty, to mere feeling. The Rationalists, on the contrary, characteristically insisted that personality, individuality, truth and reality are meaningless when reduced to brute feeling; and all things were then reduced to thought, and beauty was freed from the element of feeling. Kant's doctrine of the aesthetic judgment, as mediating between these antithetical views of the beautiful at once suggested itself as the necessary and appropriate mediating principle between these two opposed types of theory.

It is interesting to note in the present connection, that in his analysis of the aesthetic consciousness, Kant finds precisely

¹ *Kritik d. Urtheilskraft, Werke* 4, 14; Falckenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 40, ff; Höffding, *op. cit.*, p. 104, ff.; Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, III, p. 543.

those characteristics which the epistemological consciousness demands for the solution of its own characteristic problem. He appears to have appreciated that his discussion in the second *Critique* only pushed the problem farther back and that the problem can be solved only in terms of feeling, which mediates between reason and desire. Neither thought nor conduct can give us a complete object, since each refers beyond itself. Feeling, on the other hand, presupposes a *complete idea* of the object. The problem to which Kant gives himself after concluding that the feelings possess an epistemological significance, is the determination of the *a priori* forms of feeling without which they would possess neither universal nor necessary validity. Are there aesthetic judgments and what are their differentia? The object alike of thought and desire is necessarily subordinated to some end. The new problem to which Kant now sets himself is the determination of those feelings which are motivated by no conscious purpose. Such feelings, Kant finds, make up the content of the beautiful and the sublime. The beautiful is thus distinguished from both the true and the good in that it is the object of a completely disinterested satisfaction.¹ It differs from the merely agreeable in that it is the object of universal satisfaction. It differs further from the good in that it pleases without a concept. The pleasure of the perfect is conceptual, of the good is purposeful, while the pleasure of the beautiful is emotional and hence immediate. The secret of aesthetic construction is, that in it, the mind constructs its own objects without purpose and under its own immediate control.

The object therefore that shall at once reconcile the sensuous and the formal, the mechanical and the teleological, is one that recognizes the legitimacy and the place of the several demands of consciousness and in the construction of which both sense-perception and reason coöperate. As to the objectivity of the object presented by the aesthetic consciousness, Kant was somewhat in doubt, and in the end asserted the existence of a principle of beauty and purpose and goodness hidden in nature which reason

¹ Purposive without the idea of an end,' *Kritik d. Urteilstkraft*, p. 87, note.

can not formulate. Nevertheless Kant recognized the epistemological value of the aesthetic consciousness and his analysis of the latter is a faithful reflection of the epistemological problem of the universalization and objectification of experience.

The German Mystics.

The outcome of the Kantian discussions is that the object of thought is thought's own construction. The world that each of us knows is made by him rather than for him, through the activity of consciousness itself. The problem is no longer as to how the world as already organized is carried over into the mind as Locke thought, but rather how we can construct our own world. The object of thought is neither an immediate datum of sense, a brute shock as the Empiricists held, nor a mere predicate analyzed out of an already given subject, but essentially a free construction upon the part of consciousness. In this way Kant thought to be able to strike a balance between the empirical and speculative tendencies of his age. His philosophy must be regarded as an idealism whose peculiarity is to be sought in its attempt to mediate between and reconcile the apparently irreconcilable antagonisms of the philosophy and science of the preceding age. The three *Critiques*, however, lack a principle of unity which shall at once bind them together and thus reduce the entire discussion to unity. The general advance made by Kant is to be seen in the fact, that both the theoretical and the practical reason are given independent treatment, with neither of which is it possible to identify the self as the 'transcendental unity of apperception.' Until Kant, no hesitancy was experienced in identifying the self with the one or the other of its two possible aspects. From Socrates on, repeated attempts have been made to identify the self with the moral consciousness and will has been repeatedly made the postulate of thought and reality. But in each such instance, as has been indicated, the practical reason was resorted to only because the theoretical consciousness could not render the whole content of experience. In the philosophy of Kant, the will may be said to have come to its majority and was brought under the control of the

individual himself. But Kant at once appreciated that after reason and will had worked themselves through, there was still a meaning left over, which he at once identified with the *noumenal*, as that aspect of being lying beyond all thought, but which nevertheless made thought possible. Thus again, as in earlier periods, the problem of the remainder became the problem of succeeding thought.

Kant himself found the principle of world unification and interpretation in the feelings as the judgment of the beautiful and his immediate disciples followed in the wake of the master in their farther search after unity. Their immediate problem was the resolution of the *thing-in-itself*; without it one could not enter the Kantian philosophy, nor with it remain in. Kant himself seems to have appreciated the inconsistency of the noumenal conception, and suggestions are found, in which he identifies the 'thing-in-itself' with the Pure Ego as the inner organizing and constructive principle of the mind. Reinhold raises the point at the outset, as to the failure of the Kantian philosophy owing to the absence of some one presupposition without which philosophy can never be a true science. Philosophy is not possible until the philosopher determines upon some one principle upon which the whole rests and which adds meaning and beauty to the whole. But it is here, as Reinhold remarks, that Kant fails, and at once attempts to surmount the failure by setting up, what he calls, the '*principle of consciousness*.' Consciousness thus becomes the primary fact which makes all thought and conduct possible. Knowledge is made up of ideas which are related both to the subject and the object, so that they must be distinguished from consciousness as well as related to it. In fact, consciousness is only the relating of the ideas to the subject and object, hence it is to be said of Reinhold that he placed greater emphasis than Kant upon the activity and unity of consciousness. The unity of consciousness can not therefore be identified either with subject or object. The various form, of knowledge are only the ways in which this relating process proceeds.

It is thus seen, as Höffding has pointed out, that the Kantian conception of a 'thing-in-itself' has become restricted to a

much narrower sphere than with Kant, from which it follows that neither the object nor the subject can be known in itself, but only the world of consciousness which hovers between the two. The presentation is distinguished in consciousness both from the presented object and the presenting subject, while related to both. The outer and inner conditions of reality, Reinhold insists, must not be confounded. Noumena are neither conceived objects nor things-in-themselves, but the laws which control our dealing with the objects of experience. Failing however to completely isolate the subject as the control factor of thought from the object, while insisting upon the necessity of the unity and activity of consciousness, Reinhold sought to transcend the dualism implicit in all his work by setting up an immediacy of consciousness in which both aspects are merged in an ultimate unity.

Maimon also holds with Reinhold that the two aspects of all knowledge as held by Kant must be given up and that knowledge must be deduced from one common principle. The distinction between matter and form can be relative only. He departs from Reinhold, however, in maintaining that it is impossible to establish a single highest principle. The principle of consciousness as held by Reinhold expresses what is common to all principles, while the special principles are not deducible from it. Assuming the dualistic character of all knowledge, Maimon holds, that running throughout all knowledge, there is an endeavor to reduce the dualism to unity. In fact it is precisely this demand for continuity that makes knowledge possible. Experience is not, therefore, a necessary relation, but the actual continuity of the perceived phenomena. Things, objects exist only in and for consciousness. We understand only what we ourselves construct. The thing-in-itself, whether the subject within or the object without, represents a limiting notion only, which can in no way become an object of knowledge. The problem of knowledge is the apprehension of phenomena through their reciprocal relations.¹ The instinctive desire of all thought is the desire for unity, totality, which finds its locus and

¹ Jacobi and Fichte, 1799.

explanation in the instinctive desire for perfection. But the idea of totality and unity can not be had as an object of thought, while the striving for unity has only ethical value. How then is unity of apprehension to be realized? How can the individual reach beyond the limitations of his present experience and comprehend the chaotic manifold in a single, self-contained experience? Such unity can not be had in terms of thought, Maimon continues, since thought always points beyond itself. In his further criticism of Kant, Maimon suggested a theory of knowledge which would have led beyond the limitations of Kant, but he became involved in the romantic cravings of the age, and in search after unity in terms of imagination as a sort of immediate deliverance of pure feeling. So it can be concluded with Höffding that "The romantic craving for unity, the longing to revel in the absolute, to unite thought with artistic conceptions, was too strong to permit of Maimon's critical and skeptical considerations exciting any permanent interest."

Throughout his whole life Schiller manifested a genuine delight in philosophical matters, a fact which justifies the bringing forward of his name in the present connection. He was an artist, rather than a philosopher, but took to philosophy, as he himself said, in order to prove that the artist alone is the true man and that art as such is the peculiar characteristic of man:

"Die Kunst, O Mensch, hast du allein."

Influenced at first by the ideal of freedom according to nature, an ideal borrowed from Rousseau and the English Empiricists, he finally arrived at the conception of the perfection of the individual through the harmonious development of his own powers, a development however proceeding from within. In the light of such ideal, no power of the individual is to be regarded as unfit and unclean. Nature hath joined the sensuous and the rational and let no man 'put them asunder.'¹ His problem was thus the problem of the age as to how the sensuous and the rational

¹ Vide, *Versuch über den Zusammenhang der tierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner geistigen.*

could be brought together in some harmonious way. The ideal life can not be reached by leaving the sensuous behind, nor can the highest development of the one be secured by the suppression of the other. The old-time unity between mind and nature, the one and the many, has been lost as a result of advancing culture. The bringing together of these two aspects of human experience represents the problem of the age as Schiller saw it and he sought solution in the aesthetic experience. To play is human and play is the beginning of art. Only as the individual plays is he really human in the sense of reaching a free determination of himself. All other activities of the individual arise from some particular attitude and thus set a limit upon the mind, whereas the aesthetic experience is self-contained and leads to the unlimited. The aesthetic experience is a whole in itself and completes in itself all other experiences, so that in it, the individual feels as if he were snatched out of time, beyond the 'flammatia moenia' of the world, to an experience in which all his powers function harmoniously without being moved or conditioned by external powers or needs. Only by a free play of the individual's own powers can he express himself as a totality, that 'schöne seele' in which the conflict between the sensuous and the super-sensuous is transcended.¹ Artistic activity thus mediates between the lower sensuous impulses and the higher, rational form-impulses and unites the two sides of human nature into a harmonious whole. "In all the years;" he says, "art has been the one mirror which held up to men a picture of their real self. To it we must again return if we would find deliverance from the limitations into which thought and conduct alike involve us. Science, philosophy, political and business activities appeal to individual aspects of human nature only. It is art alone that demands the whole man and which can thus restore the inner harmony of primitive nature. Man is only fully man in perceiving and creating the beautiful, which can arise only from the most complete and harmonious blending of the real and the ideal, of matter and form, of necessity and freedom."

The search after unity and totality of experience became a

¹ *Briefen über die ästhetische Erziehung, and Anmut u. Würde.*

passion with the men of the closing years of the eighteenth and the opening years of the nineteenth century. Both in political matters and in thought the unity of the spirit was everywhere seeking a more complete embodiment. As in the past, so again, men looked both to religion and to art as the means of a more adequate expression of the increased richness of life. The Critical Philosophy had left too far apart the several aspects of thought, and their unification in a higher experience became the problem of the age. The period was one of general upheaval. The past was felt to be altogether inadequate and attempts were made everywhere to construct life and thought upon a new basis. The poetry of Goethe and Schiller represent attempts to embody the profound aspirations of the times. The unity and totality which thought found itself unable to attain unto were thus attained in art, and as a consequence there was a general turning to art as a resource from the limitations and embarrassments in which thought found itself. Novalis in an unfinished work entitled *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*, held poetry to be the innermost essence of things which is, as such, a peculiar movement of the human spirit. Philosophy is, after all, only the theory of poetry and in poetry alone is the mystic word which completes and unifies our otherwise dualistic and discordant experience. But poetry was the expression of feeling rather than the embodiment of thought, so that feeling was everywhere regarded as the constructive principle of thought and life.¹ The mind of the poet is free to mould and construct sensuous images as it pleases. The distinction in thought between the sensuous and the super-sensuous is a distinction which the mind itself makes and in turn finds in art the organ of its reconciliation and transcendence. As the outcome of the attempt to throw the entire content of the intellectual life into a connected whole in terms of feeling, light was shed upon many problems and utterance given to ideas which outlived the several attempts themselves. These several movements are the subject of more extended notice in the next chapter.

¹ Cf. Erdman, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, sections, 314, 315; and R. Noyes, *Die Romantische Schule*.

CHAPTER IX.

The Development of Modern Thought from the Post-Kantian Idealists to the Present, with Reference to the Rise of the Subject-Object Dualism and its Transcendence by Postulating some Form of Immediacy of Consciousness.

The suggestion of Kant that the thing-in-itself might be identical with the pure ego, supplied a lead, not only for the freeing of thought from the conception itself, but for the determination of the Ego as the subject of all experience. It will be recalled that Kant left a hard and fast line of cleavage between the pure ego and the form and materials of knowledge. The ego, as the 'thing-in-itself,' represents a remainder as yet unaccounted for, and always the problem of the remainder becomes the problem of advancing thought. For Kant the ego was only a negative and limiting conception, but one made necessary by the demand for conscious unity. Because of this limitation, a necessary one, however, the three *Critiques* of Kant remained more or less independent of each other, and whether we agree with McCosh or not, that "Kant was distinguished more as a logical thinker and systematizer than a careful observer of what actually takes place in the mind,"¹ the fact is that he introduced a new point of view for the study of the phenomena of consciousness.

Fichte.

Kant found after the completion of the first *Critique* that his theory of knowledge was incomplete, since it could not of itself supply the transcendent element without which knowledge is impossible. The unconditioned, which lends meaning and relation to the conditioned, can not be reached in terms of pure thought. The forms are valid only in the sphere of the under-

¹ McCosh, *Realistic Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 197.

standing. The three ideas, which are regulative of experience, can not be arrived at in terms of thought. But according to Kant, what the reason can not accomplish the moral life can. The moral consciousness alone can carry thought beyond the phenomenal to that which is objectively valid and universally necessary. The organization of experience must therefore be sought for on the active side of consciousness. Later, Kant found a conflict between these two disciplines and sought their reconciliation in the aesthetic judgment as issuing from the feeling aspect of consciousness. Fichte, however, whose chief concern lay in the sphere of the practical, assumed that out of this conflict and contradiction, this dualism of self and not-self, the principle of knowledge issued. His assumption is that in the moral conflict is to be found an explanation and the source of theoretical knowledge. Kant had already insisted that the object of knowledge is the outcome of our own self-activity. The transcendental ego is the law-giver of the universe. But in either instance, the self as the pure ego was wholly lacking in content. It was mere form and its unity was predetermined. Fichte, on the other hand, whose problem was to bring to clearer consciousness the nature of this free activity of the self in knowledge and conduct, holds that the ego is both form and content. It is precisely in this notion of the self as fundamentally active that Fichte thought to find the unifying principle of philosophy. Accordingly, he insists, in opposition to Kant, that the self is not that which thinks and acts, but is itself the activity. It is, he further insists, an activity which both goes out of itself and returns upon itself. Only in activity can the self be known and only thus can it realize itself. Kant's "thing-in-itself" thus becomes the activity of the self for Fichte, so that by giving it a more positive place in philosophy its farther determination became possible.

For Fichte, the object of knowledge is determined, not beyond consciousness, but within consciousness as that which is necessary to supplement the abstract reality of the ego. The primary assumption of knowledge is not the 'I think' of Descartes, or the transcendental ego of Kant which lies behind the life of thought and conduct, nor the unity of the subjective and

objective of Reinhold, but rather the 'I act,' in which the identity of the subject and object is expressed. But the non-ego, as that which is necessary to complete the ego, is derived from the ego itself, as that which is asserted or demanded by the ego in order that it may have an object against which to assert its own consciousness. We come therefore to believe in an objective world because we have previously willed to do so. For Fichte as also for Schopenhauer and more lately Professor Royce the non-ego, as the object of knowledge, is that which the ego or subject posits that it may become completely conscious of itself. The self and the not-self, the subject and the object, are therefore correlative, since neither exists apart from the other. The ego however must assert its own reality before it can assert the reality of the sense-world. The fundamental principle of all science he says is expressed in the proposition, "Das Ich setzt ursprünglich schlechthin sein eigenes Seyn."¹ Prior to all assertions, the ego must be asserted through itself.² The material of knowledge, to account for which Kant was obliged to posit a 'thing-in-itself,' is thus found in the activity of the self-existent ego. The 'thing-in-itself' is absorbed in the subject, so that instead of the ultimate dualism that obtained from Descartes, we have an *idealistic monism*, and the laws of thought are also the laws of being.

The ego, however, which in its pure conscious activity is ground both of the empirical ego and the non-ego, remains for Fichte the mere unlimited. It is only through the ego that the non-ego is posited and the ego denied. Therefore, the ego both posits and denies itself. Both the ego and the non-ego are to be regarded as objects of an ego, which as yet, lacks determination in the Fichtean theory of knowledge. Fichte's appreciation of this, led to his third principle as an attempted synthesis of the former two. The ego, he says, asserts a distinguishable ego over against a distinguishable non-ego. *Ich setze im sich dem theilbaren Ich ein theilbares Nicht-Ich entgegen.*³

¹ *Wissenschaftslehre*, Vol. I, p. 10.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 5.

³ *Complete Works*, Vol. I, pp. 83ff.

Fichte recognizes three approaches to the Absolute. The first has already been referred to in the third principle of the 'Science of Knowledge' which required an ego over and above the mutual limitations of the divisible ego and non-ego. Since, he argues, the individual self is constantly asserting the not-self, and the not-self, in consequence, is required to take successively higher points of view, there must of necessity be a 'universal principle' which shall at once include all these activities. But he also concludes that this all-embracing principle must be of the general nature of the ego as the form of self-activity to which everything in the universe is referred. Fichte also reaches, in the same way, the conception of an Absolute thought in which all finite processes of thought are made complete. Still further, he conceives of the Absolute as the harmony of freedom and law, in which sense God only is Absolute and therefore the one Reality. The ego is thus identified with God from whom, in a somewhat Neo-Platonic fashion, all reality is derived. In God, therefore, as the Absolute Ego, there is something more than self-consciousness, and only in religion, as the life of blessedness and love, can the individual ego become one with the Absolute Ego.

Schelling.

What Schelling attempted to do represented the next step in the Post-Kantian Philosophy. The conflict which Kant relegated to the world of 'things-in-themselves' is carried over by Fichte into the consciousness of the individual. For Kant, the conflict was both unavoidable and insoluble, and came to an end only in the Infinite. Fichte on the other hand, assumes that out of these conflicts and contradictions the principle of thought and conduct is born. The 'thing-in-itself,' of Kant, becomes the activity of the self for Fichte. The object of knowledge as the non-ego is not as Kant assumed, a substance lying outside of consciousness whose qualities the ego becomes aware of, but the assertion of the ego of that which is necessary for its own realization. The world thus becomes the product of our own consciousness, and the contradiction is to be looked upon, not as a paralogism, but as the postulate of moral con-

duct. Nature is the material of duty, and without limit there would be no moral life.¹ Every presentation involves a conflict, but this conflict is not to be interpreted as coming from an existence determined wholly apart from consciousness, but rather a conflict falling within consciousness, and is in itself the very making of thought and moral conduct. The ego is thus both form and content, and the processes of the world of nature become its own history.

But in addition to the conflict between reason and desire, the self and the not-self, which Fichte brought together in an immediacy of consciousness,² there is also the conflict between the individual and the physical world. The philosophy of Schelling represents an attempt to deal with this problem. For Fichte the not-self is a projection of the self, so that his philosophy represents an attempt to identify the two terms of the dualism by assuming an identity of process. The not-self thus becomes a negative concept very comparable to the 'Ding-an-sich' of Kant. One can not avoid asking, as Professor Royce has asked, why the ego interrupts its unbroken activity in order to posit the non-ego? Why posit the non-ego at all and why posit one that necessitates a struggle upon the part of the ego?³ Finally it must be said that for Fichte, Nature as the non-ego was merely a limitation of the ego and at the most only a means of the exercise of the individual's moral activities. The self is not therefore self-controlling and the not-self of Fichte as that in which the self seeks sanction and support for its constructions remains, like the play object of the child, 'pragmatisch' in character.⁴

Schelling, on the contrary, holds that the not-self is given in nature. The self and the not-self are therefore to be identified, not by the assumption of the identity of process but of an identity of presented content. All nature is dual.⁵ Both in nature and

¹ Höffding, *op. cit.* Vol. II, p. 157.

² Vide especially his lectures, *Über das Wesen des Gelehrten*.

³ On the psychology of the 'Dualism of Inner Struggle,' see Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 247f.

⁴ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 119.

⁵ Cf. *System des transcendentalen Idealismus*, p. 190.

spirit the essential principle of development is thought; but while in Nature thought is seen struggling toward and finally reaching consciousness, in Spirit there is the progress from consciousness to the highest reaches of self-conscious thought. Nature, for Schelling, is 'slumbering thought' and exhibits the three great modifications, Mechanism, Light and Organic Life, in each of which is present the fundamental antithesis required for all activity.¹ The Spirit likewise, has passed through a series of similar stages from theoretical thought, through practical, to aesthetic or art-consciousness. In each of these three stages a characteristic antithesis appears, which disappears only with the appearance of a more comprehensive mode of consciousness.

The conflict in the thought of Schelling is one that issues from a single principle which successively appears as nature and spirit. In the second period of his activity he was led to the position that this common principle, while somehow distinct from both nature and spirit, is, nevertheless, the ground of both. The conclusion reached is that there is one principle which manifests itself in the two terms of the dualistic experience. But Schelling was unable to carry out this conclusion, so that the one principle, the substratum of subject and object, which he designates as the 'Identical Basis of all Differences,' is as much lacking in positive content and determination as the 'Absolute Self' of Fichte and the 'Ding-an-sich' of Kant.²

The epistemological problem presented itself to Kant as a conflict between the form and content of knowledge, which was overcome in the aesthetic judgment. With Fichte the conflict was between the concrete individual of the Ego and the Absolute, which was also transcended in the immediacy of the religious consciousness. It is important to note that in both instances the principle of transcendence issued from the affective-volitional aspect of consciousness. It was a resort to the *Gemüth*. The active aspect of consciousness was always running in advance of thought; desire refusing to be held within the limitations of

¹ *Über den wahren Begriff der Naturphilosophie*, Collected Works, Vol. I, p. 85f.

² Cf. Schelling, *Philosophie der Mythologie*.

reason. In the instance of the Romanticists, and even of Fichte, the emotional aspect of consciousness seized and determined the entire field of experience. But every emotional experience tends toward an aesthetic moment, which becomes, for the time, our final interpretation of the universe and our means of evaluation. But since the aesthetic object is not merely the object of thought, its full content must be sought elsewhere than in reason. In the present instance, as in the previous ones, because of lack of content for the construction of the aesthetic object, consciousness turns to the past and uses materials similarly used in earlier periods. Schelling therefore in his search for a more positive filling of his concept of Identity turned to the Ideas of Plato, the Pantheism of Bruno, and the Mysticism of Böhme. To his philosophy of nature and the transcendental philosophy of spirit, Schelling now adds a philosophy of identity in which all things are seen under the Spinozistic 'sub specie aeternatis' and is thus lead back to the Absolute Identity in which all plurality is transcended. In the aesthetic consciousness, he concludes, we are at once both finite and infinite, and our final interpretation of the world is artistic rather than scientific; the beautiful is the perfect realization of the union of the subjective and objective—an identity toward which thought is moving but which art alone can accomplish. In art, therefore, the antithesis between the real and the ideal, between reason and desire, between thought and conduct, disappears, so that art becomes the solution of all the problems of reflection.¹

Hegel.

With Hegel the epistemological problem is opened anew and instead of the postulate of the Absolute Indifference of Schelling, he proposes the Absolute of immanent activity. The Absolute is not substance but self-conscious Spirit, and the unity of consciousness is the principle from which all things issue and to which they are to be referred for their final explanation. From the Cartesian opposition of mind and matter, neither Kant, nor Schelling, nor Fichte, was able to free himself. In

¹ Falckenberg, *History of Mod. Phil.*, p. 456.

each instance the epistemological problem was occasioned by the presence of an extraneous principle, so that the solution of the problem thus presented could be found only in going beyond consciousness. But for Hegel, the conscious spirit is the real presupposition and the ideal end of all things. According to Schelling, subject and object proceed from the Absolute, which is, in succession, nature and spirit, whereas with Hegel, the Absolute becomes successively subject and object, nature and spirit, or in the words of Turner, Hegel's Absolute is a "process rather than a source, an infinite of activity rather than one of static immensity and undifferentiated plenitude, a maelstrom rather than a sea of unruffled rest."¹

Fichte attempted to solve the epistemological problem set by Kant by reducing the 'thing-in-itself' to one of its aspects, while Schelling made the 'thing-in-itself' an Absolute identity. The motive in each instance was to find a common principle from which the dualism of subject and object issued. The limitation of each attempt is to be found in the necessity of seeking the support and sanction of thought and conduct beyond consciousness which could be realized only in terms of some mystical or ecstatic immediacy. The advance in Hegel is to be seen in the making of the Absolute the common source of the ego and the non-ego. In fact Hegel makes the process itself the Absolute.

This movement, however, has its own law and goal. These are not due to the action of some external agency but are immanent in the process. Reason is the law and self-conscious reason is the goal of the process. Reason, therefore, and the Absolute are identical and thought is the source and sum of all reality. Being is only thought realized and becoming is only the development of thought. Philosophy can not transcend rational experience since only the rational is real and philosophy must be in harmony with actuality and experience.²

According to Hegel philosophy starts with the 'idea,' as the system of reason and the sum of reality. This all-comprehen-

¹ Turner, *Hist. of Philosophy*, p. 562.

² Wallace, *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 10.

sive idea follows a law of development whose end is determined within the process and in the course of its development passes through three definite stages which constitute the three divisions of philosophy. In each of these three divisions, there is a further triadic division, so that each constitutes, as it were, a microcosm, while the three make up an all-inclusive macrocosm. It necessarily follows that the first, as dealing with the idea as the whole of reality, will be of the greatest importance in the Hegelian system. Logic, therefore, as the science of things held in thought, and thus identical with metaphysics, has to do with the several stages through which the idea passes, from the earliest stage of immediacy, in which there is no distinction between being and non-being, to the stage in which the idea from the stage of reflection passes back into itself again in another and higher immediacy.

The 'notion,' according to Hegel, is *being* returned to its own immediacy or, as he himself puts it, the notion is the principle of freedom, the power of substance self-realized. As containing all the earlier categories, the notion is the truth of being—the realization of totality and must be regarded as *semblant* since the 'other' of the notion is not really another. The contradiction thus involved between the notion as idea, and that which is not notion, except in a semblant way, disappears in the idea as the absolute notion, which Hegel defines as the union of the notion and its objectivity, of the real and the ideal, of soul and body. Truth is the absolute notion become its own object in the theoretical sphere. The Good is the absolute notion become its own object in the practical realm. But when the notion returns to itself from the limitations of the true and the good, the finiteness of cognition and volition, it becomes the absolute idea. This represents the goal of the logical processes.

In its next stage, the Idea passes into otherness and becomes nature, which Hegel defines as 'the Idea in state of otherness,' a state midway between the immediacy of reason as notion, and the reintegrated immediacy of reason as fully realized in the spirit. In nature the Idea has been particularized and externalized and natural science is justified in regarding phenomena as isolated realities and in dealing with the universe in piecemeal

fashion rather than as a whole. But philosophy takes a higher point of view, and represents the Idea as attaining again its unity and identity in man, who is the goal of nature's processes. In the individual, as in nature, the Idea passes through a three-fold stage of development as subjective, objective and absolute Spirit.

By the subjective mind, Hegel refers to the soul, consciousness, and the several psychical processes. The highest realization of this phase of mind is to be found in the "free will as intelligence."¹ But this freedom is acquired only as the mind comes to complete self-consciousness. At the first mind was wholly immersed in nature. When it came to the recognition of itself as the Ego, it divested itself of nature and as theoretical mind made itself the determiner of its own intuitions and thoughts. Then, by means of the impulses, desires and inclinations, it proceeded to determine its own contents thus arriving at a complete self-determination, which is freedom. The entire procedure is, however, purely theoretical, as contrasted with the purely practical character of the manifestations of the objective mind. In both instances, the mind is in a state of otherness, as Hegel would say, meaning doubtless that whatever control the mind exercises in either the theoretical or the practical sphere, is *mediate* in character.

But the Idea passes into a state of otherness, only that it may return enriched and deepened into itself again. The absolute mind, in which the antithesis between the theoretical and the practical, the true and the good, is transcended, represents the complete realization of the world-process. It is for Hegel, a conception of the ideal in which the soul becomes completely unified with all its finite manifestations in a richer and deeper mind. In brief the Absolute mind is the mind with all its meaning realized.

But that in which the mind finds itself fully realized reveals itself as an Ideal under three forms—as the beauty of Art, as Divine Perfection in God, and finally as the Absolute of Philosophy. The Ideal thus becomes the sphere in which the subject

¹ *Encyclopedia*, sec. 481.

knows itself as reconciled both with the world of nature and the world of spirit. Such an absolute experience, Hegel like Schelling finds in the aesthetic consciousness and defines a work of art as the representation of the Idea in sensuous existence, which satisfies alike the demands of theoretical and practical knowledge and elevates the mind above all forms of finitude to the highest enjoyment.¹ But all reality is development and the principle of the true philosophy is neither the abstract understanding, which finds itself limited to the phenomenal world, nor a mystical intuition which attempts to reach the highest knowledge by an easy and quick leap, but reason itself as the faculty of concrete concepts. The reconciliation of the several antitheses of thought, is therefore, neither impossible nor immediate from the outset of thought, but is the result of development. Reason neither sets the opposition nor denies it but proceeds to reconcile the antithesis, which is the necessity of all development. The object of philosophy is the absolute as the living subject which posits distinctions and returns from them to a higher synthesis. Each such synthesis becomes, in turn, the pedestal for a still higher synthesis, a platform upon which higher modes of reality may arise.²

Reality is replete with contradictions, but is nevertheless rational. The contradictions in which thought involves itself are not due to an a-logical *moment* which falls beyond the thought process, but show rather the incentive and possibility of all thought. These contradictions are not to be annulled by a return to a more primitive consciousness,³ but rather to be conserved by thinking the contradictory concepts together in a higher synthesis. For Hegel, the absolute thought, as the merging of the subjective and the objective, passes also through a three-fold stage of development, and art, which is the absolute in sensuous form, the infinite in the finite, must yield to religion in which the sensuous element of the former passes into a higher state of consciousness and becomes the inward life of the

¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Fine Art* (Bosanquet's trs.), p. 13.

² Cf. Baldwin's 'Theory of Genetic Modes' in *Development and Evolution*, ch. xvii and xix.

³ Falckenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 492.

emotional nature. As art was the reconciliation of the sensuous and the Ideal, a reconciliation in which the sensuous prevailed, so religion is the reconciliation of feeling and thought in which the emotional nature holds the chief place.

But in religion, the contradiction is between thought and the emotional nature, which philosophy alone is able to resolve. Philosophy thus becomes the highest form under which the Absolute manifests itself. There is here a complete return to thought, the circle is made complete, and the process may repeat itself but can not reach a higher stage. The contradiction in the religious consciousness provokes free speculative thought with which logic or the science of thought as it is in and for itself, has to do. Having thus returned to itself, there can be no further development and the process can only repeat itself. The Idea, as the Absolute, is the process of development actualized, and philosophy, as the science of the actualization of the Absolute Idea is, "The highest, freest and wisest phase of the union of the subjective and the objective mind and the ultimate goal of all development."

The absolute Idea as the synthesis of the objective and the subjective notion becomes the platform for a further determination upon the part of the Idea itself. The syntheses thus far effected are to be explained as imaginative constructions from the images and ideas derived from the data of intuition. They are still, as Hegel calls them, more or less concrete, individualized creations. But with the rise of the absolute Idea, thought has been so far perfected as to no longer need help for its intuitions. As reason, its first movement was the appropriation of the immediate datum which makes it universal; but with the attainment of the absolute Idea, it proceeds to give the character of an existent to the materials thus far perfected by the process of 'Auto-intuition.' A construction of such character can arise only when thought has reached that stage of its unfoldment at which its ideas are accepted as its own and which, under its own positive coefficients of control, can be used for the sake of the embodiment of further meanings.

The absolute Idea appears successively as Nature and Mind, thus furnishing the subject-matter of two independent disci-

plines. Nature is the Idea (reason) in the state of otherness—a state mid-way between the immediacy of the notion and the immediacy of reason as fully realized. In nature, the Idea has once more lost its unity, and appears as a series of independent particulars. It passes through a series of stages and at last comes to self-consciousness in the individual. Here once more it passes through the three-fold stages of development. Defining the formal essence of the mind as freedom, Hegel holds that it is only as the mind arrives at complete self-consciousness, that the mind attains perfect freedom. Only by successive acts of knowledge does the mind emancipate itself from foreign control. The recognition of the ego means the attainment of inner freedom of determination. Having assumed the determination of its own ideas, intuitions and thoughts, the mind proceeds by means of the impulses and desires to fashion this content for the sake of the satisfaction of theoretical and practical interests. But freedom thus attained must be realized, perfected, and this can be accomplished only through necessity, as its opposite. For this reason alone, the mind objectifies itself in law, the family and the state. But in the most perfect objectification the mind is limited. The subjective mind can not always find itself perfectly expressed in the objective. The former is always running in advance of the latter and making demands which the latter can not satisfy.

But since the antithesis is of the mind's own making, it can also be synthesized by the mind, so that the mind, having objectified itself, completes the circle of development by returning to itself again, thus becoming identical with itself and as being subject to itself alone, becomes the Absolute Mind, as embodied in art, religion and philosophy. The theory of art has already been dealt with, and it needs only to be added in the present connection, that it again becomes the organ of immediacy and supplies a synthesis of nature and mind, which at once becomes the platform of a higher construction as embodied in religion and philosophy.¹ The latter, however, becomes for Hegel the reconciliation of art in which the sen-

¹ Hegel, *Introduction to Philosophy of Fine Art* (Bosanquet's trs.), p. 13.

suous prevailed and religion in which the emotions prevailed. In both art and religion the truth is revealed symbolically, whereas in philosophy, it is revealed as reason, and is therefore superior to both art and religion.

It has been shown, I think, that the aesthetic consciousness in the treatment of Hegel developed with the epistemological and that it became in every instance the organ of a higher synthesis. In the instance of the epistemological problem of the reflective consciousness, as Hegel regards reflection, the aesthetic consciousness again becomes that phase of experience in which higher aspect of reality is immediately disclosed. Art is thus the Absolute Mind disclosed, not as something behind the sensuous form, but in the sensuous form, giving it its form and meaning. Art, therefore, is not a matter of inference, but something to which to come immediately.¹ In religion also reality is manifested in an immediacy of consciousness. In ethics the mind is always confronted with the knowledge that beyond the present act, lies another, which has to be accomplished. Duty always connotes and involves another, thus illustrating the relationship of the one and the many. The moral consciousness is capable of endless progress and the self could never reach its goal through it. But in religion, which is the surrender of the will of the individual, and the acceptance of the will of God, the self finds its true life, thus ending the moral struggle by the attainment of the end of the moral life in an immediacy of consciousness. But Hegel, whose temperament was wholly idealistic, sees here a contradiction, which can be overcome only in terms of pure thought. Nevertheless one can not read the *Philosophy of Fine Art* without retaining the conviction, that the aesthetic consciousness, as the organ of transcendence, does after all afford the only ultimate view of reality. We do not get rid of our finiteness in our philosophizing, but in art and religion, according to Hegel, we come into immediate knowledge of those deeper aspects of reality which are in their nature ultimate and thus form the very basis of our finite existence.

¹ Ibid., p. 15.

That the rational alone is real, implies that reason has no limitations. Everything real is ultimately analyzable into terms of rational thought. How inadequate this conception of reality is, is to be inferred from the reactions that at once arose against it with their characteristic insistence upon the importance of the non-rational. The attempt to bring the whole of reality under a single principle certainly represents the goal of philosophic endeavor, but such principle can not be reached by neglecting or ignoring either of the several aspects and demands of the conscious life.

It can not be denied that the attempt of Hegel to completely unify the element of the Kantian philosophy represents the most comprehensive view of the problems of philosophy hitherto found. No department of human knowledge was untouched by it and there was none that did not feel its influence. By making thought 'common' rather than purely individual, as it had hitherto been, and by making so large use of the notion of 'development,' his philosophy was made to represent the embodiments of the highest aspirations of the last century.

But his attempt to bring the whole of reality under one principle of the mind brought about its immediate failure. Immediately after his death there arose a certain mystical and pessimistic reaction against his system. The vast and rapid accumulation of scientific knowledge, the increased daring of the human mind and the larger control over the external world during the past century, tended to the weakening of the rationalistic explanation of the universe. Predicates were daily arising that could not be analyzed out of the subject and reality was coming to be felt as larger than thought. Subject and object could no longer be kept upon the same basis of reality in pure thought and the subject at once sought to erect its own object; and since thought has failed resource again is sought in the affective-volitional aspect of consciousness. With Schopenhauer, the Will-activity of the mind, is brought into prominence, as the creator of the world.

According to Schopenhauer, the world is not a mere appearance, as Kant thought, but rather a world whose reality is to be sought in a blind force struggling for self-conscious assertion.

The Will thus becomes the 'thing-in-itself.' Will, not thought, is the ultimate principle of the mind and thought is but the reflection of will.¹ The affective-conative tendencies, as the struggle of inner forces for objective expression, is to be made the true basis of philosophy and the only approach to the Absolute.

Schopenhauer's epistemology is summed up in the expression 'Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung.' The ideas are not to be thought of as given archetypes of an external reality, but presentations created by the subject from the principle of 'sufficient reason' (*zureichenden Grunde*). The innermost reality of the world is to be sought in subjective struggle, as an unconscious force behind the world of appearance. But by insisting that the innermost reality of the Absolute as Will can never be known to consciousness, Schopenhauer, at once reduces his system to a mystic pantheism.²

But having defined the Absolute Schopenhauer attempts a definition of the world of presented fact. This he finds to be only successive modifications of the will. Each successive objectification of the will represents an embodiment of the 'will-to-be.' The world of presentations thus comes to be a reflection of the will and, therefore, dependent upon the subject which perceives it. The subject can not get beyond itself. The object of knowledge is a wholly relative thing, created by the subject under the *a priori* laws of thought.³

But while the world of presentation is wholly determined by the subject as the knower, consciousness nevertheless points to a higher world which does not depend upon the subject. This world, which to Kant remained wholly beyond the limits of experience, is, according to Schopenhauer forced upon us in an act of belief. To know one's own self necessitates the knowledge of things beyond one's self. Neither subject nor object can stand alone. Either would be meaningless apart from the other. The self is, therefore, both the subject and object of thought. "I know myself," he continues, "as the object

¹ *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Bk. IV.

² Perry, *Approach to Philosophy*, p. 290; Höffding, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 235 ff.

³ *Die Welt als Wille u. Vorstellung*, Vol. I, pp. 3 ff.

of thought of others and thus an object of thought along with other objects." The chasm between thinking subject and objects of thought is thus partially transcended.¹

In making the subject and object of knowledge alike the products of will, Schopenhauer followed in the path marked out by Fichte. He makes will the essence of the world and also the nature of man, so that the world can be known only through man. The common essence of each is however grounded, not in appearance, but in the 'thing-in-itself.' Will thus becomes both the phenomenal and the noumenal. It is precisely here that the epistemological problem of Schopenhauer really appears. How can will, which is known by means of ideas, be identical with the will as the 'thing-in-itself?' He appears to have appreciated, what had not hitherto been appreciated, that the phenomenal and the noumenal can not be separated in any absolute way. But despite the fact that his conception of the will is elementary and his general psychology romantic rather than scientific, Schopenhauer himself realized that the will is dualistic and hence a problem within itself, which the will can not of itself solve. Knowledge is brought into being as the servant of the will but can not in any possible manner influence the will. Moreover the will remains identical throughout all stages of the development of knowledge. Only therefore in a higher type of knowledge can will escape from its characteristic bondage, the *Urphänomen*, in which the will as it is in itself is presented. But since the *Urphänomen* can not be reached in terms of ideas, Schopenhauer turns to the aesthetic experience and finds that it is only in art as the goal of human striving that all pain and suffering cease. Knowledge is always proceeding from one ground to another and will is ever striving anxiously forward after that which it is not, but in artistic contemplation, in which all things are seen *sub specie aeternatis*, the terrible struggle for existence is ended. Defining the epistemological problem of Schopenhauer as the unification and realization of the will as a dualistic experience, the solution reached was in terms of the aesthetic experience, as an experience of an immediacy of will.

¹ Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 736ff.

It is unnecessary to pursue this historical investigation further, since the characteristic epistemological theories of more recent times are the subject of critical investigation in an earlier chapter.¹ Until the idealistic reaction a half century ago psychology was rather epistemology, and the subject of experience was interpreted in terms of content established apart from the mind perceiving it. That psychology has so long been in the 'gall of metaphysics and the bonds of ontology' is due to the failure to apply to the material with which it has to do the same methods—and in the same spirit—which have for a long time been applied to the treatment of external phenomena. The failure of the current epistemological theories is to be found in the fact that the mind, as the subject term of the currently recognized dualism, is not treated as being under definite and continuous laws of development. As in the earlier periods already discussed, the mind as the inner aspect of the dualism of current discussion remains the 'undigested' element in the theory of knowledge. But our point has been to show that in the earlier dualistic experiences solution was found by carrying over into the inner the coefficients under which the outer was held and guaranteed and thus made material for the embodiment of inner purposes. The failure to follow out such precedent in the treatment of the epistemological problem presented by the subject-object dualism, has motived the setting up of a number of defective and limited theories of knowledge. Within a dualistic experience it is possible always for consciousness to proceed in either of two directions, so that we are to expect materialistic and mechanical theories on the one hand and idealistic and humanistic theories on the other. But the several theories which proceed by emphasizing the one term of the dualistic experience to the exclusion of the other have been weighed in the balance and found wanting, and as after similar attempts at a solution of earlier dualisms, so now, there is a general movement toward a more idealistic solution.² Repeated attempts have been made to identify the self with some content, either intellectual or volitional, and in either instance, it has been found that neither

¹ Chapter iv.

² Cf. Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. xiv.

thought nor volition is able to completely harmonize its own content. The conclusion has thus been reached, that reality as an absolute experience, can be neither thought nor will, but some form of immediacy of experience, in which both alike are completed. So long as thought remains thought it is necessarily less than the whole of reality which it seeks to know, so that reality must always contain an aspect which can not be apprehended in thought. Moreover thought is always general, while reality must necessarily be also singular and immediate. But while thought is always seeking to comprehend the singular, it is found that the singular can not as such become the actual content of thought and so remains as an 'intent' meaning in consciousness.¹

And likewise of the will. For as has been indicated, the will implies the possession of and the motivation by the contrast between existence as it at present is and as it should be for the actualization and realization of ends in experience. It also, like thought, implies a separation of content and its references,² while reality can only be found in an experience in which these two aspects are finally united in an immediacy of will, an experience in which, as Professor Royce says, 'the will wills its own will,' or better, an experience in which the will by willing fulfills its own will. But an object in which the will finds itself fully reflected is necessarily an ideal object and therefore a form of 'intent' rather than content. Hence in the case of the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists alike, reality, as an absolute experience in which thought loses its generality and mediacy and will its privacy and intent of struggle, is not reached. For the one, reality remains a-logical, for the other a-volitional. In short each fails to reduce the term of the dualism embraced by the other.

Both types of epistemological theory agree that reality, as the object of knowledge, must issue from the subject, while the mystical resort in the case of each appears in the attempt to set up an ideal object as an intent meaning, which somehow falls beyond the process to which it makes its exclusive appeal.

¹ See Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, chaps. xiv, xv.

² Prof. Baldwin's dualism of 'fact and end,' *Ibid.*, Vol. II, chaps. xiii and xiv.

Such experience may be found in undifferentiated and unrelated feeling, as an experience in which the several aspects of thought and volition are merged in an unbroken immediacy; hence both alike tend to set up some such experience as the type of reality in an absolute experience.

Closer analysis reveals the fact that these two types of epistemological theory represent severally aspects of human experience, either of which is meaningless and valueless apart from the other. The apparently empty and meaningless outcome of these several attempts point the way, at least, in which the future solution of the epistemological problem of reflection lies. Both thought and conduct are implicated in any fruitful and significant theory of reality. Some way out must be found whereby consciousness may regain its immediacy, without breaking with its entire life of achievement, and thus falling short of the full meaning of thought and volition. The mystical (in the sense of affectivistic), outcome of the Intellectualistic and the Voluntaristic theories of knowledge and reality, is to be inferred from the fact that neither can reach an absolute experience without breaking with the meanings already acquired in consciousness. But why stop the constructive process at this point? Since the dualism falls wholly within consciousness, is in fact of consciousness' own making, why not look also within consciousness for a higher mode of construction in which the fragmentary and limited meanings are transcended? Moreover it has been the burden of the present attempt to indicate the fact that consciousness has reached the dualism of subject and object only by transcending a series of earlier dualistic experiences. Each such experience found its completion by a process of reading forward of the meanings then present in consciousness. The transcending of the earlier dualistic experiences was not reached by ignoring the meanings then present, so that the resulting construction, represented in each instance, not an empty, but the fullest and richest possible experience. If Mysticism means a theory of knowledge and reality reached and realized only in unanalyzed and undifferentiated feeling, our outcome is not mystical; for the aesthetic experience in the several stages of its development brings unity and

completion to an otherwise incomplete and dualistic experience by setting up, in a schematic way, a farther and richer meaning. In terms of the semblant consciousness a way has been found whereby consciousness may transcend itself without ignoring or breaking with its already acquired meanings. Lacking such method of treatment of meanings already present in consciousness, both Bradley and Royce are driven in the end to set up a form of 'sheer sentience' and 'volitional immediacy' in which the essential character and meaning alike of the Intellect and Will are wanting. The conclusion of the present attempt is, that in the aesthetic experience we have a mode of conscious construction in which the dualistic character of thought and will are transcended without sacrificing the essential meanings of either.¹

Such a solution of the epistemological problem presented by the dualistic character of reflective experience, can be reached only when both types of experience, isolated by the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists respectively for methodological purposes, become the subject-matter of a new and higher mode of conscious construction. Each successive determination of thought has been reached only by an increasing determinateness of its two-fold aspect, content and control. At each higher mode of conscious determination both the content and the control are deepened and furthered, the former by the taking over into the objective, as a sphere of guaranteed content, what had before been inner as the undetermined, the latter by a process of retreating into a further 'inner' whose kernel is the sense of agency and control. The significance of reflection is that it marks that stage in the development of consciousness at which the self, as the presupposition of control, is finally set over against the whole of its content as made up respectively of mind and body. To reduce matter to mind or mind to matter or both to some mystical principle, leaves the epistemological problem unsolved, since the dualism of subject and object remains unmediated.

¹ Vide, Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 413; Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 172; Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Vol. I, p. 42; and Baldwin, *Thought and Things* (Vol. I, Preface, and Vol. II, Appendix, II).

It has been the purpose of this historical investigation to show that thought, alike in the individual and the race, has reached the mode of reflection with its characteristic dualism of subject and object, only by passing through a series of earlier dualistic experiences in each of which the epistemological problem arose anew, while the solution of such experience was sought by a resort to the aesthetic experience. The epistemological consciousness is always dualistic, while the demand of consciousness is for a self-centered and self-controlled world. The unification and objectification of the world, in terms of the inner control factor, became the epistemological problem within each of the earlier dualistic experiences, and remains so when reflection is reached. But, regarding a dualistic experience as an incomplete experience, a conclusion reached both by the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists, it has already been shown that such experience can complete itself only by the establishment of a farther experience, which, while not as yet realized, can nevertheless be accepted and treated as '*if it were already realized.*' The object of knowledge in terms of which our finite and fragmentary experience is completed and interpreted is, as Kant already pointed out, the object of a possible experience, *mögliche Erfahrung*. Knowledge is, therefore, a process of idealization. Thought as mediate and relational, and therefore finite, is always seeking an Other as its own completion. But unless the "Absolute is content with making eyes at itself in a mirror, or like a squirrel in a cage satisfied in revolving in a circle of its own perfections,"¹ the Other must fall beyond the process of thought. Thought and fact are not identical, and for thought to make them so means the destruction of thought itself. Here then is the dilemma of the Intellectualists: How can thought posit an Other, which, while falling beyond present experience, is not independent of all experience? Bradley realizes the precise character of the problem set by a thorough-going Intellectualism and reaches the conclusion that "thought to get beyond its relational character and thus reach something more than truth must be absorbed into a fuller experience."

Thought can, therefore, desire a consummation in which it is lost, a whole of experience in which all the elements of finite experience would be contained in an immediacy which is nothing else than 'sentient experience.'¹

The Voluntaristic theory of knowledge as most adequately worked out by Royce is brought face to face with the same dilemma, viz: How can the idea as an internal meaning set up an Other as an external meaning in which the internal meaning is determinately embodied? "In seeking its object," says Professor Royce, "any idea whatever seeks absolutely nothing but its own explicit, and, in the end, complete determination as this conscious purpose embodied in this one way. The complete content of the idea's own purpose is the only object of which the idea can ever take note. *This alone is the Other that is sought.*" "What is, or what is real, is as such the complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas." The Other of thought thus becomes a further meaning in which all partial and fragmentary meanings are completely embodied, but the fact remains that Professor Royce has nowhere shown how it is possible for the ideas as finite meanings to set up a completed experience and to treat it '*as if it were completely present.*'² Thus despite the difference of the premises from which they start, both the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists arrive at the same conclusion, viz., that experience whether of the intellectual or volitional type can complete itself only in a further experience; but lacking a method whereby present meanings may be treated for the sake of further meaning both arrive at a more or less empty and meaningless type of reality as an absolute experience.

But the extremity of the intellectual and the voluntaristic becomes the opportunity of the aesthetic, which appears with the epistemological, and functions always as the organ of world-transcendence and world-completion. In the instance of the earlier dualistic experiences, reconciliation and completion were secured, not in terms of meanings already acquired, but always

¹ Ibid, ch. xv.

² Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Lecture VII, on 'The Internal and External Meaning of Ideas.'

by a schematic treatment of meanings already present for the sake of further meaning. Each such reconciliation and unification represents an increasing determinateness of the two aspects of thought already distinguished as content and control, and the resulting immediacy of experience is due to the erection of a 'semblant' object under the presupposition of 'inner' control with which the 'inner' as the subject of experience identifies itself by a process variously named but coming into general recognition of 'Einfühling'¹ (Lipps), 'absorption'² (Mitchell), and 'sympathetic or semblant projection'³ (Baldwin).

With the rise of reflection, and the subject-object dualism, the subject term functioning in each instance as presupposition of a control, there is a re-distribution of contents for the sake of common reflection. Two types of meaning are present and issue respectively in two types of judgment as the embodiments of the theoretical and the practical interest respectively. But it has been pointed out that in both thinking and acting the subject is more than either thought or conduct. Neither type of experience is able to render the whole of its own peculiar meaning, while at the same time it tends to minimize the meaning peculiar to the other. The essential point in the present connection is that both types of experience are dualistic and remain so, so that to destroy this dualistic character means to deprive both of whatever meaning they have acquired. Any postulate of reality as an absolute experience reached by such procedure will necessarily be a-dualistic, whether expressed in terms of logical identity or mystical contemplation.

But our contention has been, and here the matter must end, that consciousness has developed from its first immediacy, as an a-dualistic experience, to the full-fledged dualism of subject and object, only by a process of semblant construction, in which the two aspects of thought are merged in a new and higher immediacy. The 'that' and the 'what,' the existential reference and the related content, have arisen and developed together. The resulting epistemological problem becomes the reconcilia-

¹ Lipps, *Raumaesthetic u. geometrisch-optische Täuschungen*.

² Mitchell, *Growth and Structure of the Mind*, Lect. viii.

³ Baldwin, *Unpublished Lectures on Aesthetics*.

tion of these two factors of thought; but it can not be reached by assigning the primacy to either. It is precisely in such procedure that we are to seek for the rise of the partial and inadequate epistemological theories of the present time. The conviction is thus forced upon us that the epistemological problem can be solved only by the setting up of a mode of conscious construcion in which the two aspects of thought are reconciled and thus unified. Such mode of conscious determination is found in the aesthetic experience, hence the conclusion is reached that the epistemological and the aesthetic have arisen together and that the latter has functioned always as the organ of world unification and completion, thus satisfying the demands of the two-fold aspect of all thought.

From this point of view, the aesthetic experience becomes an absolute experience, but not in the sense that it is a static and meaningless experience. Here I think is found the fruitfulness of the present point of view in contrast with the Intellectualistic or Voluntaristic or pure Affectivistic. New dualisms will continue to rise but as Professor Baldwin has shown, such dualisms will be those of fact and not of meaning.¹ Both types of meaning are now objective to the self as the presupposition of control, so that we can conclude with the statement of Professor Baldwin that with the rise of the aesthetic experience consciousness has a way of finding its dynamics intelligible as a truthful and so far a static meaning, and also of acting upon its established truths as immediate and so far dynamic satisfactions; thus reaching the only tenable absolute as an experience in which all contrasted meanings as relative and instrumental are removed. If we define the epistemological problem as the problem of 'transcending the subject,' of 'constituting the totality which we call the real world,' of "forming the idea of an absolute experience in which phenomenal distinctions are merged, a whole become immediate at a higher stage without losing any richness," or finally "the complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas," and further define the aesthetic experience as a mode of

¹ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, Appendix, II.

conscious determination in which a higher mode of immediacy is reached by the merging of the dualisms and relativisms of thought, light is at once thrown upon the resort to the aesthetic experience in the history of the development of the thought of the race; and the thesis here presented, that the aesthetic has arisen with the epistemological and functions as the epistemological principle of world-completion and interpretation is confirmed.

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